Sanchez v. State of Wyoming

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT September 15, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
HENRY SANCHEZ,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 13-8077
(D.C. No. 2:12-CV-00182-SWS)
STATE OF WYOMING, (D. Wyo.)
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
Before GORSUCH, PORFILIO, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Henry Sanchez seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the
district court’s denial of his habeas application filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He
argues that his convictions are attributable to his trial counsel’s ineffective
assistance. The district court thoroughly addressed his contentions, appropriately
applying the deferential standard of review under § 2254(d), and concluded that
Mr. Sanchez did not meet the requirements for habeas relief. We deny a COA and
dismiss this appeal.
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Mr. Sanchez is entitled to a COA only if he makes “a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). And he can do that only
by showing that reasonable jurists could debate (or agree on) a different resolution of
the habeas petition or the merit of further proceedings. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484 (2000). Although Mr. Sanchez recites the Slack standard of review in his
application for a COA, he fails to apply it to the district court’s analysis.
The district court reviewed Mr. Sanchez’s ineffective assistance claim under
§ 2254(d), which permitted the court to grant him habeas relief only if the state
court’s adjudication of his claim
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Mr. Sanchez asserts that the district court should have
reviewed his ineffective assistance claim de novo because the Wyoming Supreme
Court did not adjudicate his claim “on the merits,” as required by § 2254(d). But that
section applies even if the state court summarily denies a claim. See Cullen v.
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1402 (2011). And here the Wyoming Supreme Court
went further and addressed Mr. Sanchez’s allegations of ineffective assistance. It
held that he did not show that his counsel’s performance was deficient, or that he
failed to demonstrate any resulting prejudice to his defense, or both. See Sanchez v.
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Wyoming, 253 P.3d 136, 147-49 (Wyo. 2011); see also Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (setting forth two-prong test for ineffective assistance
claim requiring prisoner to show deficient performance and prejudice).
Mr. Sanchez nonetheless maintains that the Wyoming Supreme Court’s refusal
to grant him an evidentiary hearing precluded that court from adjudicating his
ineffective assistance claim on its full merits. But a state court does not fail to reach
the merits every time it denies a motion for an evidentiary hearing. See Wilson v.
Workman, 577 F.3d 1284, 1292 (10th Cir. 2009) (en banc), abrogated on other
grounds as explained in Lott v. Trammell, 705 F.3d 1167, 1212-13 (10th Cir. 2013).
Rather, a state court adjudicates a claim “on the merits” when it denies a motion for
an evidentiary hearing after analyzing the proffered evidence against the Strickland
standard and concluding it would not entitle the prisoner to habeas relief. See id.Here, in the context of explaining its denial of Mr. Sanchez’s motion for an
evidentiary hearing, the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed his new evidence. But it
concluded that he did not satisfy the Strickland standard, particularly due to his
failure to identify any prejudice resulting from counsel’s allegedly deficient
assistance. See Sanchez, 253 P.3d at 148-49.
Finally, Mr. Sanchez asserts that the district court erred in denying his
application for habeas relief even under the deferential standard of review in
§ 2254(d). The district court held that the Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision
denying his ineffective assistance claim was not based on an unreasonable factual
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determination, nor was it contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly
established law set forth in Strickland. We agree with the district court’s analysis of
Mr. Sanchez’s contentions. Moreover, the court appropriately limited its review to
the record that was before the Wyoming Supreme Court. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct.
at 1398. And having found that § 2254(d) barred a grant of habeas relief, the district
court also did not err in denying Mr. Sanchez an evidentiary hearing under
§ 2254(e)(2). See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400-01 & n.7 (holding “that evidence
later introduced in federal court is irrelevant to § 2254(d)(1) review,” and noting
§ 2254(d)(2) expressly provides for review “in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Because Mr. Sanchez has not demonstrated that reasonable jurists could debate
the correctness of the district court’s denial of his habeas claim, we deny his
application for a COA and dismiss the appeal.
Entered for the Court
ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk
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