United States v. Verner

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 9, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 15-5042
D.C. No. 4:15-CR-00039-CVE-1
KEENAN DANCELL VERNER, (N.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, MURPHY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
The government obtained an indictment charging Keenan Verner with
possessing with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of methamphetamine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(viii). Verner filed a motion to
suppress, asserting the evidence supporting the charge was obtained as a result of
an illegal arrest. The district court granted Verner’s motion, concluding Verner’s
seizure amounted to an arrest rather than an investigative detention and the arrest
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
was not supported by probable cause. The government appeals, contending
Verner failed to establish a nexus between the illegal arrest and the suppressed
evidence. We conclude the government forfeited its nexus argument when it
failed to timely raise it in the district court. Thus, exercising jurisdiction
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731, this court affirms the district court’s order of
suppression.
We draw the background from the district court’s factual findings, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to Verner, the prevailing party below.
United States v. Hudson, 210 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2000). Tulsa Police
Department Officers William MacKenzie and Tim Wilson went to a Flying J
Travel Plaza in an unmarked truck to investigate a possible drug transaction. A
confidential informant told William1 a black male driving a Jeep would be selling
methamphetamine at that location. William and Wilson observed a Jeep occupied
by a black male driver and a white female passenger in the Flying J’s south
parking lot. The black male, later identified as Verner, got out of the Jeep and
walked to a portion of the parking lot designated for commercial vehicles. The
officers drove to that location and observed Verner sitting in the passenger seat of
a white truck occupied by a white male driver. Although the officers believed
1
Both William MacKenzie and his brother Andrew MacKenzie are police
officers and both are involved in this case. For that reason, this opinion refers to
both officers by their first names.
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they were witnessing a drug transaction, Wilson testified surveillance of the white
truck was difficult due to the presence of commercial vehicles. The officers did
not see any drugs or money change hands.
After a few minutes, Verner exited the white truck and walked over to a
Kia. The Kia was driven by an individual later identified as Kenneth Taylor. The
officers observed Verner enter the Kia and watched as Taylor drove the Kia to a
business across the street. Verner went inside the business and returned to the
Kia. In the meantime, the officers had moved the unmarked truck to a location
which allowed them to observe Verner and Taylor interacting. The Kia returned
to the Flying J about five minutes later. At that point, William asked Officers
Andrew MacKenzie and Tyler Turnbough to stop the Kia in the Flying J parking
lot.
The initial stop of the Kia was recorded on the dash camera of Andrew’s
police vehicle. The video shows three police officers in uniform approach the Kia
with firearms displayed and, at times, pointed at the Kia. Five police officers, not
including William and Wilson, were present. Officers Ian Adair, Brad Blackwell,
and Adam Miller arrived in a separate patrol car and served as backup for the
stop. Andrew’s firearm, though visible, was not pointed directly at the Kia.
Turnbough’s firearm, on the other hand, was pointed at the Kia as he approached
the vehicle. The officers directed Verner and Taylor to show their hands and
slowly step out of the Kia. Taylor exited the Kia first; he was immediately placed
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in handcuffs by Andrew. Verner briefly pulled his hands down to open the
passenger side door and then stepped out of the Kia. Verner was immediately
placed in handcuffs by Turnbough. Turnbough conducted a brief patdown of
Verner; he did not find any weapons or illegal drugs. Both Andrew and
Turnbough testified they detected a strong odor of marijuana coming from the
Kia. 2 After Verner and Taylor were handcuffed, Andrew ran a records check and
found that both men had outstanding misdemeanor warrants. Verner and Taylor
were formally arrested based on the outstanding warrants. A canine unit was
called to the scene of the detention; the canine alerted to the presence of illegal
drugs. Turnbough searched Verner more thoroughly after the formal arrest and
found two baggies containing more than fifty grams of methamphetamine. Verner
told Turnbough, “I’m on federal paper” and “I’m going [away] for a long time.”
Turnbough testified Verner made the statements voluntarily and not in response to
interrogation.
Verner filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of his
detention, arguing the stop of the Kia by the officers was inconsistent with an
investigative detention and was, instead, a de facto arrest. See United States v.
Mosley, 743 F.3d 1317, 1329 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that absent a reasonable
2
As explained more fully below, the district court did not make a finding
regarding the credibility of this testimony because such a finding was not
necessary to resolve Verner’s motion to suppress, as that motion was litigated by
the parties.
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belief it is necessary for police protection, pointing guns at a suspect will
generally “elevate a seizure to an ‘arrest’”). That is, Verner claimed the display
of force at the inception of the encounter (i.e., presence of five uniformed officers
in two marked cars; exhibition of weapons, at least one of which was pointed at
the Kia; and immediate use of handcuffs) mandated the conclusion he was placed
under arrest before any of the incriminating evidence relating to the drug charge
was discovered. He further asserted his arrest was not supported by probable
cause. Finally, to round out his syllogism, Verner contended none of the evidence
obtained during the illegal arrest (most notably the methamphetamine and the
statements made to Turnbough) would have been discovered but for the illegal
arrest.
In response, the government asserted Verner was not placed under arrest
until the discovery of the outstanding misdemeanor warrant. It posited the
following time line of Verner’s detention: (1) the detention was a Terry stop until
officers approached the Kia and detected the smell of marijuana; (2) the smell of
marijuana gave officers probable cause to further detain Verner and to search the
Kia; (3) during that extended detention, officers discovered the existence of an
outstanding warrant, providing probable cause for a formal arrest; and (4) only
after the formal arrest, and thus pursuant to a proper search incident to arrest, did
officers search Verner and find the methamphetamine on his person. Because,
under this theory, Verner was never under arrest until after officers had probable
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cause for such an arrest, the government argued Verner’s suppression motion
necessarily failed.
To be clear then, as the above summary of the parties’ litigation positions
demonstrates, Verner’s suppression motion was presented to the district court for
resolution of only one question: was Verner placed under de facto arrest
immediately upon his detention by the TPD officers? That is, at no point did
Verner argue he was entitled to suppression if his detention was a valid Terry stop
prior to the discovery of his outstanding warrant. Likewise, and of particular
importance for the resolution of this appeal, the government never offered any
argument that Verner was not entitled to suppression even if he was under arrest
for the entirety of his detention.
The district court granted Verner’s motion to suppress. It concluded the
government was correct in asserting reasonable suspicion existed to support an
investigatory detention. Nevertheless, the district court concluded the existence
of reasonable suspicion was irrelevant because the encounter between Verner and
the officers was an arrest at its inception. The district court further concluded
that Verner’s arrest was not supported by probable cause and, therefore, Verner
“was unlawfully detained from the inception of the stop.” Finally, because the
government had not disputed the existence of a nexus between the illegality at
issue (i.e., an arrest not supported by probable cause) and the evidence Verner
sought to exclude, the district court concluded suppression was appropriate.
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In response to the district court’s grant of Verner’s motion to suppress, the
government filed a motion for reconsideration. In that motion, the government
argued for the first time that Verner was not entitled to suppression because there
existed no nexus between his illegal arrest and the evidence he sought to
suppress. The government’s theory as to the lack of a nexus was as follows:
[Verner] . . . already had been lawfully seized in a valid traffic stop
based on reasonable suspicion and would not have been allowed to
leave the scene. The officers could lawfully approach the car during
the course of that justified traffic stop and they could lawfully detect
the scent of marijuana emanating from the car. Neither the stop nor
the discovery of the scent of marijuana was the fruit of the unlawful
arrest. The scent of marijuana established probable cause to arrest
defendant and search him and the car. He was not searched until
after the scent of marijuana was discovered. Thus, suppression is
unwarranted.
Implicitly recognizing the district court did not make any findings relevant to the
presence of the smell of marijuana in the Kia, namely because such findings were
unnecessary to resolve the suppression motion as presented by the parties, the
government nevertheless asserted reconsideration was appropriate because Verner
never disputed the officers’ testimony in that regard. The government sought to
excuse its failure to previously raise the issue by noting that, as to the merits, it
has no burden in the suppression context until a defendant first demonstrates a
factual nexus between the illegality and the evidence sought to be suppressed.
See United States v. Nava-Ramirez, 210 F.3d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir. 2000).
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The district court denied the government’s motion for reconsideration. It
first recognized that motions for reconsideration are proper in the criminal
context. See United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d 534, 540 (10th Cir. 2014)
(“Motions to reconsider are proper in criminal cases even though the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure do not specifically provide for them.”). A district
court may grant such a motion if it “has misapprehended the facts, a party’s
position, or the law.” Id. “A motion to reconsider should not be used to . . .
advance arguments that could have been raised earlier.” Id. Applying this
paradigm, the district court concluded the government’s motion failed for two
independent, and equally sufficient, reasons. First, the district court concluded
the government was wrong in arguing “the police officers’ belief that they
detected the scent of marijuana” broke the causal chain between the illegal arrest
and the discovery of the methamphetamine. Second, the district court concluded
the government’s nexus argument was untimely 3:
3
In its reply brief, the government asserts language relating to timeliness in
the district court’s order denying reconsideration only applies to the issue of
attenuation. This assertion is unconvincing. The district court perceived in the
government’s motion for reconsideration two possible arguments: (1) a nexus
argument and (2) an attenuation argument. After rejecting each of these
arguments on the merits, the district court concluded, in the alternative, that “it
would be unfair to [Verner] to allow the government to revise its theory of the
case after reviewing the . . . suppression order” and the “arguments” raised by the
government could have been raised earlier in the proceedings. Furthermore, the
district court explicitly labeled the government’s nexus argument as “a new
theory.” There is simply no doubt the district court’s timeliness argument applied
(continued...)
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The Court also notes that it would be unfair to defendant to allow the
government to revise its theory of the case after reviewing the
Court’s suppression order. The arguments now advanced by the
government could have been raised in its response to defendant’s
motion to suppress or at the suppression hearing, and this is not a
situation in which the Court “mistakenly overlooked” an argument
that should have been considered in a prior ruling.
The government asserts the district court erred in concluding a nexus
existed between Verner’s illegal arrest and the evidence he asked to be
suppressed. This court will address that issue only if it was properly preserved in
the district court. “Absent compelling reasons, [this court will] not consider
arguments that were not presented to the district court.” Crow v. Shalala, 40 F.3d
323, 324 (10th Cir. 1994). This rule applies in criminal as well as civil appeals.
See United States v. Eastteam, 426 F.3d 1301, 1303 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005).
The government argues the nexus issue it seeks to assert on appeal is
preserved despite its failure to brief or argue it during the litigation of the
suppression motion because the issue was addressed and resolved on the merits by
the district court sua sponte. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 41
(1992) (holding appellate courts can reach issues that were either “pressed” by the
appellant before, or “passed upon” by, the lower court); United States v.
Hernandez-Rodriguez, 352 F.3d 1325, 1328 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[W]hen the district
3
(...continued)
independently to each of the two potential “new theories” set forth in the
government’s motion for reconsideration.
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court sua sponte raises and explicitly resolves an issue of law on the merits, the
appellant may challenge that ruling on appeal on the ground addressed by the
district court even if he failed to raise the issue in district court.”). In advancing
this argument, the government relies on the following language from the district
court’s order denying suppression: “There is no dispute that drugs found on
[Verner’s] person would not have been discovered but for [his] arrest . . . . The
Court finds that [Verner] has established the required nexus between the illegal
conduct and evidence to be excluded, and the evidence seized from [his] person is
subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule.”
The government errs in asserting the district court “passed upon” the
particular issue it seeks to raise on appeal. To “pass upon” an issue, a court must
apply the relevant law to the relevant facts. See Hernandez-Rodriguez, 352 F.3d
at 1328. As noted at length above, however, the nexus issue advanced by the
government on appeal (i.e., the presence of the smell of marijuana as the officers
approached the Kia broke the causal chain between the illegal arrest and the
discovery of the methamphetamine) was not presented to the district court in the
government’s opposition to Verner’s suppression motion. Nor did the district
court recognize the possibility such an argument could be made by the
government and decide the issue sua sponte. Instead, in Verner’s suppression
motion, consistent with his obligation to demonstrate a nexus between the
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constitutional violation and the evidence he sought to suppress, he argued as
follows:
In this case, the police initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle in
which Mr. Verner was traveling and then put him under arrest at
gunpoint. There is no evidence suggesting the police knew of the
warrant for Mr. Verner’s arrest before he was stopped and arrested.
The police arrested Mr. Verner at the beginning of the interaction, in
the absence of probable cause. The police only learned of Mr.
Verner’s identity (and that there was a warrant relating to him) due
to an interrogation that happened during a detention that was not
supported by probable cause. As the unlawful arrest and
interrogation is the basis for the unlawful arrest and subsequent
search, all evidence yielded from the search is subject to suppression.
R. Vol. 1, at 23. The government did not respond to this argument, and most
certainly did not ask the district court to make relevant factual findings about the
purported smell of marijuana necessary to resolve the nexus theory it now seeks
to have reviewed by this court on appeal. Thus, the only issue the district court
“passed upon” was whether the narrow set of facts identified by Verner, and not
contested by the government, satisfied the nexus requirement set out in this
court’s precedents.
In essence, the government asks this court to conclude that when the
district court (1) noted Verner’s nexus argument, (2) recognized the government
did not dispute that argument and, therefore, (3) concluded the nexus requirement
was satisfied, the district court implicitly considered and rejected each and every
hypothetical argument against the existence of a nexus in this case. Such a
conclusion is completely at odds with this court’s preservation precedents.
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We have consistently rejected the argument that raising a related
theory below is sufficient to preserve an issue for appeal. Changing
to a new theory on appeal that falls under the same general category
as an argument presented at trial or discussing a theory only in a
vague and ambiguous way below is not adequate to preserve issues
for appeal. Indeed, the Court of Appeals is not a second shot forum
where secondary, back-up theories may be mounted for the first time.
Okland Oil Co. v. Conoco Inc., 144 F.3d 1308, 1314 n.4 (10th Cir. 1998)
(quotations, citations, and alteration omitted); see also United States v. Abdenbi,
361 F.3d 1282, 1288-89 (10th Cir. 2004) (refusing to consider on appeal specific
theories for suppression of evidence which were not raised in defendant's district
court motion to suppress). Because the district court did not “pass upon” the
issue advanced by the government on appeal in its order granting suppression,
this segment of the government’s preservation argument is without merit.
Alternatively, the government argues it preserved the nexus issue advanced
on appeal because it was raised and resolved by the district court in the ruling
denying the motion for reconsideration. The problem for the government is that
the district court denied reconsideration on two independent grounds: (1) the
government’s nexus argument failed, even assuming officers believed they
smelled marijuana when they approached the Kia; and (2) the argument was not a
proper basis for reconsideration because it was a “new theory” that could have,
and should have, been raised in response to Verner’s motion to suppress. It is
appropriate to reach the merits of the government’s nexus argument only if the
district court abused its discretion in concluding the government’s motion for
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reconsideration was an unjustified attempt to raise an issue that could have been
advanced earlier in the litigation. Christy, 739 F.3d at 539 (concluding a “motion
to reconsider should not be used to . . . advance arguments that could have been
raised earlier” and reviewing the district court’s disposition of a motion for
reconsideration for abuse of discretion).
In asserting it was appropriate to raise its nexus argument for the first time
in its motion for reconsideration, the government notes that this court’s
precedents place the initial burden on the party seeking suppression to satisfy the
nexus requirement. See United States v. Ladeaux, 454 F.3d 1107, 1111 (10th Cir.
2006) (holding a defendant must show there is a factual nexus between “the
illegality and the challenged evidence,” meaning the evidence the defendant seeks
to exclude “would not have come to light but for the government’s
unconstitutional conduct” (quotations omitted)). The government further asserts
that because Verner did not so much as mention the existence of a nexus, the
issue was not apparent until the district court issued its suppression order.
See U.S. Opening Br. at 19 (“Notably, in the brief in support of his motion,
Verner did not cite to, nor address, the but-for causation standard that would
apply if he succeeded in showing some illegality. . . . It was only after the
district court ruled that the officers’ display of firearms effectively elevated the
investigative detention into an unlawful arrest that the question was squarely
joined as to whether Verner had shown but-for causation . . . .”). The
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government’s argument in this regard is both factually and legally incorrect. As
the extensive quote from Verner’s suppression motion set out above demonstrates,
he did argue his illegal arrest was the but-for cause of the discovery of the
evidence he sought to suppress. Supra at 11 (quoting from R. Vol. 1, at 23).
Furthermore, even as the nonmovant, the government is not entitled to sit back
and ignore potential legal problems in a motion to suppress, only to later raise
those issues in a motion for reconsideration. See Lebahn v. Owens, 813 F.3d
1300, 1307-08 (10th Cir. 2016) (reaching the same conclusion in the civil context
and holding “it is not the [district] court’s job to comb the record in order to make
the non-movant’s arguments for him” (quotation omitted)). The district court’s
determination that the nexus argument set out in the government’s motion for
reconsideration was a new theory that could have been raised earlier in the
litigation of the suppression motion is, most certainly, not an abuse of discretion.
Thus, there is no need to reach the district court’s alternative merits decision.
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For those reasons set out above, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma is hereby AFFIRMED. 4 The government’s
motion to file a supplemental appendix is DENIED as moot.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
4
In a letter filed with this court pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j), the
United States identifies the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Utah v. Strieff, 136
S. Ct. 2056 (2016), and asks this court to either take up the issue of attenuation in
light of Strieff or leave the matter open on remand to the district court. Given the
explicit waiver of the issue in the government’s appellate briefing, and in the
absence of any reason to discard this court’s general reluctance to take up waived
issues, we decline this invitation. See U.S. Reply Br. at 9 (“[W]e did not make an
inevitable-discovery argument in the district court and we do not assert an
inevitable-discovery argument here.”).
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