Goss v. Cathey

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 12, 2021
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
JERRY GOSS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 20-5031
(D.C. No. 4:18-CV-00304-TCK-JFJ)
KELLY CATHEY, an individual; (N.D. Okla.)
OKLAHOMA HORSE RACING
COMMISSION,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
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Before LUCERO, HOLMES, and EID, Circuit Judges.
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Jerry Goss appeals from the district court’s denial of his post-judgment motion
seeking to reopen his case to amend his complaint. Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
BACKGROUND
After the appellees terminated Mr. Goss’s employment as a horse-racing
steward, he brought suit in Oklahoma state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state
law. The appellees removed the action to federal court and moved to dismiss under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Mr. Goss responded that his allegations adequately pleaded
both his federal and state claims. Identifying certain deficiencies in the pleading of
the federal claims, the district court dismissed those claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims.
Mr. Goss then filed a post-judgment motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and
60(b). Noting that the case originally was filed in state court, he asserted, “Now that
heightened federal pleading standards apply, basic fairness tilts in favor of this Court
granting leave to amend.” Aplt. App. at 87. Although he claimed he could remedy
the deficiencies the court had noted, he identified no new facts or law that he would
include in an amended complaint. The defendants-appellees opposed reopening,
arguing that amendment would be futile because Mr. Goss’s § 1983 claims fail as a
matter of law. The district court denied the post-judgment motion in a minute order,
without explanation.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Goss appeals only from the district court’s denial of his post-judgment
motion. We review the denial of a Rule 59(e) or a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of
discretion, see Walters v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 703 F.3d 1167, 1172 (10th Cir.
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2013), which also is the standard of review for a denial of leave to amend, see Foman
v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 1
Mr. Goss argues that denying leave to amend without giving any reason or
justification is itself an abuse of discretion. See id. (“[O]utright refusal to grant the
leave [to amend] without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an
exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the
spirit of the Federal Rules.”); Triplett v. LeFlore Cty., 712 F.2d 444, 447 (10th Cir.
1983) (applying Foman in the context of a request to amend contained within a
motion to reconsider a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal). But while acknowledging this
general rule, this court also has held that a failure to explain a denial of leave to
amend “can be harmless error where the reason is apparent.” Pallottino v. City of Rio
Rancho, 31 F.3d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
appellees suggest that apparent reasons include undue delay, lack of justification, and
futility.
We are persuaded that the district court’s failure to explain why it denied the
post-judgment motion was harmless error. The motion baldly asserted that Mr. Goss
could remedy the deficiencies the court had identified. It did not discuss any specific
new facts or law that he would cite and did not attach a proposed amended complaint.
1
Technically, the district court did not deny a motion for leave to amend; it denied a
post-judgment motion under Rule 59(e) and/or Rule 60(b). The parties’ arguments
treat the motion effectively as one for leave to amend, however, as this court did in
similar circumstances in Triplett v. LeFlore County, 712 F.2d 444, 445-47 (10th Cir.
1983). We therefore analyze the district court’s disposition in this light.
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It therefore gave the district court no grounds to evaluate the propriety of allowing
amendment. “[W]e do not require district courts to engage in independent research
or read the minds of litigants to determine if information justifying an amendment
exists.” Calderon v. Kan. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 181 F.3d 1180, 1187
(10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Computerized Thermal
Imaging, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 312 F.3d 1292, 1300 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[H]aving
produced no showing of how it would properly amend its pleadings or how newly
discovered evidence warranted relief from dismissal, [the plaintiff] remains bound by
the record it created.”). Mr. Goss’s failure to identify any specifics distinguishes this
case from Triplett, in which the motion to reconsider explicitly identified and
discussed proposed theories of recovery that that were within the bounds of
established law. See Triplett, 712 F.2d at 447; see also Calderon, 181 F.3d at 1186(recognizing that the post-judgment motion in Triplett demonstrated “the particular
grounds for the amendment”).
CONCLUSION
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Allison H. Eid
Circuit Judge
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