United States v. Wood

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 29, 2020
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 19-1477
(D.C. No. 1:19-CR-00196-RBJ-1)
ANTHONY LYNN WOOD, (D. Colo.)
Defendant - Appellant.
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
_________________________________
Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
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In 1999, Georgia state courts sentenced Defendant Anthony Wood for several
sex offense convictions. In 2006, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C. §§ 20901 et seq. SORNA established a
comprehensive, national sex offender registration system. In SORNA, Congress gave
the Attorney General the authority to determine SORNA’s retroactive reach.
Exercising that authority, the Attorney General concluded that SORNA should apply
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
to all pre-Act offenders—thus requiring Defendant to comply with the new
registration scheme.
Defendant failed to register. A federal grand jury indicted Defendant for
failure to register in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(1), 2(B), and (3). [ROA Vol. I
at 4–5.] Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, contending that
Congress unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the Attorney General
when it authorized the Attorney General to determine SORNA’s applicability to sex
offenders convicted before the enactment of the statute. [Id. at 7–12.] The district
court denied that motion. [Id. at 14.]. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea
and appealed the district court’s denial. [Id. at 15.] Exercising jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, we review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an
indictment. United States v. Wagner, 951 F.3d 1232, 1253 (10th Cir. 2020).
In this case, our inquiry is a short one. Defendant acknowledges that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019), and our
prior decision in United States v. Nichols, 775 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2014), rev’d on
other grounds, Nichols v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1113 (2016), foreclose his
argument. [ROA Vol. I at 10.] Defendant concedes that he raises this argument only
for the purpose of preserving it for future appeal or in the event of an intervening
change in the law. [Id. at 11; see also Opening Br. at 2.] We agree with Defendant
that the Supreme Court upheld Congress’s SORNA delegation. 1 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at
1
We recently rejected the same argument Defendant raises here. United States
v. Six, 775 F. App’x 443, 444 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (rejecting the same
2
2130–31 (Alito, J., concurring) (plurality opinion); see also Nichols, 775 F.3d at
1232 (reaching the same conclusion as Gundy that Congress’s SORNA delegation
did not violate the nondelegation doctrine).
Of course, we are bound by Supreme Court decisions and cannot overrule a
prior panel decision of this Court. United States v. Manzanares, 956 F.3d 1220, 1225
(10th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, we conclude—as Defendant concedes—that
Defendant’s argument fails.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Joel M Carson III
Circuit Judge
argument because “Gundy did not disturb our prior holding in Nichols that [SORNA]
did not violate the nondelegation doctrine”); see also Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2128
(clarifying that SORNA does not allow the Attorney General to determine whether to
apply the Act to pre-Act offenders, but only how to do so).
3