Hodgson v. Farmington City

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 10, 2017
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
KIA LYN FADEL HODGSON; KRISTIN
LOUISE FADEL; DOUGLAS KELLY
FADEL; KARA FADEL BURNETT,
trustees of the Rock Manor Trust,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 16-4120
(D.C. No. 1:15-CV-00125-DBP)
FARMINGTON CITY, (D. Utah)
Defendant - Appellee.
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before PHILLIPS, McHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
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Appellants Kia Lyn Fadel Hodgson, Kristin Louise Fadel, Douglas Kelly
Fadel, and Kara Fadel Burnett (“the Fadels”) are trustees for the Rock Manor Trust
(“Rock Manor”). The Fadels filed this lawsuit against Farmington City after the City
deemed a deteriorating structure on Rock Manor’s property to be unsafe and
demolished it, at Rock Manor’s expense. The complaint alleges civil rights,
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
constitutional, and statutory violations. The district court dismissed the complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),1 and the Fadels appealed. Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I. Background
The structure at the heart of this lawsuit was located on Rock Manor’s
property in Farmington, Utah. Built in 1959, the structure originally served a dual
purpose: (1) it was a barn, and (2) the outside wall facing the highway was used as a
billboard for advertising. The photographs in the record show that the structure
transformed over time and generally deteriorated.
In 2011, the sign portion separated from the structural supports of the barn
during a windstorm, triggering a series of repairs and inspections, as well as more
controversy. In 2012, Farmington City ordered a structural assessment from an
engineering company, which advised it had “never seen a project that met as many
‘dangerous’ conditions listed in the” Uniform Code for the Abatement of Dangerous
Buildings (“UCADB”) and identified the entire structure as dangerous. Aplee. Supp.
App., Vol. 2 at 212. During the same time frame, the fire marshal advised that the
structure was in “a dilapidated condition” and was “an ‘attractive nuisance’ to
curious children and youth,” as well as a fire and safety hazard. Id. at 213.
Consequently, Farmington City issued a “Notice and Order to Repair or Demolish
Building.” Id., Vol. 1 at 21-24. Rock Manor refused to comply.
1
The district court’s decision was issued by a magistrate judge, sitting by
consent of the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), (3).
2
The parties then participated in an administrative hearing and appeal before the
City’s Building Board of Appeals, with Farmington City prevailing in both. In its
written decision, the Board of Appeals concluded the structure was “a ‘dangerous
building’ under the provisions of the [UCADB] (1997).” Id., Vol. 2 at 125. The
Fadels sought review of the Board of Appeals’ decision in state district court. But
Farmington City prevailed on summary judgment in 2013, and the Utah Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment in 2014. Farmington City then filed a motion for an
order allowing demolition of the structure at Rock Manor’s expense, which the
district court granted. This led to a second unsuccessful appeal by the Fadels in
2015. Having twice secured the court’s authorization, Farmington City demolished
the structure on April 1, 2015, and invoiced the Fadels $2,239.14 for the demolition
costs per the UCADB.
The Fadels filed this lawsuit, seeking at least $400,000 in compensation for the
structure or, in the alternative, requesting that the structure be rebuilt and relocated.
The district court dismissed the Fadels’ complaint with prejudice under Rule
12(b)(6). This appeal followed.2
2
The appeal is timely even though the Fadels did not file their notice of appeal
within thirty days of final judgment, as required by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). After we
noted this deficiency in a show-cause order, the Fadels requested an extension of time to
appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), explaining that they paid the docketing fee before
the deadline and believed the electronic filing was complete as well. The district court
granted the motion, and the Fadels filed a notice of appeal within the designated time
frame.
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II. Analysis
The Fadels argue that the district court erred in dismissing its claims that
Farmington City’s demolition of the structure violated Rock Manor’s rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, the United States Constitution, and state and municipal
eminent-domain laws. They also argue that the dismissal was erroneous because the
motion to dismiss was filed after the responsive pleading and was thus untimely and
because the district court failed to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
We do not consider the eminent-domain or timeliness arguments because the
briefing on them is deficient under Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8). See Bronson v.
Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104-05 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e routinely have declined to
consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an
appellant’s opening brief. . . . [C]ursory statements, without supporting analysis and
case law, fail to constitute the kind of briefing that is necessary to avoid application
of the forfeiture doctrine.”). The Fadels merely cite the eminent-domain statutes in
their appellate brief, without any meaningful discussion or analysis of them. And the
assertion that the motion to dismiss was not timely filed appears only within the issue
statement of their brief.
We review de novo the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the Fadels’
claims against Farmington City, accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.
Howard v. Waide, 534 F.3d 1227, 1242-43 (10th Cir. 2008). “To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
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a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also
Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 2012) (“A plaintiff must
nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible in order to survive a
motion to dismiss.” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We agree with the district court that the Fadels’ complaint “essentially
amounts to a collateral attack on extended administrative and judicial processes in
Utah’s state and appellate courts that culminated in the demolition of [Rock Manor’s]
structure.” Aplt. App. at 42. The Fadels have had ample opportunities to challenge
the demolition and do not advance any new meritorious arguments in this case. The
district court carefully considered their claims and concluded that they are not
plausible. We affirm for substantially the same reasons articulated in the district
court’s thorough, well-reasoned decision dated May 12, 2016.
In affirming, we reject the Fadels’ assertion that the district court erred in
taking judicial notice of public records from the parties’ administrative and judicial
proceedings without converting Farmington City’s motion to dismiss into a motion
for summary judgment. The district court correctly noted that “‘facts subject to
judicial notice may be considered in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion without converting the
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.’” Id. at 32 (quoting Tal v.
Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1264-65 n.24 (10th Cir. 2006)). This includes another court’s
publicly filed records “concerning matters that bear directly upon the disposition of
the case at hand.” United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir.
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2007); see also St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. F.D.I.C., 605 F.2d 1169, 1172
(10th Cir. 1979) (“[F]ederal courts, in appropriate circumstances, may take notice of
proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if
those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.”). The records at issue
here document the review and authorization of Farmington City’s actions and thus
have “a direct relation” to this case.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing the Fadels’
claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh
Circuit Judge
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