Coddington v. Sharp

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 12, 2020
Christopher M. Wolpert
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
JAMES CODDINGTON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 16-6295
TOMMY SHARP, Warden, Oklahoma
State Penitentiary,*
Respondent-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. 5:11-CV-01457-HE)
John T. Carlson, Ridley, McGreevy & Winocur P.C., Denver, Colorado (Seth A. Day, Hall
Estill P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs), for Petitioner-Appellant.
Caroline E.J. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General (Mike Hunter, Attorney General of
Oklahoma, with her on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before LUCERO, MORITZ, and EID, Circuit Judges.
EID, Circuit Judge.
*
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Mike Carpenter is replaced by Tommy Sharp as
the Warden of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections.
Petitioner James Coddington seeks collateral review of the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals’ (OCCA) resolution of his constitutional challenges to his conviction
and sentence. Coddington argues that the trial court deprived him of his constitutional
right to present a defense when it refused to allow his expert to testify that he was unable
to form the requisite intent for malice murder. He also argues that his confession to the
murder should have been suppressed because he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive
his Miranda rights. The OCCA denied relief, and, applying AEDPA deference, the
district court below did the same. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district
court’s denial of Coddington’s petition because Coddington has failed to show that the
OCCA’s rejection of his challenges involved an unreasonable application of federal law.
I.
In March of 1997, Coddington, who had a history of cocaine use, relapsed and
began using cocaine again. Coddington v. State, 142 P.3d 437, 442 (Okla. Crim. App.
2006). He spent approximately $1,000 per day to support his habit. See id. Eventually,
he ran out of money. See id. On March 5, following a three or four-day cocaine binge,
he was desperate for cocaine and robbed a convenience store. See id. But the money he
took from the store was insufficient, so later that day he went over to Al Hale’s house.
See id. Hale and Coddington were friends, and Coddington knew that Hale usually kept
large sums of cash (on March 5, Hale had over $24,000 in cash in his home). See id.Coddington did not immediately ask Hale for money—he watched TV with him
for a couple hours. See id. At some point though, Coddington asked Hale if he could
borrow some money. See id. According to Coddington, Hale could tell that Coddington
2
had “relapsed on drugs.” 2003 Tr. VI at 47. He refused Coddington’s request, told him
to go back to treatment, and then asked him to leave. Id. at 48. Coddington began to
leave. Id. But after noticing a hammer on the counter when he walked through the
kitchen toward the door, Coddington stopped. State Ex. 89 at 14. Hale then went into
the kitchen and “pushed* [Coddington] and told [him] to get out.” 2003 Tr. VI at 76.
Coddington then grabbed the hammer and hit Hale in the head, causing him to fall. Id. at
69. When Hale was lying face-down on the ground, Coddington hit him several more
times in the back of the head. Id. at 69–70. He then took the money that Hale had on his
person ($525) and, believing Hale was dead, left the house. State Ex. 89 at 15.
Coddington was mistaken; Hale was not dead. See id. at 443. Hale’s son, Ron,
discovered his father later that day. See id. There was “blood and blood spatter
everywhere.” Id. “Hale was lying in his bed, soaked in blood, still breathing but unable
to speak.” Id. Hale had moved from the kitchen to his bedroom. See id. Hale was
rushed to a hospital, where he died 24 hours later. See id. The autopsy showed he died
from blunt-force trauma to the head. See id.
After Coddington left Hale’s house, Coddington immediately bought more cocaine
and continued committing crimes to finance his purchases. He robbed five more
convenience stores. See id. at 442. When he eventually got back home, he threw the
hammer in a creek behind his apartment. See id. at 455.
*
Coddington told the police that Hale pushed him, but he did not volunteer this
information in his trial testimony. State Ex. 89 at 15; 2003 Tr. VI at 49.
3
Two days later, the police arrested Coddington at his apartment. See id. at 443.
When the police arrived, Coddington began voluntarily making statements. See id. at
447. Realizing that Coddington may have been starting to confess, the police officers
read him his Miranda rights. See id. Coddington waived his Miranda rights and
continued making statements to officers. See id. About two to three hours after he
initially waived his rights outside of his apartment, the police officers interrogated him at
the station. See id. At the station, the officers reminded Coddington of his waiver from a
few hours earlier, and Coddington stated he remembered waiving his rights. See id.
Coddington then confessed to the convenience store robberies and to murdering Hale.
See id. at 443.
At the station, Coddington was able to recall the murder in detail. See State Ex. 89
at 13–21 (Transcript of Police Station Interview); see also 2003 Tr. VI 47–48, 62–63. He
recalled the clothes he wore, that he and Hale conversed for a couple hours, that they
watched TV, that he had gone to Hale’s home to ask for money, that Hale refused his
request for money, that Hale then asked him to leave, and that he struck Hale with a claw
hammer as Hale was showing him out. See State Ex. 89 at 14–15. He also remembered
specific details about the hammer—that it had a chrome handle with a rubber grip. See
id. at 20. He remembered how many times he struck Hale. See id. at 15. He
remembered how much money he took from Hale’s person and the denominations of the
bills. See id. at 18. Finally, he stated that he did not call the police when he left Hale’s
home because he did not want to get caught. See Coddington, 142 P.3d at 443.
4
The state charged Coddington with multiple armed robberies, murder, and robbery
with a dangerous weapon. Coddington pleaded guilty to six armed robberies and
proceeded to trial on the murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon charges. Prior to
trial, the court resolved two motions in limine relevant to this petition. First, the court
considered the state’s motion to exclude Coddington’s expert’s testimony on whether
Coddington was able to form intent. See id. at 448–51. Coddington proffered that his
expert—Dr. Smith—would have testified that his cocaine use leading up to and during
the murder rendered him unable to form malice aforethought. See id. at 448–51. The
state moved to have this portion of Dr. Smith’s testimony excluded, and the trial judge
granted the motion. See id.Second, the court considered Coddington’s motion to suppress his confession. See
id. at 446–48. Coddington believed that he did not knowingly or voluntarily waive his
Miranda rights. See id. The court did not agree and denied the motion. See id.The case proceeded to trial. At the guilt phase of trial, the jury convicted
Coddington of first-degree murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon. See id. at 442.
At the sentencing phase, the jury found the existence of two aggravating circumstances
and sentenced Coddington to death. See id. Coddington appealed his conviction and
sentence to the OCCA. See id. Among other things, he challenged the pretrial rulings (1)
denying his motion to suppress his confession and (2) excluding a portion of Dr. Smith’s
testimony. See id. at 446–51. The OCCA first concluded that Coddington’s confession
was sufficiently knowing and voluntary, but it agreed with Coddington that the trial court
erred by restricting Dr. Smith’s testimony. See id. The OCCA summarily determined
5
that this amounted to a constitutional error and applied Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18 (1967), to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See
id. at 448–51. The OCCA determined that the evidence that Coddington acted with
malice aforethought was overwhelming. See id. at 451. Accordingly, it held that “Dr.
Smith’s expert opinion on the ultimate issue of whether Coddington could form the
requisite malice would not have made a difference in the jury’s determination of guilt.”
Id.
The OCCA similarly rejected Coddington’s other guilt-phase arguments and
affirmed his conviction. It did, however, find that reversible error occurred at the
sentencing phase. See id. at 461.† It therefore vacated Coddington’s death sentence and
remanded for resentencing. See id. At resentencing, the jury found the existence of
aggravating circumstances and again sentenced Coddington to death. Coddington v.
State, 254 P.3d 684, 693 (Okla. Crim. App. 2011). The OCCA affirmed, see id. at 718,
and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, see Coddington v. Oklahoma, 565
U.S. 1040 (2011). Coddington then filed a petition for post-conviction relief with the
OCCA. Coddington v. State, 259 P.3d 833 (Okla. Crim. App. 2011). The OCCA denied
the petition. See id. at 840. Subsequently, Coddington filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition.
†
The OCCA found that the trial court made two reversible errors during the
sentencing phase. The first was that the court did not allow Coddington to play a video
tape of his mother’s testimony, but instead only allowed Coddington to show the jury a
written transcript of it. The trial court’s second error was its allowance of a confusingly-
worded jury instruction that potentially misled the jury about the significance of various
testimony from Coddington’s family members. Coddington, 142 P.3d at 460–61.
6
Coddington v. Royal, No. CIV-11-1457-HE, 2016 WL 4991685 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 15,
2016).
In his § 2254 petition, Coddington raised nine grounds for relief. See id. at *1.
The district court denied relief on all of them. See id. We granted a Certificate of
Appealability (COA) as to the first and second grounds: (1) whether the OCCA
unreasonably applied federal law when it held that the exclusion of Dr. Smith’s testimony
was harmless, and (2) whether the OCCA unreasonably applied federal law when it
affirmed the lower court’s decision that Coddington’s waiver of his Miranda rights was
knowing and voluntary.
II.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the
standard under which we review the district court’s disposition of a state petitioner’s
habeas petition depends on how the claim at issue was resolved in the state court. Byrd v.
Workman, 645 F.3d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 2011). Here, because the issues in
Coddington’s habeas petition were already adjudicated on the merits by the OCCA, “we
review the district court’s legal analysis of the state court decision de novo.” Littlejohn v.
Trammell, 704 F.3d 817, 825 (10th Cir. 2013). We therefore—like the district court
before us—review the OCCA decision under the AEDPA deference standards.
The AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), provides that:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim--
7
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
A decision is contrary to federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion
opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court
decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts.” Valdez v. Bravo, 373 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 2004)
(quotations omitted) (alterations in original). Relatedly, a decision is an unreasonable
application of federal law “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal
principle from [the Supreme Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to
the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. (same). Finally, a federal court may only grant
habeas relief if “there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state
court’s decision conflicts with the Supreme Court’s precedents.” Frost v. Pryor, 749
F.3d 1212, 1223 (10th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted).
III.
In his first claim for relief, Coddington argues that the trial court deprived him of
his constitutional right to present a defense when it refused to allow his expert to testify
that he was unable to form the requisite intent for malice murder, and that the OCCA
wrongfully concluded that the trial court’s error was harmless. We affirm the district
court’s denial of this claim, concluding that the OCCA did not unreasonably apply
8
Chapman in holding that the exclusion of a portion of Dr. Smith’s testimony was
harmless.
A.
On direct appeal, a state appellate court evaluates a state trial court’s federal
constitutional error for harmlessness. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
Specifically, the court considers whether the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that the federal constitutional error was harmless. See id. When a state court’s Chapman
decision is reviewed by a federal court under AEDPA, “a federal court may not award
habeas relief under § 2254 unless the harmlessness determination itself was
unreasonable.” Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2199 (2015) (emphasis in original).
This AEDPA limitation to Chapman is subsumed by the Brecht test for harmlessness,
which is used by courts engaging in collateral review. Id. Under this test, a petitioner
cannot gain relief for a trial court’s error unless he can establish that the error “had [a]
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quotations omitted). In other words, the
petitioner must establish actual prejudice. See id. Coddington must therefore “show that
he was actually prejudiced by” the trial court’s failure to admit the expert’s testimony, “a
standard that he necessarily cannot satisfy if a fairminded jurist could agree with the
[OCCA’s] decision that [the error] . . . met the Chapman standard of harmlessness.”
Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2199.
The Brecht test for harmlessness also applies to Coddington’s claim that the trial
court’s rejection of Dr. Smith’s testimony separately amounted to a violation of due
9
process. Any constitutional due process violations are likewise reviewed for
harmlessness. See Patton v. Mullin, 425 F.3d 788, 800 (10th Cir. 2005) (applying Brecht
harmlessness analysis to petitioner’s allegation of due process violation at trial).‡
B.
As a preliminary matter, the state argues that Coddington has not shown the
existence of a constitutional error sufficient to trigger Chapman/Brecht. See Resp.’s Br.
at 16 (“[T]he application of the Brecht harmless error standard presupposes the existence
of an actual federal constitutional error.”). It contends that expert testimony on the
ultimate issue of intent is generally not allowed in the federal system because it is
prohibited by Federal Rule of Evidence 704. See Fed. R. Evid. 704(b) (“In a criminal
case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did
not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of
a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.”). Additionally, it notes that
multiple federal courts—including the Tenth Circuit—have upheld Rule 704 in the face
‡
We have previously stated that “once a showing of fundamental unfairness is
made, a petitioner is entitled to habeas relief without an assessment of harmless error.”
Spears v. Mullin, 343 F.3d 1215, 1229 n.9 (10th Cir. 2003). We based this statement on
our belief that the fundamental unfairness inquiry “essentially duplicate[s] the function of
harmless error review.” Id. (alteration in original) (quotations omitted). The Supreme
Court, however, has commented that “the Chapman harmless-error standard is more
demanding than the ‘fundamental fairness’ inquiry of the Due Process Clause.” Greer v.
Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 n.7 (1987). One standard that is less demanding than another
cannot “duplicate” the more demanding standard. Accordingly, we decline to follow this
court’s earlier holding in Spears that would preclude harmlessness review when a due
process violation is found on habeas review. See Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of
Judicial Precedent 303–04 (2016) (noting that, while earlier horizontal precedent nearly
always controls, an exception exists if that decision was “clearly contrary to a then-
standing vertical precedent”).
10
of constitutional challenges because testimony on the ultimate issue of intent is not
actually evidence. See id. at 17 (citing United States v. Austin, 981 F.2d 1163, 1165 (10th
Cir. 1992)). Under those precedents, the testimony Coddington sought to have admitted
was not evidence at all. See, e.g., Austin, 981 F.2d at 1165. So, the argument goes,
Coddington’s constitutional right to present a defense was not violated, and the analysis
should end there.
We disagree. Even if a state law violation cannot be tied to the denial of a specific
federal constitutional right (such as the right to present a defense), it is still reviewed to
determine whether the violation “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the
resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 12
(2004). And whether we analyze Coddington’s claim as a violation of a specific
constitutional right or as a violation of constitutional due process, we still must determine
whether the alleged error was harmless. See Patton, 425 F.3d at 800 (“[A]ny trial errors
will be deemed harmless unless they had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the verdict. . . . If we are in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of an error,
the habeas petitioner must prevail.”).
Because we ultimately conclude that the trial court’s error in excluding a portion
of Dr. Smith’s testimony was harmless, see infra, we need not determine whether the
error committed by the trial court amounted to a violation of a specific constitutional
right or a more general constitutional due process violation. Instead, we “assume,
without deciding, that the error[ ] [Coddington] identifies . . . [is] of constitutional
magnitude.” Malone v. Carpenter, 911 F.3d 1022, 1032 n.1 (10th Cir. 2018) (rejecting
11
state’s argument that habeas relief was not available because there was no constitutional
violation).
C.
The OCCA concluded that, even if Dr. Smith had been permitted to testify on
intent, the jury would have still found malice aforethought. See Coddington, 142 P.3d at
451. Coddington argues that the OCCA’s harmlessness determination was unreasonable
because, while he was allowed to present substantial testimony about the effects of
cocaine use, none of the evidence went to whether he was able to form the requisite
intent. See Pet’r Br. at 17–26. After reviewing the state court record, we do not find that
the exclusion had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. First, though he
was unable to present testimony explicitly asserting that his cocaine use might have
precluded his ability to form malice aforethought, Coddington was permitted to present
copious testimony on how his cocaine use negatively affected his rationality and self-
awareness. Second, it was disputed as to whether Coddington was even intoxicated at the
time of the murder. And third, the excluded testimony would have been heavily
contradicted by other evidence in the record indicating that Coddington not only was
capable of self-awareness, but that he indeed hit Hale with the deliberate intent “to take
away [his] life.” See Criminal Appeal Original Record (C.A.O.R.) I at 88 (jury
instruction defining “malice aforethought”).
1.
Even without Dr. Smith’s excluded testimony, the jury considered evidence
regarding Coddington’s cocaine use and the ill-effects of such use on his brain. Dr.
12
Smith told the jury that he had diagnosed Coddington with cocaine dependency. See
2003 Tr. V at 81. He then told the jury that cocaine affects the “thinking part of the
brain,” i.e., the cortex and frontal lobes. See id. at 81–82. He also told the jury that the
cortex is what “makes you aware of yourself and what you’re doing and your ethics and
your judgment and how to make decisions and therefore how to behave.” Id. at 82. He
showed the jury a PET-scan of a drug-addict’s brain to give the jury a visual
representation of how drug use can cause brain damage. See id. at 83. He further told the
jury that cocaine use can cause paranoia and agitation. See id. at 88.
Dr. Smith then applied these general statements about cocaine use to Coddington
in particular. He noted that Coddington’s cocaine use “had a marked effect on
[Coddington’s] brain function” the day of the murder. See id. at 92.
It made him -- it had multiple effects on his brain function. His paranoia, his
fearfulness, his belief he was being followed and watched constantly, his
desperation to get more cocaine, his over-responsiveness to stimulation of
any kind, including touching. So I think it markedly affected his ability to
exercise reasonable judgment and control.
Id. Dr. Smith also told the jury that Coddington’s cocaine binge likely made these effects
even worse. Specifically, it likely made it “difficult for [Coddington] to control his
behavior.” See 2003 Tr. VI at 5. He testified that, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, Coddington was not thinking reasonably or rationally. See id. at 6.§
§
Coddington also contends that the OCCA’s opinion is internally inconsistent. He
says that the OCCA acknowledged that Dr. Smith’s excluded testimony would have
lowered the degree of murder. See Pet’r Br. at 18. This assertion is factually inaccurate.
The OCCA stated that Dr. Smith’s testimony would have lowered the degree of murder if
the jury believed it. See Coddington, 142 P.3d at 451. The OCCA then went on to
explain that the jury would not have believed it. See id.13
In addition to Dr. Smith’s comprehensive testimony, Coddington himself testified
that he never intended to kill Hale. He also stated that the murder basically just
happened: “the next thing I know he was laying on the floor and I had hit him with [the
hammer].” Id. at 48. Also, Coddington’s counsel repeatedly argued that Coddington’s
cocaine use and addiction rendered him incapable of forming the requisite intent.
Counsel referred to the killing as “mindless” and having occurred “in the middle of a
drug-inspired frenzy.” Id. at 150–51. In fact, in closing, Coddington’s counsel explicitly
told the jury that Coddington’s “cocaine intoxication rendered him at the moment of truth
incapable of forming malice aforethought.” Id. at 161.
2.
With or without the excluded portion, the jury might have disregarded Dr. Smith’s
testimony altogether if it found that Coddington was not “intoxicated” at the time of the
murder. Coddington offered Dr. Smith’s testimony to support his intoxication defense,
which applies where the defendant’s “mental powers” were so “overcome with
intoxication” that it would have been “impossible [for him] to form the special state of
mind known as malice aforethought.” C.A.O.R. I at 106 (Jury Instruction 39) (emphasis
added). But Dr. Smith’s testimony focused less on how a person behaves while
intoxicated from cocaine and more on how repeated cocaine use can damage a person’s
brain. He explained that cocaine can impair a person’s judgment and self-awareness by
damaging their pre-frontal cortex. He described these effects not necessarily as cocaine
intoxication, but instead as “cocaine dependency.” 2003 Tr. V at 81. And it is unclear
14
whether the jury would have equated such chronic effects of cocaine with the
“intoxication” language existing in the pertinent jury instruction.
With the above said, the jury considered evidence that Coddington likely was not
“high” at the time of the murder. Dr. Smith informed the jury that the “high” from
cocaine can last anywhere from several minutes to several hours. Id. at 94. On numerous
occasions, Dr. Smith described the effects of cocaine as “momentary.” Id. at 64, 66. His
testimony further suggested that smoking—which was Coddington’s typical method of
ingestion—crack cocaine typically resulted in a “quicker” high. Id. at 63. With that said,
Coddington was at Hale’s house for roughly two to three hours before he murdered Hale.
Therefore, for Coddington to have been intoxicated with cocaine at the time of the
murder, he likely would have either had to have smoked cocaine while at Hale’s house,
or potentially immediately before arriving there.
And whether Coddington had indeed smoked cocaine while—or immediately
before—visiting Hale was in dispute during the trial. Coddington testified at trial that he
smoked cocaine in Hale’s bathroom during the visit. 2003 Tr. VI at 47. And Dr. Smith
testified that Coddington had allegedly smoked cocaine sometime before arriving at
Hale’s house. Id. at 29. However, this testimony contrasts with Coddington’s original
confession during which he described the murder and surrounding events in detail, yet
never alleged that he had smoked crack cocaine in Hale’s bathroom. Id. at 55; State Ex.
89.
Moreover, in contrast to the above testimony, other evidence showed that it was
implausible for Coddington to have possessed and smoked cocaine at those alleged times.
15
By Coddington’s own admission, after conducting a robbery or a burglary, he would
immediately use the stolen money to buy cocaine, and “as soon as [he] bought that
cocaine [he] smoked it up.” Id. at 56. “And when [he] got to wanting another fix [he]
went and got some money and did the same thing.” Id. On the day of the murder, which
occurred sometime between 6:00pm and 7:00pm, the last time Coddington had stolen
money was at 2:30am when he robbed a convenience store. Id.** These admissions from
Coddington suggest that the last time he would have smoked cocaine on the day of the
murder was likely early in the morning after his last robbery, and that it would have been
uncharacteristic of him to have retained enough cocaine to smoke it in the evening. And
the fact that Coddington—again, by his own admission—quickly after the murder bought
more cocaine with the money he took from Hale’s wallet further suggests that
Coddington had already run out of the narcotic by that time and was desperate for more.
See id. at 78.
The jury therefore considered evidence suggesting that Coddington likely did not
ingest cocaine immediately before or during his visit with Hale, and that the effects of
any cocaine he smoked earlier in the day likely would have receded by the time of the
**
In his trial testimony, which took place over six years after the murder,
Coddington said he did not remember whether he committed any robberies between the
time he robbed the 7-11 at 2:30am and the time of the murder. 2003 Tr. VI at 56.
However, during his interrogation two days after the murder, he indicated that he did not
conduct another robbery until after the murder. Ex. 8 at 5, 20 (asserting that his first
robbery—the 7-11—took place on Tuesday night, while his second robbery—the
Texaco—took place on Wednesday night after the murder). Further, Coddington pleaded
guilty to six robberies, the first of which was the 7-11 at 2:50am on March 5, and the
second of which was the Texaco at 1:15am on March 6. C.A.O.R. I at 12–13.
16
murder. Considering this evidence, the jury could have found that Dr. Smith’s excluded
testimony—about Coddington’s alleged inability to form the requisite intent while under
the influence of cocaine—was irrelevant altogether.
3.
Even if the jury believed that Coddington was under the influence of cocaine—
from either a “high” or other cocaine-related effects—at the time of the murder, it still
likely would have found Coddington was capable of forming the requisite intent of
malice aforethought. Coddington testified that though he decided to take the cash from
Hale’s pocket, he deliberately refrained from taking Hale’s diamond ring because he
“couldn’t do that.” State Ex. 89 at 15. Therefore, if Coddington was indeed “high” at the
time of the murder, his actions immediately thereafter showed that he was nonetheless
capable of self-awareness during that period. Additionally, while allegedly “high on
cocaine,” Coddington successfully robbed three venues and intentionally began targeting
gas stations because they were more likely to carry cash. 2003 Tr. VI 58, 80; State Ex.
89 at 4–7, 9, 11. And during one of these robberies, Coddington devised a scheme in
which he first scoped-out the venue while pretending to buy a soft drink, then—after
ensuring the store was empty—returned with a knife so that he could rob the clerk. Id. at
57.
Further, the available evidence showed not only that Coddington was capable of
self-awareness at the time of the murder, but that he indeed had formed malice
aforethought when killing Hale. We agree with the OCCA that “the circumstances
surrounding [t]his murder suggest it was committed with intent. Coddington attacked
17
Hale after Hale refused to give him money for drugs. He hit Hale with the hammer three
times; Hale had defensive wounds, and there was significant blood spatter.” Coddington,
142 P.3d at 455–56. Not only did Coddington hit Hale so hard that he made Hale fall
over, but he continued to pound the back of Hale’s head with the hammer while Hale was
lying face-down on the floor. 2003 Tr. VI at 69–70. The repetition and force with which
Coddington struck Hale, along with evidence suggesting that Hale tried to defend
himself, could support a finding that Coddington had formed “the deliberate intention to
take away the life of a human being.” C.A.O.R. I at 88 (jury instruction defining “malice
aforethought”).
4.
In sum, we conclude that Coddington was not prejudiced by the trial court’s
decision to exclude Dr. Smith’s testimony that, in his opinion, Coddington “would not
have been able to form the intent of malice aforethought” while “experiencing the effects
of the cocaine.” 2003 Tr. V at 81. Despite the exclusion, the jury still heard evidence
about how cocaine could have made Coddington unaware of what he was doing. And
even with the excluded testimony, the jury still would have had to grapple with whether
Coddington was indeed intoxicated at the time of the murder. Regardless, Dr. Smith’s
excluded testimony would have been contradicted by evidence showing not only that
Coddington was capable of self-awareness at the time of the murder, but that he
repeatedly hit Hale with the intent to deliberately take away his life. Given this, we
simply cannot conclude that no “fairminded jurist could agree with the [OCCA’s]
decision that,” beyond a reasonable doubt, Dr. Smith’s testimony regarding intent would
18
not have made a difference in the outcome of the trial.†† Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2199. Put
another way, we do not find that the exclusion “had [a] substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.
IV.
In his second claim for relief, Coddington argues that his confession to the murder
should have been suppressed because he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his
Miranda rights. We find that the OCCA did not unreasonably apply federal law in
concluding that Coddington’s waiver was both knowing and voluntary. Neither the delay
between Coddington’s confession and the station-house interrogation, nor Coddington’s
drug use, were sufficient to render his confession unknowing or involuntary.
A.
Testimony from a custodial interrogation will be suppressed if the prisoner did not
knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S.
285, 292 (1988); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). This “inquiry has
two distinct dimensions.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense
that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full
awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it.
††
As noted above, the district court concluded that the OCCA’s determination was
not unreasonable. In the alternative, it held that even if the exclusion of Dr. Smith’s
testimony was not harmless, the jury would have still convicted Coddington of first
degree felony murder (because it convicted him of robbery with a dangerous weapon).
See Coddington, 2016 WL 4991685, at *6. Because we conclude the OCCA’s
determination was not unreasonable, we do not address the district court’s alternate
holding.
19
Id.“We engage in a totality of the circumstances approach, where no single factor—
whether intoxication, exhaustion, or other—is dispositive.” United States v. Burson, 531
F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2008). However, one circumstance that is not relevant to our
analysis is whether the suspect was aware of each possible subject of questioning. See
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987) (“[A] suspect’s awareness of all the
possible subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to determining
whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth
Amendment privilege.” (emphasis added)). Additionally, “[t]he mere fact of drug or
alcohol use will not” render a confession unknowing or involuntary. Burson, 531 F.3d at
1258. Drug use will only render a confession unknowing if it rises “to the level of
substantial impairment.” Id. (“The defendant must produce evidence showing his
condition was such that it rose to the level of substantial impairment [because] . . . [o]nly
then could we conclude the government has failed to prove the defendant possessed full
awareness of both the nature of his rights and the consequences of waiving them.”).
Likewise, drug use will render a confession involuntary only if the suspect’s “will was
overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession.” United States v.
Smith, 606 F.3d 1270, 1276–77 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted).
B.
Coddington advances several arguments for why his waiver was unknowing and
involuntary. See Pet’r Br. at 30–39. First, he contends that the officers misled him about
the nature of their questioning. Specifically, Coddington believes that the officers told
20
him that they wanted to question him about the robberies, when they clearly intended to
also question him about Hale’s murder. Coddington’s argument is unconvincing. “[A]
suspect’s awareness of all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation
is not relevant to determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment privilege.” Spring, 479 U.S. at 577. The
OCCA’s rejection of this argument, therefore, was a reasonable application of federal
law. See Coddington, 142 P.3d at 448 (citing Spring, 479 U.S. at 573, 577 to conclude
trial court properly admitted Coddington’s confession).
Second, Coddington argues that the interrogation at the police station occurred 2.5
to 3 hours after the officers initially read him his Miranda rights at his home. He believes
that this time gap between his waiver and the interrogation rendered his confession
unknowing. This argument overlooks key facts. First, before the police officers
interrogated Coddington at the police station, they asked him if he remembered being
advised of—and subsequently waiving—his Miranda rights several hours earlier; and
Coddington replied in the affirmative. Id. at 447; State Ex. 89 at 1–2. This court has
found that such a reminder under similar circumstances was adequate. See Burson, 531
F.3d at 1259 (concluding the defendant “knew his constitutional rights” where the
interrogating officer “asked [the defendant] if he remembered the Miranda warning he
was given at the time of his arrest less than two hours earlier” and the defendant
“responded affirmatively”). Second, Coddington had previous encounters with law
enforcement and was familiar with his Miranda rights. The Tenth Circuit has previously
held that a suspect’s knowledge of Miranda rights from previous encounters with law
21
enforcement is an appropriate consideration in determining whether a later waiver is
voluntary. Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 934 (10th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, it was
proper for the OCCA to consider Coddington’s previous law enforcement encounters in
its analysis. Coddington, 142 P.3d at 448 (“[F]rom his prior contacts with law
enforcement and prior convictions, we can assume he was familiar with and understood
the concepts encompassed in Miranda.” (quotations omitted)).
Third, Coddington contends that he could not have knowingly or voluntarily
waived his rights because he was intoxicated and sleep-deprived. It is well established
that intoxication alone will not render a confession involuntary. The intoxication must
rise to the level of “substantial impairment” to render the confession unknowing. See
Burson, 531 F.3d at 1258, 1260 (finding that the defendant—who was allegedly
“exhausted” and under the influence of drugs during an interrogation—voluntarily and
knowingly waived his rights where his “mental faculties were sufficient for him to
engage in an intelligent, rational dialogue with [the officer]”). Similarly, for intoxication
to render a confession involuntary, the circumstances of the confession must show that
the suspect’s will was overborne. See Smith, 606 F.3d at 1276–77.
The OCCA’s decision was consistent with these legal principles. Looking first to
the knowingness of Coddington’s confession, the OCCA observed that “[s]elf-induced
intoxication, short of mania, or such an impairment of the will and mind as to make the
person confessing unconscious of the meaning of his words, will not render a confession
inadmissible, but goes only to the weight to be accorded to it.” Coddington, 142 P.3d at
448 (quotations omitted). The OCCA then held that Coddington’s will was not
22
sufficiently impaired to render his confession inadmissible. See id. This was not an
unreasonable application of federal law. Coddington was able to recall “specific details
about the robberies and Hale’s murder, and appeared to understand exactly what was
going on.” Id. This shows that, like the defendant in Burson, Coddington’s “mental
faculties were sufficient” enough for him to voluntarily and knowingly waive his rights.
Burson, 531 F.3d at 1260.
Coddington also argued before the OCCA, as he does here, that his heightened
intoxication is demonstrated by the fact that he confessed to crimes that authorities in
Oklahoma were unable to corroborate. However, we agree with the OCCA that this fact
on its own “does not show he was so intoxicated that his Miranda waiver was not
knowingly and voluntarily made.” Id. Coddington confessed to numerous crimes that
Oklahoma was able to verify, and he recalled specific details from those crimes.
Finally, the OCCA did not unreasonably apply federal law in concluding that
Coddington’s drug use did not render his confession involuntary. See id. at 447–48. The
totality of the circumstances demonstrate that Coddington was aware of his surroundings
and that the officers did not pressure or coerce him into confessing. Accordingly, even if
Coddington was intoxicated at the time of the confession, Coddington has not shown that
his “will was overborne.” Smith, 606 F.3d at 1276 (quotation marks omitted).
V.
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of
Coddington’s petition for habeas relief.
23