Prather v. Hedgecoth

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 18, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
JOHN C. PRATHER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 09-5160
(D.C. No. 4:09-CV-00393-CVE-TLW)
GAIL HEDGECOTH, Osage County (N.D. Okla.)
Assessor; THE OKLAHOMA TAX
COMMISSION; STATE OF
OKLAHOMA; BILL CAUGHMAN;
W B MCCABE,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
OSAGE COUNTY ASSESSOR’S
OFFICE, certain employees; OSAGE
COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION, members of; JOHN
DOE; JANE DOE,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, TYMKOVICH, and GORSUCH, Circuit
Judges.
John C. Prather, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed suit in
federal district court to appeal an increase in his 2009 property taxes and to
challenge the tax procedures of Osage County, Oklahoma. As defendants, he
named the Osage County Assessor, an employee in the Assessor’s office, the
chair and panel members of the Osage County Board of Equalization, the
Oklahoma Tax Commission, and the State of Oklahoma.
The district court construed Mr. Prather’s complaint liberally and
determined that it raised constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various
state-law causes of action. It determined, however, that the claims were barred by
Eleventh Amendment immunity and the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
The district court therefore dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
We affirm.
I.
Mr. Prather is a member of the Osage Indian Tribe, a resident of Osage
County, and an owner of real property subject to county property tax. After he
received notice that his property taxes would be increasing in 2009, he pursued an
informal telephone appeal with the Osage County Assessor’s Office. His point
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was that housing prices had generally decreased because Oklahoma, along with
the rest of the country, was in a severe recession. Nevertheless, the Assessor’s
Office confirmed that the tax increase was final.
Mr. Prather then requested supporting documentation from the Assessor.
The responsive documents suggested to him that the assessment of his
cement-block barn was erroneous. He asked the Assessor to look at the barn and
reassess any taxes based on the value of the barn. When a field agent came out to
the property, Mr. Prather objected to the agent’s use of a cloth tape measure and
inspection of structures other than the barn. He ordered the agent off the
property.
Dissatisfied, Mr. Prather filed a formal appeal with the Osage County
Board of Equalization. From Mr. Prather’s perspective, the appeal process was
flawed. He alleged that the Board did not subpoena requested documents, the
regular Board panel was not present at the hearing, and the Board was in a
conspiracy with the Assessor. During a post-hearing attempt by the Assessor’s
office to re-measure his buildings, Mr. Prather refused to let county field agents
onto his property. Ultimately, the Board confirmed the tax increase.
Mr. Prather filed a complaint in federal district court, alleging that
defendants violated his equal-protection and due-process rights and conspired to
violate his civil rights. He also asserted state-law claims of invasion of privacy,
intentional affliction of emotional distress, fraud and negligence. The State of
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Oklahoma and Oklahoma Tax Commission sought dismissal arguing, among other
things, that Eleventh-Amendment immunity deprived the district court of
subject-matter jurisdiction. The individual county defendants also moved for
dismissal, based on the Tax Injunction Act.
In a thoughtful and thorough Opinion and Order, the district court agreed
with both the state and county defendants. Without reaching the merits of Mr.
Prather’s claims, it entered a judgment of dismissal. Mr. Prather filed his appeal
in this court.
II.
Both Eleventh Amendment immunity and the Tax Injunction Act implicate
the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v.
Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 760-61 (10th Cir. 2010) (Tax Injunction Act); Ruiz v.
McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1180 (10th Cir. 2002) (Eleventh Amendment
immunity). We conduct a de novo review of dismissals premised on these two
theories. Chamber of Commerce, 594 F.3d at 760-61.
State Defendants and Eleventh Amendment Immunity
“Under the Eleventh Amendment, states are generally immune from suits
brought in federal court by their own citizens, by citizens of other states, by
foreign sovereigns, and by Indian tribes.” Id. at 760. Mr. Prather sued the State
of Oklahoma and the Oklahoma Tax Commission, evidently for actions taken in
alleged concert with Osage County officials and employees. On appeal, we have
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examined Mr. Prather’s filings and the record. Our review reveals no coherent
argument against the State defendants’ entitlement to immunity from suit under
the Eleventh Amendment--immunity that extends to the State’s individual officers
in their official capacities. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
71 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a
suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it
is no different from a suit against the State itself.”).
County Defendants and the Tax Injunction Act
The Tax Injunction Act provides, in its entirety: “The district courts shall
not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under
State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of
such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. The Act is intended “to protect the federal
balance by permitting states to define and elaborate their own laws through their
own courts and administrative processes without undue interference from the
Federal Judiciary. To that end, [it] erects a broad barrier to the jurisdiction of
federal courts.” Chamber of Commerce, 594 F.3d at 761 (quotation, citation, and
alteration omitted). The Act “divest[s] the federal courts of subject matter
jurisdiction over claims challenging state taxation procedures where the state
courts provide a plain, speedy and efficient remedy.” Marcus v. Kan. Dep’t of
Revenue, 170 F.3d 1305, 1309 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). This
jurisdictional bar remains in place even if a case involves civil-rights claims or an
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individual member of an Indian tribe. See Brooks v. Nance, 801 F.2d 1237,
1239-40 (10th Cir. 1986).
Under any interpretation of Mr. Prather’s filings, his challenge to the
property-tax increase and state procedures lies within the ambit of the Act.
Further, it is apparent that Oklahoma provides him with a sufficient remedy in
Oklahoma State Court, including the opportunity to proceed in forma pauperis.
See Okla. Stat. tit. 68 § 2880.1 (conferring on taxpayer the right to appeal a
county board of equalization decision to district court, with further appeal to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court); Okla. Stat. tit. 68 § 2885(B) (providing that appeals
“from all boards of equalization shall have precedence”); Okla. Stat. tit. 28
§ 152(G) (setting forth Oklahoma’s in forma pauperis procedure).
III.
The district court correctly dismissed Mr. Prather’s case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. We therefore AFFIRM.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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