United States v. Spencer

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
July 14, 2010
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
No. 09-2289
v. (D.C. No. 1:07-CR-01767-LH-1)
(D. N.M.)
LYLE MICHAEL SPENCER,
Defendant–Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before KELLY, McWILLIAMS, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Lyle Michael Spencer appeals his conviction and sentence for involuntary
manslaughter and assault resulting in serious bodily injury. Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we affirm.
I
On August 5, 2007, Spencer was driving while intoxicated in Indian Country.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Speeding in excess of 100 miles per hour, he crashed into the rear of another vehicle,
killing one passenger and seriously injuring another.
Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Spencer pled guilty to involuntary
manslaughter in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1112 and assault resulting in serious bodily
injury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6). In exchange, the government promised that
it would not bring additional charges and stipulated that Spencer was entitled to a two- to
three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. However, the plea agreement was
expressly limited as follows:
a. The United States has made, and will make, NO AGREEMENT
pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C), Fed. R. Crim. P., that a specific sentence is
the appropriate disposition of this case.
b. The United States has made, and will make, NO AGREEMENT to
approve, to oppose, or not to oppose pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(B), Fed. R.
Crim. P., any request made by the defendant or on behalf of the defendant
for a particular sentence in this case.
c. The United States hereby expressly reserves the right to make
known to the United States Probation Office, for inclusion in the
presentence report prepared pursuant to Rule 32(c)(2), Fed. R. Crim. P.,
any information that the United States believes may be helpful to the Court.
A Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) prepared the Unites States Probation
Office calculated a total offense level of twenty-one after deducting three levels for
acceptance of responsibility. It further assessed Spencer five criminal history points
based on three prior driving under the influence (“DUI”) convictions and the fact that the
instant offense was committed while Spencer was on probation, leading to a criminal
history category of III. Using these values, and identifying no reason to depart from the
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advisory Guidelines range, the PSR recommended a sentence of forty-six to fifty-seven
months’ imprisonment.
Following preparation of the PSR, the government moved for an upward departure
or variance. It sought a sentence of 120 months. Spencer moved to strike the motion,
arguing that the government’s actions violated the plea agreement.
The district court conducted three sentencing hearings. During these hearings, the
court heard argument on Spencer’s motion to strike and evidence from two accident
reconstruction experts. At the first hearing, the court denied Spencer’s motion to strike
and announced that it was inclined to vary upward. Before imposing a sentence, the
court provided Spencer an opportunity to withdraw his plea. Spencer declined.
At the final sentencing hearing, the court concluded that the PSR properly
calculated the advisory Guidelines range as forty-six to fifty-seven months. However, the
court determined that several 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors warranted a sentence above that
range. It noted that Spencer’s actions resulted in the death of a woman and serious
injuries to a twelve-year-old girl, that Spencer refused a breathalyzer but admitted he was
drunk, that Spencer was travelling more than 100 miles per hour, and that Spencer had
three prior DUI convictions. Citing the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
characteristics of the defendant, along with the need to promote respect for the rule of law
and impose just punishment, the court settled on a sentence of seventy-two months on the
manslaughter count and ninety-six months on the assault count, with the sentences to run
concurrently. Spencer timely appealed.
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II
We first consider Spencer’s contention that the government violated the plea
agreement by filing a motion for an upward departure or variance, and by presenting
evidence directly to the court. “Whether the government violated a plea agreement is . . .
a question of law subject to de novo review. We review a sentencing court’s factual
determinations under a clearly erroneous standard.” United States v. Johnson, 973 F.2d
857, 859 (10th Cir. 1992) (quotations and citations omitted).
“Where the Government obtains a guilty plea which is predicated in any
significant degree on a promise or agreement with the U.S. Attorney, such promise or
agreement must be fulfilled to maintain the integrity of the plea.” United States v.
Stemm, 847 F.2d 636, 637 (10th Cir. 1988). “This Circuit uses a two-step analysis to
determine whether the United States violated a plea agreement: the sentencing court
should 1) examine the nature of the promise; and 2) evaluate the promise in light of the
defendant’s reasonable understanding of the promise at the time of the guilty plea.”
United States v. Guzman, 318 F.3d 1191, 1195-96 (10th Cir. 2003). “General principles
of contract law define the government’s obligations under the agreement, looking to the
express language and construing any ambiguities against the government as the drafter of
the agreement.” Id. at 1195. “We will not allow the government to resort to a rigidly
literal construction of the language of the plea agreement to frustrate a defendant’s
reasonable expectations. However, the government’s obligations to the defendant do not
arise from mere silence.” United States v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 124 F.3d 1194, 1199
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(10th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted).
Spencer claims that two provisions of the plea agreement, paragraphs 7c and 9,
demonstrate an implicit promise that the government would not present facts directly to
the court. Paragraph 7c provides: “The United States hereby expressly reserves the right
to make known to the United States Probation Office, for inclusion in the presentence
report prepared pursuant to Rule 32(c)(2), Fed. R. Crim. P., any information that the
United States believes may be helpful to the Court.” Paragraph 9 states: “By signing this
agreement . . . [t]he defendant agrees that the Court may rely on any of these facts, as
well as facts in the presentence report, to determine the defendant’s sentence, including,
but not limited to, the advisory guideline level.”
Spencer claims that he reasonably understood these provisions as requiring the
government to present any and all evidence to the Probation Office rather than the court.
He analogizes his case to United States v. Cachucha, 484 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2007). In
Cachucha, the government agreed to recommend a sentence within the advisory
Guidelines range and stipulated to a specific offense level. Id. at 1270. Although the
prosecutor technically recommended a within-Guidelines sentence, he preceded his
official recommendation with complaints that the Guidelines range was “way too low”
and “incredibly low,” and stated that a within-Guidelines sentence did not “make any
sense to [him] as a professional prosecutor.” Id. We concluded that the prosecutor’s
statements constituted a breach of the government’s promise to recommend a within-
Guidelines sentence. Id.-5-
Spencer also points to United States v. Rewis, 969 F.2d 985 (11th Cir. 1992), in
which the parties entered into a plea agreement reserving the government’s right to
inform the court of “all relevant facts regarding the offenses,” but explicitly noting that
the defendant had no obligation to cooperate with the government. Id. at 987. The
government further promised that it would not recommend a sentence. Id. Despite these
promises, it submitted a sentencing memorandum in which it stressed the defendant’s
refusal to cooperate and suggested that a lengthy sentence was necessary to encourage
cooperation from future defendants. Id. The Eleventh Circuit held that the government
breached the plea agreement by “dwelling on Rewis’ noncooperation” and by
“suggest[ing] a harsh sentence.” Id. at 988.
Rewis and Cachucha properly prohibited the government from breaching a
specific term of a plea agreement despite technical compliance. In both instances, the
government advocated for a stiff sentence contrary to explicit promises. In the case at
bar, however, Spencer cannot point to a specific term of the agreement the government
has breached: The government expressly refused to agree that any particular sentence
would be appropriate for Spencer. Nor do the provisions cited by Spencer bar the
government from submitting evidence to the court; they simply make clear that the
government will submit evidence to the Probation Office for preparation of the PSR.
Spencer counters that such a reading would contravene the well-settled
“presumption that every provision of a contract is placed there for a purpose” and
therefore should be given effect. Mountain West Mines, Inc. v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron
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Co., 470 F.3d 947, 952 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). Yet our interpretation does
not render paragraphs 7c and 9 nugatory. It allows the government to provide relevant
facts to the probation officer, the district court, or both, which is the general state of
affairs in a sentencing proceeding. It also considers reality: The probation office “acts as
an agent of the court for the purpose of gathering and classifying information and
informing the court in the exercise of its sentencing responsibility.” United States v.
Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 979 (10th Cir. 1990).
To the extent that Spencer believed the plea agreement prohibited the government
from arguing or presenting evidence to the court, such a belief was unreasonable.
Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the government did not breach the plea
agreement.
III
Spencer also argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. “Review
for substantive reasonableness focuses on whether the length of the sentence is
reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 2009)
(quotation omitted). We review a district court’s sentencing determination for abuse of
discretion regardless of whether the sentence is inside or outside the advisory Guidelines
range. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). However, when a district court
selects a sentence outside the Guidelines range, it “must consider the extent of the
deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree
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of the variance.” Id. at 50. “[A] major departure should be supported by a more
significant justification than a minor one.” Id. “A district court abuses its discretion
when it renders a judgment that is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly
unreasonable.” United States v. Yanez-Rodriguez, 555 F.3d 931, 946 (10th Cir. 2009)
(quotation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct.
1423 (2009).
Spencer contends that the district court improperly relied on factors already
considered in the Guidelines. But in this circuit, “[d]istrict courts have broad discretion
to consider particular facts in fashioning a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), even
when those facts are already accounted for in the advisory guidelines range.” Yanez-
Rodriguez, 555 F.3d at 946. Spencer also argues that his crime fell within the heartland
of involuntary manslaughter and assault cases. See United States v. Montgomery, 550
F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008). He claims that U.S.S.G. § 2A1.4 considers his reckless
behavior and that his three prior DUI convictions were fully represented in setting his
criminal history category. We disagree.
Application note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 2A1.4 defines “reckless” as the disregard of a
risk that “constitute[s] a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would exercise in such a situation.” It further provides that driving “while under
the influence of alcohol or drugs” that results in the death of another “ordinarily should
be treated as reckless.” Id. The district court correctly determined that Spencer’s actions
were exceptionally reckless even under this definition. Spencer chose to drive more than
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100 miles per hour while he was intoxicated to such a degree that he crashed into the rear
of a vehicle that was safely driving at or near the speed limit directly in front of him.
Notwithstanding the faux physics advanced by the defense at oral argument—that this
case involved a mere forty-mile-per-hour accident—the cumulative speed of the vehicle
that was struck caused it to flip and crash, killing a mother and injuring a twelve-year old
child. Such conduct is particularly egregious, even among DUIs leading to the death of
another.
With respect to the criminal history category, a defendant could accumulate five
criminal history points for any number of crimes. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1. But all three of
the convictions relevant to Spencer’s criminal history score were for DUIs. This fact
plainly takes him outside the heartland of defendants in criminal history category III.
Spencer was well aware of the risks of driving under the influence of alcohol, but opted
to continue his unlawful behavior despite three prior convictions. The district court’s
conclusion that this pattern of behavior rendered Spencer more culpable than most
defendants charged with involuntary manslaughter and assault was entirely permissible.
Spencer’s repeated decisions to drive while under the influence similarly support the
court’s determination that a variance was necessary to promote respect for the rule of law
and to impose just punishment. Even assuming that this case involves a “major”
variance, see Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, we do not discern a basis in the record to set aside the
sentence imposed as an abuse of discretion.
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IV
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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