Horace Mann Ins. v. Myers

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SEP 9 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
HORACE MANN INSURANCE
COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 96-6346
v. (D.C. No. CIV-95-1725-R)
(W.D. Okla.)
ROXANNA MYERS, Personal
Representative of the Estate of
John W. Myers, Deceased;
ROXANNA MYERS, an individual;
ORVILLE E. MYERS, an individual,
Defendants-Appellants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY and HENRY, Circuit Judges, and DOWNES, ** District Judge.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
Honorable William F. Downes, District Judge, United States District Court
for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Horace Mann Insurance Company brought this diversity action for
declaratory judgment to ascertain its rights and obligations under an automobile
insurance policy issued to defendants Roxanna Myers and Orville Myers.
Defendant Roxanna Myers, as personal representative, made a claim under the
policy for the death of the Myerses’ minor son John W. Myers, who was killed
while riding in a motor vehicle driven by Mr. Myers. The district court entered
summary judgment, concluding that Oklahoma state law permits defendants to
recover only the statutorily mandated minimum coverage amount of $10,000,
rather than the $100,000 defendants claimed. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.
The automobile insurance policy issued to defendants Roxanna Myers and
Orville Myers contains an exclusion from coverage for members of the insureds’
household, which applied to the decedent. The Myerses assert that the household
members exclusion does not apply because it is invalid under Oklahoma law or, in
the alternative, the insurance policy was ambiguous and therefore the question of
their reasonable expectation of coverage presented a jury question. They also
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argue that because the insurance coverage went into effect before they received a
copy of the full policy, they are entitled to rely on the preliminary application
documents which did not refer to the household member exclusion. Lastly, they
maintain that the district court should have certified a question of law to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court.
We review de novo the district court’s summary judgment order, applying
the same standards as the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Wolf v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 50 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1995). There is no
dispute that Oklahoma state law controls. In applying Oklahoma law, we afford
no deference to the district court’s legal rulings. See Salve Regina College v.
Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1991).
The Myerses argue that summary judgment was inappropriate because the
question of their reasonable expectations of insurance coverage was a jury
question. Oklahoma has recognized the doctrine of reasonable expectations
which applies where an insurance policy is ambiguous or contains “exclusions
which are masked by technical or obscure language or which are hidden in policy
provisions.” Max True Plastering Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 912
P.2d 861, 863 (Okla. 1996). Contrary to defendants’ argument, the question of
whether the policy is ambiguous or contains obscure exclusions is for the court,
not the jury, to decide. See id. at 865, 869. Based on our independent review of
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the insurance policy, we hold that the policy is not ambiguous and the household
members exclusion challenged here is not technical, obscure or hidden.
Accordingly, the doctrine of reasonable expectations does not apply.
We turn to the Myerses’ claim that the household members exclusion is
void under Oklahoma law. In Nation v. State Farm Insurance Co., 880 P.2d 877
(Okla. 1994), a plurality held that a household exclusion is invalid up to the
minimum limits of liability insurance required by Oklahoma statute as a condition
of operating a motor vehicle. See id. at 877. Therefore, because the statutory
minimum was $10,000, the automobile insurer was required to pay $10,000 on
each policy. See id. at 878. We conclude that under Nation, the household
exclusion limits defendants’ recovery to $10,000. See Pierce v. Oklahoma
Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 901 P.2d 819, 821 (Okla. 1995) (“In [Nation], we
invalidated, to the extent of the minimum coverage required by statute, an
exclusion which omitted from coverage all resident members of a household.”).
The Myerses next argue that the policy was improperly amended from the
time of the application to the time the actual policy was mailed to them. They do
not dispute plaintiffs’ statement that the application stated that the policy booklet
superseded the application binder. Therefore, defendants are bound by the policy.
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Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s refusal to
certify a question to the Oklahoma Supreme Court because we conclude that
summary judgment was appropriate under prevailing Oklahoma state law. See
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Brown, 920 F.2d 664, 667 (10th Cir. 1990) (decision to certify
question to state supreme court is within discretion of federal district court).
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
William F. Downes
District Judge
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