Darling v. McCurtain County

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 8 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
EDITH DARLING,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-7019
(D.C. No. 96-CV-189-P)
McCURTAIN COUNTY BOARD OF (E.D. Okla.)
COMMISSIONERS, also known as
Board of County Commissioners of
McCurtain County, Oklahoma,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK, BARRETT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff, Edith Darling, appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendant, McCurtain County Board of Commissioners,
in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action, and the dismissal of her pendent
state claims. “We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standard used by the district court pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).” Goldsmith v. Learjet, Inc., 90 F.3d 1490, 1493 (10th
Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
We construe the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in
the light most favorable to Ms. Darling, as the nonmovant. See Gullickson v.
Southwest Airlines Pilots’ Ass’n, 87 F.3d 1176, 1183 (10th Cir. 1996).
Ms. Darling claims the deputy sheriff of McCurtain County forcibly entered her
home without a warrant, forcibly seized her and placed her into involuntary
protective custody in violation of her Fourth Amendment and due process rights.
Ms. Darling claims that the deputy did not comply with the requirements of
Oklahoma’s emergency detention and protective custody statute, Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 43A, § 5-207, though she does not dispute that the deputy received prior
authorization from a state district court judge to take her into protective custody.
However, she does dispute defendant’s evidence that she was suicidal and
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intoxicated at the time she was taken into custody, and she claims that the deputy
sheriff used excessive force when taking her into custody. These disputed issues
are not material, however, because Ms. Darling has not presented evidence that
defendant is liable for the deputy’s actions. See Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d
1341, 1346-47 (10th Cir. 1997) (“A fact is ‘material’ only if it may affect the
suit’s outcome.”).
Municipal liability in § 1983 cases is limited to deprivation of federally
protected rights caused by action taken pursuant to official municipal policy.
See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
The plaintiff must . . . demonstrate that, through its deliberate
conduct, the municipality was the “moving force” behind the injury
alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was
taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a
direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation
of federal rights.
Board of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1388 (1997).
As thoroughly discussed by the district court in its order, Ms. Darling presented
no facts demonstrating such a causal link between the alleged actions by the
deputy sheriff and the Board of County Commissioners. Her conclusory
allegations that the deputy acted pursuant to an unconstitutional, established
county policy in taking her into protective custody, or that the county had an
inadequate training program for sheriffs and their deputies regarding protective
custody seizures are unsupported by any evidence and, thus, are insufficient to
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defeat summary judgment. See White v. York Int’l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360
(10th Cir. 1995) (conclusory allegations will not defeat properly supported motion
for summary judgment).
We have carefully reviewed the record on appeal and we conclude the
district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant on Ms. Darling’s
§ 1983 claim, and we discern no abuse of discretion in its decision to dismiss her
pendent state claims. The judgment of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED substantially for the reasons set forth
in its order dated January 24, 1997.
Entered for the Court
James E. Barrett
Senior Circuit Judge
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