United States v. Richardson

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
JUN 8 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-5137
(D.C. No. 97-CV-353)
BOBBY GENE RICHARDSON, (N.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO, BARRETT, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Defendant Bobby Gene Richardson appeals from the district court’s
denial of his motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The
background facts of this case are fully set forth in United States v. Richardson, 86
F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1996), and we will repeat here only those facts necessary to
our analysis. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Richardson was originally convicted of eight counts of drug trafficking
and weapons charges. He was sentenced to 168 months’ imprisonment on the
drug convictions followed by 60 months’ imprisonment on the weapons
convictions. Richardson’s sentence was based on the sentencing court’s finding
that the drug offenses involved d-methamphetamine. 1 This court affirmed
Richardson’s convictions on direct appeal. See id. at 1554. In his § 2255 motion,
Richardson challenges his sentence on the grounds that (1) his counsel’s failure to
1
Methamphetamine exists in two isomeric forms: d-methamphetamine and l-
methamphetamine. L-methamphetamine produces very little effect when ingested
while d-methamphetamine produces the high desired by users. According to the
Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time Richardson was sentenced, in
calculating a base offense level, one gram of d-methamphetamine was equivalent
to one kilogram of marijuana and one gram of l-methamphetamine was equivalent
to 40 grams of marijuana. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (1994), Drug Equivalency
Tables. There was, therefore, a significant sentencing difference between the two
isomers. See United States v. Deninno, 29 F.3d 572, 579 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1994).
Because of the fact that l-methamphetamine is rarely seen and not intentionally
produced, the Sentencing Guidelines were amended effective November 1, 1995,
to eliminate the distinction between the two isomers. See Amendment 518,
United States Guidelines Manual, Appendix C at 343-44. As of the effective date
of the amendment, offenses involving l-methamphetamine are treated the same as
offenses involving d-methamphetamine. See id.-2-
object to the lack of proof that the 4.5 kilograms of methamphetamine considered
by the court to be relevant conduct was, in fact, d-methamphetamine constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) the district court erred when it included
the 4.5 kilograms of methamphetamine as relevant conduct in determining his
base offense level under the sentencing guidelines. 2
“We review a district court’s factual finding that a specific isomer of
methamphetamine was involved in criminal activity for clear error.” United
States v. Lande, 40 F.3d 329, 330 (10th Cir. 1994). We will not disturb a
sentencing court’s finding unless it lacks factual support in the record, or “we
are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made after
reviewing all of the evidence.” Id. The government bears the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence the type of methamphetamine involved in the
offense of conviction. See United States v. Glover, 97 F.3d 1345, 1347 (10th Cir.
1996).
2
Because Richardson filed his § 2255 motion after enactment of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, provisions of that act
requiring federal habeas appellants to obtain a certificate of appealability apply
in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). In this court’s order of April 15, 1998,
we granted Richardson a certificate of appealability on his first issue regarding
his sentencing based on d-methamphetamine, but denied the requisite certificate
of appealability on Richardson’s issue of the quantity of drugs used to determine
his sentencing range. Therefore, in this decision we review only Richardson’s
issue regarding the type of methamphetamine used to calculate his sentence.
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The district court concluded that, even if counsel was ineffective in failing
to object, Richardson was not prejudiced and the outcome of sentencing would
have been the same. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)
(holding that in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that counsel’s
errors prejudiced the defense).
In a recent case we held that counsel’s failure to require the government to
meet its burden of proof as to the type of methamphetamine involved in a drug
offense constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. See Glover, 97 F.3d at
1349-50. In Glover, however, the government did not present any evidence of the
type of methamphetamine involved in the offenses at issue either at sentencing or
in the defendant’s § 2255 proceeding. See id. at 1350. Therefore, this court
remanded the case to the district court to determine, if possible, the type of
methamphetamine used in calculating the defendant’s sentence. See id. Here,
however, the government presented evidence at sentencing as to the type
of methamphetamine involved in Richardson’s offenses.
Richardson and coconspirator, Darrell Wayne Stone, were arrested as
a result of an undercover operation involving controlled buys of narcotics. At the
time Richardson was arrested, the government, pursuant to a search warrant,
seized approximately one pound of methamphetamine and six empty baggies from
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Richardson’s tool shed near his residence. The methamphetamine recovered was
tested and found to be d-methamphetamine. The empty baggies contained
methamphetamine residue.
At Richardson’s trial, Stone testified that approximately two years earlier
he had driven Richardson to the Tulsa airport where Richardson took delivery
of approximately ten pounds of methamphetamine. Stone testified that the
methamphetamine was packaged in two and a half pound vacuum sealed bags
and was transferred to the kind of bags recovered in Richardson’s tool shed.
Stone also testified that Richardson later told him he only had one pound of
methamphetamine left and owed his supplier over $100,000.
At sentencing, the government offered into evidence the lab report
indicating that the methamphetamine seized from Richardson’s residence was
d-methamphetamine. By proffer, the government offered the testimony of the
arresting police officer who was prepared to testify as to the bags containing
methamphetamine residue which were seized in Richardson’s tool shed. With
date and time restrictions, Richardson’s counsel accepted this proffer. The
government then argued that this evidence was consistent with Mr. Stone’s trial
testimony that Richardson received a large amount of methamphetamine earlier,
repackaged it into smaller portions, sold it over time, and told Stone shortly
before his arrest that he had only one pound left.
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Even when “‘no direct evidence of the drug’s chemical composition or the
method of its manufacture is available, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient
to determine which isomer is involved.’” Id. at 1350 n.5 (quoting United States v.
Dudden, 65 F.3d 1461, 1471 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Lande, 40 F.3d at 331
(relying on circumstantial evidence to uphold finding that drug involved was
d-methamphetamine). Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the
district court did not commit clear error in finding that the methamphetamine used
as relevant conduct in calculating Richardson’s base offense level was,
more likely than not, d-methamphetamine. Despite counsel’s ineffectiveness,
see Glover, 97 F.3d at 1349-50, Richardson has not demonstrated that his
counsel’s performance was so prejudicial “that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Therefore, the district court
properly denied Richardson’s § 2255 motion.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
John C. Porfilio
Circuit Judge
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