United States v. Fields

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
OCT 9 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 98-8033
v. (D. Wyoming)
HURON FIELDS, (D.C. No. 98-CV-71-CAB)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Huron Fields, having been granted a certificate of appealability by the
district court, appeals the dismissal, on the ground of untimeliness, of his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
In 1980, Mr. Fields pled guilty to multiple federal crimes and was
sentenced to two consecutive life terms of imprisonment, and three consecutive
fifteen-year terms, all to commence after he completed serving a sentence for
state crimes. Mr. Fields’ federal convictions and sentences became final in 1980.
He began serving his federal sentences in 1991 or 1992.
Subject to certain other triggering events not applicable here, a prisoner
may not file a § 2255 motion more than one year after the prisoner’s conviction
becomes final. Id. In United States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 746 (10th Cir.
1997), this court held that a prisoner whose conviction became final before the
effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, i.e., before
April 24, 1996, had until April 23, 1997, to file his § 2255 motion.
On April 14, 1997, Mr. Fields filed a motion in the district court requesting
an extension of time to May 23, 1997, for filing his § 2255 motion, due to
difficulties in assembling certain materials. That motion was granted. On May
12, 1997, he filed another, essentially open-ended motion, for an extension of
time to file. That motion was not granted. Mr. Fields ultimately filed his motion
on March 23, 1998, well beyond the applicable one-year limitations period. The
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district court ruled, among other things, that the motion was untimely, and denied
relief.
Mr. Fields’ only relevant argument on the point is that the AEDPA may not
be applied retroactively to those whose convictions and sentences became final
before the effective date of the Act; therefore, he is not subject to the one-year
period of limitations. We have rejected that argument on the ground that the
limitations period would not begin until April 24, 1996, thus giving prisoners
ample additional opportunity to file. See Simmonds, 111 F.3d at 746.
Furthermore, this interpretation of the law does not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause. An ex post facto law is one that retroactively alters the definition of a
crime or increases the punishment for criminal conduct. Lynce v. Mathis, 117 S.
Ct. 891, 896 (1997). Our holding in Simmonds, and the limitation period in the
AEDPA, do neither.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The
mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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