Bowman v. Anderson

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 18 1998
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CECIL BOWMAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 98-6214
v. (W.D. Oklahoma)
ROBERT ANDERSON, in his Official (D.C. No. 97-CV-701-L)
Capacity as the Chairman of the
Oklahoma Tax Commission,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON , McKAY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
*
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
This case involves an employment dispute between Cecil Bowman and his
longtime employer, the Oklahoma Tax Commission. Bowman sought, and was
denied, a promotion within the ranks of the Tax Commission. After he was
denied the promotion, Bowman filed this action in the district court, alleging that
the Tax Commission had unlawfully discriminated against him in violation of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 , and Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. The district court granted the Tax
Commission’s motion for summary judgment, and Bowman appeals. For the
reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
BACKGROUND
The record shows the following facts to be undisputed. After his
graduation from high school in 1963, Bowman held various jobs, including
district manager for a life insurance company, security investigator for an auto
supply company, security officer for a hospital, and manager of a hotel. In 1980,
Bowman enrolled in school at The State University of New York at Albany,
where he graduated in 1983, earning a degree in business and social science.
Bowman went on to earn a master’s degree in law enforcement from Columbia
Pacific University. Soon after completing his master’s work in 1985, Bowman
took a job with the Oklahoma Tax Commission. When he entered the service of
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the Tax Commission, Bowman held the position of Revenue Examiner I. In 1988,
Bowman was promoted to the position of Revenue Examiner II, and he held that
position when, in 1995, he sought a promotion to the position of Auditor I, the
promotion at issue in this case.
For persons without an accounting degree, including Bowman, the typical
career ladder for promotion within the Oklahoma Tax Commission begins with
Revenue Examiner I, and progresses to Revenue Examiner II, Tax Auditor, and
eventually to Senior Tax Auditor. The Auditor I position, which Bowman sought
in 1995, is the career ladder equivalent of Senior Tax Auditor.
The published requirements for the Auditor I position include either (1) “a
baccalaureate degree in accounting,” (2) “a baccalaureate degree in business or
public administration and one year of professional-level auditing experience,” or
(3) “an equivalent combination of education and experience.” Appellant’s App.
at 116. Before an applicant can be hired for any position with the Tax
Commission, the Oklahoma Office of Personnel Management (OPM) must certify
that the applicant meets the published qualifications.
Bowman does not have a degree in accounting, and therefore must fit into
one of the other two categories. The record reflects that the positions of Revenue
Examiner I and Revenue Examiner II are not considered “professional-level
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auditing experience.” Id. at 92 (uncontradicted deposition testimony of Hank
Batty).
In 1992, while working as a Revenue Examiner II, Bowman sought
certification from OPM that he was qualified for the Auditor I position. He sat
for and passed the required written test, and on April 7, 1992, OPM sent Bowman
a letter stating that he was eligible to be considered for the Auditor I position
when an opening became available. Id. at 98. Bowman periodically renewed this
eligibility, and in 1995, when he applied for the Auditor I position, OPM listed
Bowman as qualified and eligible for the position. The Oklahoma Merit Rules for
Employment require OPM to give notice to persons who are removed from the
qualified list for reasons other than lapse of time, and grant such persons a right
of appeal from the decision of removal. The record reflects that Bowman was
never notified of any removal from the qualified list.
On or about May 10, 1995, the Tax Commission posted a notice stating that
there were three new openings for the Auditor I position. Bowman, along with 25
others, submitted an application for the positions. The record does not reflect the
gender and age of all 26 of the applicants. From this pool of 26 applicants, the
Tax Commission selected ten for personal interviews. Bowman was not selected.
The ten interviewed candidates included five men and five women; five of the
interviewees were over the age of 40.
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The Tax Commission selected three candidates from this pool. The
Commission extended offers to a 50-year-old male, a 37-year-old female, and a
58-year-old female. Soon after this selection, OPM discovered, upon review of
the three candidates’ qualifications, that the 50-year-old male did not qualify for
the position. The Tax Commission then tendered an offer to the highest-ranked
individual remaining, a 29-year-old female.
On April 29, 1997, Bowman filed this action in the district court. He
alleged that the Tax Commission violated his civil rights by denying him a
promotion on the basis of his gender and age. In July 1997, soon after the suit
was filed, OPM reviewed Bowman’s file to determine why he had been denied the
promotion. This review revealed that Bowman did not meet the educational and
experience requirements for the Auditor I position. In his deposition, OPM
official Hank Batty testified that he did not know why his office had certified
Bowman as qualified in 1992. He posited two possible explanations for this:
either Bowman submitted different information in 1992 than he did in 1995, or
else someone at OPM had simply made an error in certifying Bowman. Id. at 88.
Batty testified that “the most likely” explanation was that OPM made a mistake by
certifying Bowman in 1992. Id.
In November 1997, the Tax Commission moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted this motion on January 26, 1998, holding that Bowman
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could not make out a prima facie case of discrimination under either ADEA or
Title VII, and that even if he could, there was no evidence in the record which
demonstrated that the Commission’s proffered reasons for denying Bowman the
promotion were pretextual. Bowman appeals this decision of the district court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo ,
using the same legal standard applicable in the district court. See McKnight v.
Kimberly Clark Corp. , 149 F.3d 1125, 1128 (10th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment
is proper only in cases where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c).
DISCUSSION
I. Title VII
Bowman’s first assertion is that he was denied the promotion because of his
gender, in violation of Title VII. To make out a case of discrimination under
Title VII, a plaintiff must “carry the initial burden . . . of establishing a prima
facie case of . . . discrimination.” McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973). To make out a prima facie case of gender discrimination,
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Bowman must show the following: (1) that he belongs to a protected class; (2)
that he applied for and was qualified for the position he sought; (3) that, despite
his qualifications, he was turned down; and (4) that the employer eventually
awarded the promotion to a person of the other gender whose qualifications were
no better than his own. See id. ; see also Tomsic v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co. , 85 F.3d 1472, 1475 n.3 (10th Cir. 1996); Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Schools , 43
F.3d 1373, 1380 (10th Cir. 1994). The district court held that Bowman could not
make the required prima facie showing, because he could not show that he was
qualified for the Auditor I position. We agree.
It is undisputed that the Auditor I position requires either (1) an accounting
degree, (2) a business degree coupled with one year of professional-level auditing
experience, or (3) “an equivalent combination of education and experience.”
Appellant’s App. at 116. It is also undisputed that Bowman does not have either
an accounting degree or one year of professional-level auditing experience. And
Bowman does not even attempt to argue, either here or before the district court,
that he fits into the third category. Rather, Bowman bases his entire argument on
the fact that OPM listed him as “qualified” for the Auditor I position from 1992.
This is simply not enough. Bowman must show that he really is qualified for the
position, not merely that OPM, apparently mistakenly, designated him as such.
Bowman must put forth some showing that he, in actuality rather than merely
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according to a bureaucratic ledger, possesses the necessary qualifications for the
position. On the record before us, there is simply no evidence to support
Bowman’s claim. On the contrary, the record is perfectly clear—Bowman did not
have the education and experience required for the Auditor I position. Therefore,
Bowman cannot make out a prima facie case of gender discrimination, and the
district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of the Tax
Commission.
Moreover, the district court is entirely correct when it stated that, even
assuming that Bowman could make out a prima facie case, the Tax Commission
would still be entitled to summary judgment. In order to survive a summary
judgment motion, Bowman must establish more than a mere prima facie case. See
Lee v. ABF Freight System, Inc. , 22 F.3d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir. 1994); Hooks v.
Diamond Crystal Specialty Foods, Inc. , 997 F.2d 793, 798 (10th Cir. 1993),
abrogated in part on other grounds , Buchanan v. Sherrill , 51 F.3d 227, 229 (10th
Cir. 1995). Bowman must also produce some evidence which tends to establish
that the Tax Commission’s proffered reasons for denying him the promotion were
pretextual, see Hooks , 997 F.2d at 798; see also Ingels v. Thiokol Corp. , 42 F.3d
616, 622 (10th Cir. 1994) (applying similar standards to an ADEA claim), or
“must otherwise introduce[] evidence of illegal discriminatory motive,” Beaird v.
Seagate Tech., Inc. , 145 F.3d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 1998). Bowman “at all times
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bears the ultimate burden of persuasion.” Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc. , 121
F.3d 1390, 1396 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509
U.S. 502, 511 (1993)). The only “evidence” in the record to which Bowman can
point is the Tax Commission’s (or OPM’s) failure to give Bowman the required
notice when, by determining in 1995 that he was not qualified, they effectually
removed him from the qualified list. See Appellant’s Br. at 3-4. The state’s
failure to notify Bowman that they had erred in placing him on the qualified list
may very well have violated Oklahoma’s Merit Rules for Employment, 1
but this
failure in no way indicates that the state’s proffered reason–that Bowman was not
qualified–is mere pretext or was in some other manner discriminatory.
To the contrary, the record demonstrates that the Tax Commission acted
without discrimination. First of all, as discussed above, there seems to be no real
dispute, either on the record or among the parties themselves, that Bowman, in
actuality, did not meet the published criteria for the Auditor I position. This
alone persuades us that the Tax Commission’s proffered reason is not pretextual.
Second, however, the Tax Commission interviewed ten applicants, five of whom
1
Because the issue is not before us, we express no opinion on whether there
was any violation of the Oklahoma Merit Rules for Employment, or what the
remedy would be if there were such a violation. We make mention of the issue
only to point out that evidence of such a Rules violation does not necessarily raise
an inference of gender or age discrimination, and that a federal civil rights
lawsuit is not the proper forum to pursue violations of such Rules.
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were male and five of whom were female. The Tax Commission tendered an
offer to one male applicant. On the record here, there is no evidence, either direct
or circumstantial, which tends to show that the Tax Commission discriminated
against Bowman on the basis of his gender. Thus, even if Bowman could have
made out a prima facie case, summary judgment would still have been
appropriate.
II. ADEA
Bowman’s next contention is that the Tax Commission discriminated
against him on the basis of his age, in violation of ADEA. We analyze Bowman’s
ADEA claim under standards remarkably similar to the Title VII standards.
ADEA plaintiffs, like Title VII plaintiffs, must make an initial prima facie
showing. See McKnight , 149 F.3d at 1128 (stating that “[i]n evaluating ADEA
claims, the Tenth Circuit uses” the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis).
Bowman must show that “he (1) was within the protected age group at the time of
the failure to promote; (2) was qualified for promotion; (3) was not promoted; and
(4) was passed over for an available promotion in favor of someone younger.”
Furr v. AT&T Technologies, Inc. , 824 F.2d 1537, 1542 (10th Cir. 1987). The
district court held that Bowman could not make out this prima facie case because
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he could not demonstrate that he was qualified for the promotion. For largely the
same reasons set forth above in the Title VII analysis, we agree.
Moreover, even if Bowman could have proved his prima facie case, we
think summary judgment still would have been proper. Like most circuits, the
Tenth Circuit requires ADEA plaintiffs to show more than the prima facie case in
order to survive summary judgment. See Marx v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc. , 76 F.3d
324, 327 (10th Cir. 1996) (granting defendant summary judgment on an ADEA
claim even though plaintiff had established a prima facie case, on the grounds that
plaintiff’s pretext evidence did not allow for an inference of age discrimination);
see also Conner , 121 F.3d at 1397 n.6 (citing cases from other circuits which have
also held that ADEA plaintiffs must move beyond the prima facie case to survive
summary judgment). As in the Title VII context, ADEA plaintiffs must produce
some evidence showing that the defendant’s proffered explanation for the failure
to promote was pretextual, or must demonstrate in some other way that the
defendant acted with discriminatory intent. See Marx , 76 F.3d at 327. For
substantially the same reasons discussed above, in the Title VII section, we think
Bowman has failed to make such a showing.
First, the record demonstrates that the reason proffered—lack of
qualifications—was not pretextual. Second, of the ten applicants interviewed by
the Tax Commission, five of them were over 40 years old, and thus members of
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the protected age group, and four of those five were over 50 years old. Two of
the three candidates initially offered Auditor I positions were 50 or older,
although the 50-year-old male was eventually disqualified. Put simply, the record
simply does not contain any evidence which tends to show that the Tax
Commission’s proffered reason was pretextual; indeed, the evidence tends to
show that the Tax Commission acted without discriminatory animus. Therefore,
we conclude that the district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of
the Tax Commission on the ADEA claim.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Tax Commission on all counts.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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