Watson v. Jones

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 18 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
In re:
LINDA A. WATSON,
Debtor. No. 97-4208
(D.C. No. 97-CV-440-B)
(D. Utah)
LINDA A. WATSON,
Appellant,
v.
DIANE S. JONES and
ADDIE MERRITT,
Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , BRISCOE , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Debtor Linda Watson objected to Diane Jones’ proof of claim in the
underlying bankruptcy proceeding. The $13,980 claim resulted from an award of
attorney fees in a custody dispute between debtor and appellee Addie Merritt.
The bankruptcy court overruled the objection and allowed the claim. Debtor
appealed, and the district court reversed the bankruptcy court decision,
disallowing the claim because, under Utah law, an award of attorney fees in a
domestic dispute is in favor of the litigant, not the attorney. Therefore, the
district court found that Jones, Addie Merritt’s attorney in the custody dispute,
was not a creditor and did not have a claim under the Bankruptcy Code.
Immediately thereafter, Jones filed a motion to amend the claim to substitute
Addie Merritt as the proper claimant. The bankruptcy court allowed the
amendment, and debtor appealed. The district court, relying on this court’s
decision in Unioil, Inc. v. Elledge (In re Unioil, Inc.) , 962 F.2d 988 (10th Cir.
1992), affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision to allow amendment. Plaintiff
appeals.
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We apply the same standards as did the district court in reviewing the
bankruptcy court’s decision: we review its legal conclusions de novo and its
factual findings for clear error. See Phillips v. White (In re White) , 25 F.3d 931,
933 (10th Cir. 1994). In deciding whether the bankruptcy court was correct in
allowing amendment of the claim to substitute the proper claimant, “we consider
de novo the threshold issue whether the original proof of claim was amendable at
all; and, if it was, we assess the decision to allow amendment under the particular
circumstances solely for an abuse of discretion.” In re Unioil , 962 F.2d at 992.
Ordinarily, amendment of a proof of claim is freely permitted
so long as the claim initially provided adequate notice of the
existence, nature, and amount of the claim as well as the creditor’s
intent to hold the estate liable. The court should not allow truly new
claims to proceed under the guise of amendment.
Id. As in Unioil , debtor does not dispute that the claim was deficient in any of
these respects or that the amendment altered the substantive content of the claim.
The only change was the substitution of the claimant legally entitled to enforce
the attorney fee award. “Accordingly, as a matter of law, the proof of claim was
amendable.” Id. Further, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing amendment of the proof of claim in the particular circumstances of this
case. Debtor has shown no prejudice resulting from the amendment. Indeed, the
substance of the claim remains the same. See id. at 993 (holding no abuse of
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discretion where no actual prejudice was shown and substance of claim was
unaltered by amendment that merely substituted proper claimant).
We AFFIRM the district court’s opinion and order. The mandate shall
issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Circuit Judge
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