United States v. Johnson

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 28 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________ PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 98-8058
(D. Wyo.)
BARBARA JEAN JOHNSON, (D.Ct. No. 98-CV-111)
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Barbara Jean Johnson filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
requesting the district court vacate her sentence and resentence her applying the
“safety valve” provision. The district court denied the motion in part, and
following a hearing on a remaining issue of ineffective assistance of counsel,
denied the motion in its entirety and her request for a certificate of appealability
We deny Ms. Johnson’s request for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the
appeal.
Ms. Johnson is serving a mandatory minimum sixty-month sentence after
pleading guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute a controlled
substance (cocaine base), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B),
and one count of forfeiture of her property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853. Ms.
Johnson did not file a direct appeal. In her § 2255 motion, she asserts ineffective
assistance of counsel claims based on her trial attorney’s failure to: (1) demand
application of the “safety valve” provision to her sentence under United States
Sentencing Guideline § 5C1.2 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), even though she met all
five “safety valve” requirements; (2) object to the forfeiture of her property; and
(3) file a direct appeal on these issues.
The “safety valve” provision under the Sentencing Guidelines, allows
sentencing without regard to any statutory minimum sentence if the defendant
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meets five specific criteria. U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(5). The district court determined
Ms. Johnson did not meet the requirement of “truthfully provid[ing] to the
Government all information and evidence ... concerning the offense,” because she
refused “to proffer all information within her knowledge regarding her drug
supplier and her daughter’s involvement in the drug distribution scheme at issue.”
The district court further determined Ms. Johnson could not claim ineffective
assistance of counsel for her attorney’s failure to object to forfeiture of her
property because she previously pled guilty to the criminal forfeiture count. As
for her counsel’s failure to file a direct appeal, the district court determined the
limited record precluded resolution of this ineffective assistance claim without the
benefit of an evidentiary hearing because the only evidence involved Ms.
Johnson’s admission that her attorney told her “the Government had her dead to
rights and there was no need to file an appeal.” Consequently, the district court
denied Ms. Johnson’s § 2255 motion in part, and ordered an evidentiary hearing.
After the evidentiary hearing, the district court found that while Ms.
Johnson’s counsel did not specifically recall informing Ms. Johnson of her
appellate rights, his customary practice included advising defendants of their right
to appeal, informing them of the likelihood of success of appeal, and inviting
them to contact him in the event they wanted to file an appeal. During the
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hearing, Ms. Johnson’s counsel testified he felt confident Ms. Johnson understood
her appeal options, and Ms. Johnson herself admitted she never asked her attorney
to file an appeal. Based on this testimony, the district court found Ms. Johnson
was fully cognizant of her appeal rights.
Finally, in response to a supplemental filing by Ms. Johnson in which she
relied on United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 118 S. Ct. 2028 (1998), the
district court addressed her new argument that the forfeiture of her property,
including the equity in her house and a car, was “grossly disproportional” to the
crime. The district court found Bajakajian inapplicable because the facts in Ms.
Johnson’s case differed significantly from that case. The district court
determined forfeiture of Ms. Johnson’s property was not grossly disproportional
to her crime because she agreed to the forfeiture as part of her plea agreement,
and forfeiture of a $60,000 home, in which she had only $6,000 in equity, was not
grossly disproportionate punishment for the “serious offense” of possession of
cocaine with the intent to distribute. For these reasons, the district court denied
the § 2255 motion in full.
On appeal, Ms. Johnson essentially raises the same three issues pertaining
to ineffective assistance of counsel but makes a different argument on appeal to
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support the “safety valve” issue. In an attempt to put a new twist on her
remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Ms. Johnson now insists she
would have cooperated and provided truthful information concerning her
daughter’s involvement in the drug distribution scheme, had her attorney
appropriately explained what the “safety valve” provision meant. This assertion
is in stark contrast to her initial claim that her attorney rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel by failing to raise the “safety valve” provision at sentencing
even though she met the requirements for its application.
We review Ms. Johnson’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de
novo because they involve mixed questions of law and fact. United States v.
Prows, 118 F.3d 686, 691 (10th Cir. 1997). To prevail, Ms. Johnson must show
her “‘counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness,’” and that the deficient performance prejudiced her. Id. (quoting
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). In order to establish
prejudice, she must show there is reasonable probability that but for her counsel’s
unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id.Ms. Johnson fails to make such a showing. While she complains her
attorney failed to object to the forfeiture of her property or demand application of
the “safety valve” provision at sentencing, and then failed to file a direct appeal
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on those issues, she has not shown with reasonable probability that but for her
counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. In other
words, even if her counsel made the objections or appealed as she insists, it is
unlikely the result would have been different. As the district court noted, Ms.
Johnson had already pled guilty to the forfeiture count of her indictment, and as
the district court indicated, did not qualify for the “safety valve” provision.
We also find no support for Ms. Johnson’s new argument that she would
have cooperated and provided truthful information on her daughter’s involvement
if her attorney had properly advised her what the “safety valve” provision meant.
At the § 2255 hearing, Ms. Johnson testified she told her attorney she “didn’t
want to snitch on anybody.” While her attorney testified he did not recall whether
he explained to her what “safety valve” meant, he conveyed to her, and she
understood, that if she cooperated in giving up her drug sources, she would get a
lesser sentence, and that otherwise she faced a five-year mandatory minimum
sentence. He further testified Ms. Johnson firmly refused to divulge her sources
or “snitch” under any circumstances. Given these circumstances, Ms. Johnson has
not shown her counsel failed to properly advise her or that his representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness.
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As for Ms. Johnson’s final argument that her attorney rendered ineffective
assistance because he did not file an appeal or adequately inform her of her
appeal rights, we find upon a review of the record, including the § 2255
evidentiary hearing, that Ms. Johnson’s attorney advised her of her appeal rights
and the likelihood of success on appeal, but she did not ask him to file a direct
appeal.
Finally, we agree with the district court that Ms. Johnson’s forfeiture of her
1991 Chrysler New Yorker car and her $6,000 equity in her home is not grossly
disproportional to the offense of possessing 12.1 grams of cocaine with the intent
to distribute. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 903 F.2d 770, 777 (10th Cir.
1990) (holding forfeiture of $413,493 resulting from illegal activity was not
disproportional to crime of possessing three-quarters pound of marijuana). Our
review of Bajakajian only reinforces our conclusion that the amount of forfeiture
in this case does “bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense it is
designed to punish.” ___ U.S. at ___, 118 S. Ct. at 2036-37. In addition, the
appropriateness of Ms. Johnson’s forfeiture is bolstered by her guilty plea to the
forfeiture count of her indictment 1 and her admitted use of her home and vehicle
1
At the plea hearing, the district court explained the forfeiture count of the
indictment to Ms. Johnson, including the fact that forfeiture of her property would include
her car and home; Ms. Johnson then voluntarily pled guilty to that count.
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during commission of the crime.
In order to obtain a certificate of appealability, Ms. Johnson must make a
“substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). See Lennox v. Evans, 87 F.3d 431, 433 (10th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 746 (1997). In doing so, Ms. Johnson must demonstrate the
district court’s disposition of her § 2255 motion is debatable, reasonably subject
to a different outcome on appeal or otherwise deserving of further proceedings.
See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983). A review of the record
establishes Ms. Johnson failed to make the requisite showing for a certificate of
appealability.
For these reasons, we deny Ms. Johnson’s request for a certificate of
appealability and DISMISS her appeal.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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