Martin v. Embry

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 8 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DANIEL JOSEPH MARTIN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 99-1203
LARRY EMBRY; THE ATTORNEY (D.C. No. 97-N-2115)
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF (D.Colo.)
COLORADO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, KELLY and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Following his conviction for a number of state law offenses, Daniel Joseph
Martin sought a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
*
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
court ruled that Martin’s habeas petition was barred by the one-year statute of
limitation set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Because we conclude that Martin
filed a motion for collateral relief that tolled the limitation period, we reverse the
district court’s dismissal of Martin’s petition.
I.
Martin was convicted in 1986 of several criminal offenses under Colorado
law. These offenses included first degree sexual assault, second degree burglary,
aggravated robbery, “a crime of violence,” and “of being a habitual offender.”
See People v. Martin , 791 P.2d 1159, 1160 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989). The trial court
sentenced Martin to 50 years imprisonment. Martin appealed, asserting that the
trial court erred by (1) requiring him to display a scar on his abdomen to the jury;
(2) failing to suppress evidence of an unconstitutional prior conviction, which
deterred Martin from testifying in his own defense; (3) submitting inadequate
instructions to the jury on the habitual criminal count; and (4) failing to compel
the attendance of an investigating officer. In 1989, the Colorado Court of
Appeals affirmed Martin’s conviction on the first four charges, but reversed
Martin’s conviction on the habitual criminal charge. Id. at 1160-62. The court of
appeals denied Martin’s petition for rehearing, and the Colorado Supreme Court
denied the parties’ petitions for certiorari. In accordance with the decision by the
court of appeals, the trial court resentenced Martin to 40 years imprisonment and
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issued an amended mittimus in 1990.
In 1993, Martin filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to
Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(c). Martin alleged in the motion that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court failed to
properly advise him of his rights under People v. Curtis , 681 P.2d 504 (Colo.
1984). The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. Martin again
appealed. A Colorado appeals court affirmed the trial court’s order in 1994, and
the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1995.
Martin filed a motion for “Correction of Mittimus” and “Sentence
Reconsideration” (the “sentence reconsideration motion,” or “SRM”) in April
1996. Martin argued in the motion that (1) the mittimus issued by the trial court
in 1990 accurately reflected his 40-year sentence but mistakenly referred to
Martin’s “former status as an habitual offender,” see SRM ¶ 7; and (2) his 40-
year sentence should be further reduced “in light of various factors which did not
exist at the time of his 1990 resentencing.” Id. ¶ 8. Martin contended that the
mittimus should be amended pursuant to Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure
35(a), and that his sentence should be reduced pursuant to Rule 35(b). 1
In
1
Rule 35 states in relevant part:
(a) Correction of Illegal Sentence. The court may correct an
illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence imposed in an
(continued...)
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September 1996, a Colorado district court granted Martin’s request to amend his
mittimus and denied Martin’s motion to reduce his sentence.
Martin filed his federal habeas petition in August 1997. Martin’s petition
contains three claims: (1) that the trial court “chilled” his constitutional right to
testify by refusing to suppress the invalid prior conviction; (2) that the trial
court’s decision to require him to display the scar on his abdomen interfered with
his right to due process; and (3) that his trial counsel, who purportedly was under
the influence of cocaine while prosecuting the case, provided ineffective
assistance. Adopting the recommendation of a magistrate judge, the federal
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(...continued)
illegal manner within the time provided herein for the reduction of
sentence.
(b) Reduction of Sentence. The court may reduce the sentence
provided that a motion for reduction of sentence is filed (1) within
120 days after the sentence is imposed, or (2) within 120 days after
receipt by the court of a remittitur issued upon affirmance of the
judgment or sentence or dismissal of the appeal, or (3) within 120
days after entry of any order or judgment of the appellate court
denying review or having the effect of upholding a judgment of
conviction or sentence. The court may, after considering the motion
and supporting documents, if any, deny the motion without a
hearing. The court may reduce a sentence on its own initiative
within any of the above periods of time.
Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(a)-(b). Martin’s motion to amend his mittimus arguably
should have been filed pursuant to Rule 36 rather than Rule 35(a). Rule 36
provides that “[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the
record and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court
orders.”
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district court concluded that Martin’s petition was untimely and dismissed it with
prejudice. We previously granted Martin’s request for a certificate of
appealability, and now consider the district court’s dismissal of the petition under
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
II.
The sole issue before us is whether Martin’s habeas petition was timely.
Section 2244(d)(1) provides that “[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to a
judgment of a State court.” The limitation period generally begins to run on “the
date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or
the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
For prisoners whose convictions became final prior to the enactment of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), “the one-year statute
of limitation does not begin to run until April 24, 1996.” Hoggro v. Boone , 150
F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 1998); accord Barnett v. LeMaster , 167 F.3d 1321,
1322 (10th Cir. 1999). Moreover, “[t]he time during which a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the
pertinent judgment or claim is pending” shall not be counted toward any period
of limitation. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
The State contends that Martin’s SRM did not toll the limitation period
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because it failed to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 2
First, the
State argues that the SRM was not one for “post-conviction or other collateral
review” because Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure 35(b) and 36 cannot be
used to challenge a judgment of conviction. The State maintains that the purpose
of Rule 35(b) is merely “to allow for discretionary reduction of a sentence,”
Response Brief of Respondents-Appellees at 12, and the aim of Rule 36 is simply
to correct clerical errors. Second, the State argues that Martin’s SRM did not
relate to any “pertinent judgment or claim.” According to the State, the SRM
“did not present any of Mr. Martin’s present federal claims to the state courts for
potential exhaustion of state remedies, nor did it seek to challenge the validity of
Mr. Martin’s conviction.” Id. at 15.
These arguments miss the mark. No authority cited by the State holds that
motions for “post-conviction or other collateral review” are limited to those that
contain constitutional challenges to the movant’s conviction. Nor do any of the
cases cited by the State indicate that a movant’s sentence is somehow unrelated to
the “judgment or claim” described in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Martin timely filed
his sentence reconsideration motion pursuant to Colorado Rule of Criminal
2
The State acknowledges that if Martin’s SRM tolled the limitations
period, his habeas application was timely. See Response Brief of Respondents-
Appellees at 10-11 (noting that Martin’s SRM was pending from April 1996
through September 1996, and that “[i]f the running of the limitation period was
tolled during [that time], then his federal habeas petition was timely filed”).
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Procedure 35, which is expressly entitled “Postconviction Remedies.” Such a
motion is sufficient to toll the one-year limitation period under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(2). See Upshur v. Hickock , No. 99-1156, 1999 WL 710352, at *1
(10th Cir. Sept. 13, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (concluding that a Colorado
defendant’s Rule 35(b) motion tolled the AEDPA “time clock”). To hold
otherwise would raise questions of comity, because it appears that Colorado
retained jurisdiction over the case during the pendency of Martin’s Rule 35(b)
motion. See People v. Smith , 971 P.2d 1056, 1059 (Colo. 1999) (stating that
Rule 35(b) “suspends the concept of finality of a criminal judgment of
conviction” and “defines the time frame during which the sentencing court
retains jurisdiction to reconsider a sentence”) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s order dismissing
Martin’s habeas petition on timeliness grounds and REMAND the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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