United States v. Gonzales

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 5 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 99-4013
v.
(D.C. No. 98-CR-392-G)
(D. Utah)
JOHN RORY GONZALES,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, EBEL and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant John Rory Gonzales (“Gonzales”) appeals his
conviction and sentence for armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2113(a) and (d). Gonzales argues that the district court erred (1) on remand when
it dismissed the indictment without prejudice and (2) when it denied a motion for
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This Order and Judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
a new trial because a juror was impliedly bias. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I. Background
On December 19, 1994, the Mountain America Credit Union (“MACU”) of
West Jordan, Utah, was robbed by two armed men wearing masks. The two men
brandished a weapon and ordered everyone in the bank on the floor. The
defendant and his accomplice then vaulted into the teller’s stations and began
opening teller drawers, removing money from the drawers and from the counter
top behind the cashier window. The total amount of money taken from the bank
amounted to $14,790.
On February 2, 1995, Gonzales was indicted for the robbery of the MACU.
The indictment was dismissed without prejudice on February 14, 1995. The
government learned that Gonzales was attempting to purchase an alibi through an
FBI sting operation. Because the FBI did not want to be forced to reveal their
sting operation immediately, the government dismissed the indictment. Gonzales
was reindicted on November 30, 1995, but did not make his initial appearance
until May 21, 1996. On May 22, 1996, a trial date was scheduled for July 15,
1996. On July 2, 1996, the court changed the date of trial to July 22, 1996 or July
25, 1996, if another criminal case proceeded to trial. Then on July 15, 1996, the
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parties learned that the other criminal case would proceed to trial and that
Gonzales’s trial would be postponed until July 25, 1996.
When the United States contacted its witnesses regarding the change of trial
dates, it learned that certain essential witnesses would be out of town through the
new scheduled trial date. The court then held a hearing on July 15, 1996 to allow
the United States to make an oral motion for a continuance based on the
unavailability of the essential witnesses. The court initially suggested August, 5,
1996, as a date available for trial. The United States attorney indicated that he
was scheduled to be out of town during the last three days of the prior week on a
family vacation which involved a non-refundable deposit on lodging. In addition,
one essential witness, Eddie Vigil, was going to be unavailable until August 3,
1996 which fell over a weekend, thus an August 5th trial date would deprive the
United States Attorney of preparation with this witness. The attorney further
indicated to the court that he was unavailable the week of August 12, 1996, as a
result of mandatory training in Washington, D.C. The court then suggested the
week of August 19, 1996, but the United States attorney requested one week
preparation time prior to trial. The trial was then continued until August 26,
1996. At the hearing, Gonzales raised a Speedy Trial objection to the continuance
of the trial date. The court found that the time between August 12 and August 26
was excludable under the Speedy Trial Act because the interest of justice
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outweighed the interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
Gonzales was then tried on August 26-28, 1996 and was convicted by jury verdict
on August 28, 1996.
Gonzales filed an appeal, arguing that the indictment should be dismissed
for a Speedy Trial Act violation. This court determined that there had been a
fourteen-day violation of the Speedy Trial Act and reversed Gonzales’ conviction.
See United States v. Gonzales, 137 F.3d 1431 (10th Cir. 1998). We then
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the dismissal should
be with or without prejudice. By order dated July 21, 1998, the indictment was
dismissed without prejudice. A complaint was filed against Gonzales on July 21,
1998, with an indictment on July 29, 1998. Trial was held between October 6 and
9, 1998, and Gonzalez was found guilty by a jury on October 9, 1998.
After trial, the government learned and disclosed to the defense that one of
the jurors, Ana Marie Burell, had a daughter-in-law who was employed at the
time of the trial at the same branch of MACU that had been robbed, although she
was not so employed when the robbery took place. This fact was not disclosed
during the voir dire proceedings at trial; however, no direct question was
requested by Gonzales or put to the jury or to Ms. Burell concerning a
relationship with employees at the credit union. The transcript of the voir dire
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proceedings reflects that the court asked members of the jury panel the following
question:
Do any of you have any doubt that you would be able to judge this
case and make your determination and render a verdict only and
solely upon the basis of evidence presented in open court? If you
have any doubt about that, don’t feel that you could do it, raise your
hand.
Following the question, one juror raised her hand and disclosed that she had been
a bank teller about fifteen years earlier and would have a difficult time judging
the case on the evidence because of that experience. No follow-up questions were
asked.
II. Speedy Trial Act Violation
When determining whether an indictment should be dismissed with or
without prejudice for a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, a district court must
look to the following factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1): “the seriousness of
offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and
the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the
administration of justice.” Additionally, the Supreme Court has clarified that
prejudice to the defendant is relevant to the district court’s consideration. United
States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 334 (1988). We will reverse a district court’s
determination only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Saltzman, 984
F.2d 1087, 1092 (10th Cir. 1993).
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Because Congress has declared that a decision will be
governed by consideration of particular factors, appellate
review is limited to ascertaining whether a district court has
ignored or slighted a factor that Congress has deemed pertinent
to the choice of remedy. . . . It is imperative for the district
court, however, to carefully consider those factors as applied
to the particular case and . . . clearly articulate their effect.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Following briefing by both parties
and oral arguments in the district court, the court entered a written order
dismissing the indictment without prejudice. In its order, the district court
carefully considered each of the factors listed in § 3162(a)(1) and found that they
weighed in favor of dismissing without prejudice. Gonzales argues on appeal that
although the offense was serious, the other statutory factors weigh against the
district court’s conclusion. He contends that the noncompliance with the Speedy
Trial Act was caused by the government’s and the court’s conduct and that
dismissal with prejudice would have sent a stronger message for the violation and
thereby promoted the administration of the Act.
We have carefully reviewed the parties’ materials, the district court’s order,
and the record on appeal. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
district court, and affirm its judgment to dismiss the indictment without prejudice
for substantially the same reasons as those set forth in the district court’s
thorough and well-written order filed on July 21, 1998.
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III. Implied Bias
Gonzales next argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for
a new trial based on the implied bias of Juror Burell, whose daughter-in-law
worked at the MACU, at the time of trial but not at the time of the crime. 1 We
review a denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Hughes, 191 F.3d 1317, 1321 (10th Cir. 1999). However, we review a
finding of implied bias de novo. See United States v. Cerrato-Reyes, 176 F.3d
1253, 1260 (10th Cir. 1999) “A finding of implied bias is a legal determination
that turns on an objective evaluation of the challenged juror’s experiences and
their relation to the case being tried.” Id. at 1260 (internal quotations omitted).
A finding of implied bias turns on whether “an average person in the
position of the juror in controversy would be prejudiced.” Id. at 1260-61 (internal
quotations omitted). The implied bias doctrine, however, “should not be invoked
lightly. It must be reserved for those ‘extreme’ and ‘exceptional’ circumstances
that ‘leav[e] serious question whether the trial court . . . subjected the defendant
1
Gonzales does not challenge on appeal the district court’s determination
that Juror Burell did not fail to answer honestly a material question during voir
dire under the test set forth in McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464
U.S. 548 (1984). McDonough held that to obtain a new trial when a juror gives a
mistaken response or fails to respond to a question on voir dire, a party must
demonstrate that “a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir
dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid
basis for a challenge for cause.” Id. at 556. Additionally, Gonzales does not
argue actual bias before this court.
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to manifestly unjust procedures resulting in a miscarriage of justice.’” Gonzales v.
Thomas, 99 F.3d 978, 987 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S.
209, 222 & n.* (1982) (O’Connor J., concurring)).
We have stated that implied bias can be demonstrated by showing that “‘the
juror is an actual employee of the prosecuting agency, that the juror is a close
relative of one of the participants in the trial or the criminal transaction, or that
the juror was a witness or somehow involved in the criminal transaction.’”
Cerrato-Reyes, 176 F.3d at 1261 (quoting Gonzales, 99 F.3d at 987 (further
internal quotations omitted)). We have also found implied bias when there are
factual similarities between a juror’s experience and the factual issue at trial. See
Cerrato-Reyes, 176 F.3d at 1261. None of these circumstances exist in the
present case. Although Juror Burell’s daughter-in-law worked at MACU at the
time of trial, she did not work at the bank when the crime occurred and is not
involved in the criminal transaction in any way. There is no reason to believe that
this circumstance standing alone would cause Juror Burell to be biased. Having a
relative who works at a bank where a crime took place at some earlier time is not
so “extreme” or “exceptional” that it would cause us to question whether the trial
was manifestly unjust. We therefore conclude that we cannot presume as a matter
of law Juror Burell was a biased juror in Gonzales’ trial. Thus, the court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.
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For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Gonzales’ conviction and sentence.
The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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