Medina v. Coors Brewing

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 3 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ALFRED L. MEDINA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-1463
(D.C. No. 97-M-2502)
COORS BREWING COMPANY, (D. Colo.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK , KELLY , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Alfred L. Medina had been employed by defendant Coors Brewing
Company for thirty-one years when Coors terminated his employment due to
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
excessive absenteeism. Mr. Medina brought this action asserting, inter alia, that
his severe depression caused his absences and that Coors’ termination of his
employment violated the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654.
The district court granted Coors’ motion for summary judgment on the FMLA
claim, and Mr. Medina appeals. We review the district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, applying the same standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) as the
district court. See Kaul v. Stephan , 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996).
The relevant facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Medina, are as
follows. Mr. Medina began missing work in the summer of 1996. In September
1996, Coors gave him a written warning for these absences and referred him to a
counseling program. He continued to miss work in September and early October,
and requested FMLA leave on October 4. On October 8, his doctor recommended
a leave of absence due to severe depression. Coors granted him a paid leave of
absence until December 9, when his doctor released him to return to work.
Mr. Medina did not return to work on December 9, nor did he work the remainder
of that week or the next. The plant was closed the following two weeks.
Mr. Medina used his vacation time to take off the month of January, and was
scheduled to return to work on February 6. When he failed to do so, Coors gave
him a final written warning regarding his absences. He did not show up for work
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on Friday, February 7, or the first three days of the following week. Coors
terminated his employment on February 19 for excessive absenteeism.
Mr. Medina first contends that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment to Coors because the court found Coors violated his FMLA rights
relative to the paid leave of absence. This contention misinterprets the district
court’s order. The court did not find that Coors violated the FMLA. It found
only that Coors could not retroactively designate the eight-week period as
FMLA-qualifying leave and that this period could not count against the twelve
weeks of leave that Coors was required to make available under the FMLA for
serious health conditions preventing an employee from working. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 2612(a); 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(a), (c). Moreover, Mr. Medina fails to explain
how Coors’ attempt to retroactively designate the eight-week period as FMLA
leave comprised or related to an adverse employment decision. See, e.g. , King v.
Preferred Technical Group , 166 F.3d 887, 892 (7th Cir. 1999) (requiring FMLA
plaintiff to prove as part of prima facie case that he suffered adverse employment
action). We thus reject Mr. Medina’s first contention of error.
Mr. Medina next argues that the district court erred in concluding that he
did not provide adequate notice of his need for FMLA leave following his return
from the leave of absence. FMLA regulations provide that an employee needing
leave that is not foreseeable must notify the employer of the need for leave as
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soon as practicable, i.e., within one or two working days except in extraordinary
circumstances, but the employee does not have to expressly assert rights under or
even mention the FMLA. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(a), (b). “If the employer does
not have sufficient information about the employee’s reason for taking leave, ‘the
employer should inquire further to ascertain whether the paid leave is potentially
FMLA-qualifying.’” Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp. , 66 F.3d 758, 762
(5th Cir. 1995) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(a)). “The critical question is
whether the information imparted to the employer is sufficient to reasonably
apprise it of the employee’s request to take time off for a serious health
condition.” Id. at 764; see also Gay v. Gilman Paper Co. , 125 F.3d 1432, 1435
(11th Cir. 1997).
Mr. Medina contends that he was not required to give Coors notice that his
absence from work following the leave of absence was due to a serious medical
condition because it knew his leave of absence had been due to depression. Like
the district court, we reject this argument because Mr. Medina’s leave of absence
ended when his doctor released him to return to work, and Mr. Medina never
subsequently indicated that his inability to work was due to depression.
Moreover, in the pretrial order, he stipulated that his February absences were due
to personal business and to being “sick.” We thus agree with the district court
that he did not furnish Coors with sufficient information to apprise it of his need
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for leave due to a potentially FMLA-qualifying reason. See Manuel , 66 F.3d
at 764; Gay , 125 F.3d at 1436.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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