McCarter v. Champion

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 6 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JACK McCARTER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 99-5240
(D.C. No. 97-CV-806-C)
RONALD J. CHAMPION, (N.D. Okla.)
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, PORFILIO, and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant was convicted in an Oklahoma state court of first degree murder
for the death of his two-year-old son, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
without the possibility of parole. After his conviction was affirmed on appeal,
defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied the petition and also
denied the motion for a certificate of appealability. Consequently, this appeal
will not be allowed unless we issue a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1). We will issue the certificate only if defendant “has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2).
In the habeas petition, defendant claimed denial of his constitutional rights
resulting from the following asserted errors: (1) the trial court allowed irrelevant
and prejudicial testimony of alleged other crimes; (2) defendant’s wife’s
testimony that she feared defendant rendered his trial unfair; (3) the evidence was
insufficient to support the conviction (4) the trial court did not grant a mistrial
after an “evidentiary harpoon;” (5) the prosecutor made improper remarks in the
closing statement; (6) the sentence was excessive; and (7) the jury was not
properly instructed as to the elements of the offense. Defendant asserts these
same arguments on appeal, but he also adds an argument: that he did not receive
effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Because defendant did not
raise the ineffective assistance of counsel arguments in his habeas petition before
the district court, we will not consider them on appeal. See Lighton v. University
of Utah , 209 F.3d 1213, 1224 (10th Cir. 2000).
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For substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its order denying
habeas relief, 1
we hold that defendant has not made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right. Consequently, we deny the application for a
certificate of appealability and DISMISS the appeal. The mandate shall issue
forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
1
In a habeas matter, a petitioner is entitled to relief only if he can establish
that the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Because the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeal’s application of the harmless error standard articulated
in Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967), was neither contrary to, nor
an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent, the district court should
not have conducted its own harmless error analysis under the standard set forth in
Kotteakos v. United States , 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946). The result is the same,
however, under either analysis: the error was harmless.
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