United States v. Cassavetes

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 21 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 00-1137
(D.C. No. 99-CR-328-N)
NICHOLAS COLTON (D. Colo.)
CASSAVETES,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, McKAY, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to a charge of possession of
an unregistered firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871. The
district court sentenced defendant to twenty-two months’ imprisonment.
Defendant appeals from the district court’s denial of his motions to suppress
evidence seized from his residence pursuant to a search warrant. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
This case was part of a two-year federal investigation into the Sons of
Silence motorcycle club, of which defendant was a member. A number of
warrants related to the investigation were issued by a federal magistrate judge on
October 5, 1999, including the warrant to search defendant’s residence challenged
here. That warrant was executed beginning at 9:40 p.m. on October 7, 1999.
The warrant was supported by information provided by an undercover
special agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. This agent stated
that he observed defendant inhaling methamphetamine at a Valentine’s Day party
in 1999 and was offered methamphetamine by defendant; saw a short-barreled
shotgun in defendant’s garage on February 14, 1999; heard defendant say that he
owned one hundred firearms, including machine guns, that day; fired guns with
defendant on the firing range on defendant’s property that day; and heard
defendant say on September 5, 1999, that he still had an AK-47. Defendant
argues on appeal that: (1) the information supporting the warrant was so old that
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any probable cause was stale; (2) an AK-47 is not necessarily a machine gun and
the information that defendant possessed machine guns was given in reckless
disregard of the truth; (3) defendant was not established as a drug user who was
prohibited from owning guns; and (4) there was no basis for a nighttime search.
“We review de novo the district court’s probable cause determination.”
United States v. Nolan, 199 F.3d 1180, 1182 (10th Cir. 1999). Our review of the
issuance of the search warrant is more deferential, however. Id. (citing Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236-39 (1983)).
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth
in the affidavit . . . , there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty
of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a
substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing] that probable cause existed.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 (quotation omitted). In reviewing the district court’s
denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the court’s factual findings unless they
are clearly erroneous, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government. United States v. Le, 173 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir. 1999). The
ultimate question of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is a legal
question that we review de novo. United States v. Hill, 199 F.3d 1143, 1147
(10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 83 (2000).
We find no error. Whether information supporting a warrant is stale is
determined by “the nature of the criminal activity, the length of the activity, and
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the nature of the property to be seized.” United States v. Snow, 919 F.2d 1458,
1460 (10th Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted). The district court did not clearly err in
finding that defendant was a gun enthusiast who probably had not, by October,
gotten rid of all of the many guns he claimed to own in February. See United
States v. Shomo, 786 F.2d 981, 984 (10th Cir. 1986).
Further, the district court did not clearly err in finding that when defendant
claimed in September to have an AK-47, he meant a machine gun. Although
defendant insists that an AK-47 can be a semi-automatic weapon, it is common
sense to interpret defendant’s September comment in light of his earlier claim to
own machine guns. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. It is immaterial that the search
failed to uncover any machine guns. And, because the magistrate judge had
probable cause to believe that defendant possessed illegal weapons, it is
unnecessary to discuss defendant’s argument that he was not shown to be a drug
user who was prohibited from owning any guns under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).
Finally, although the warrant authorized a nighttime search, the search
actually began at 9:40 p.m., which is defined as daytime. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(h).
A search that lawfully begins during the daytime may continue into the night.
United States v. Young, 877 F.2d 1099, 1104-05 (1st Cir. 1989). Therefore, it is
immaterial whether a nighttime search was properly authorized.
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The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
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