Search Warrants v. United States

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 26 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
In re THE MATTER OF THE
SEARCHES of 462 South Connell
Avenue, Pitcher, Oklahoma, and Main
and 2nd Street, Pitcher Oklahoma.
____________________________
No. 00-5114
MORRISON KNUDSEN (D.C. No. 00-SM-21-K)
CORPORATION,
(N.D. Oklahoma)
Movant - Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , ANDERSON , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Morrison Knudsen Corporation (“MK”) 1
appeals an order of the district
court refusing to unseal informants’ affidavits which were used to support search
warrants of MK’s property. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On February 14, 2000, the government, through its Assistant United States
Attorney, Ken Snoke, applied for two search warrants to search the two above-
captioned addresses. The warrants authorized the search of MK’s offices located
at the Tar Creek Superfund site in Pitcher, Oklahoma. The government
simultaneously moved to seal the affidavits supporting the two search warrants.
The magistrate judge issued the search warrants and sealed the affidavits. The
search warrants were executed and a number of items were seized.
On February 24, 2000, AUSA Snoke went on vacation, leaving AUSA Neal
Kirkpatrick to supervise the MK investigation. On March 14, AUSA Kirkpatrick
filed an application to unseal the affidavits. 2
The magistrate judge approved the
Since July 2000 MK has operated under the name “Washington Group
1
International, Inc.” Because the parties refer to the appellant in this case as MK,
and since it was MK at the times relevant to this lawsuit, we refer to the appellant
as MK.
The record reveals that there was some discussion between AUSA
2
Kirkpatrick and MK’s counsel concerning unsealing the affidavits and the terms
and conditions under which they would be unsealed. The record contains no
further information about those terms and conditions.
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motion and unsealed the affidavits. On March 16 a story appeared in the Grove
Sun Daily newspaper, which described the allegations in the affidavits but did not
disclose the identity of the informants identified in the affidavits. Upon returning
from vacation, AUSA Snoke learned that the affidavits had been unsealed and
promptly filed a motion to reseal the affidavits. The magistrate judge granted the
motion. MK then filed its own motion to unseal the affidavits. The magistrate
judge denied MK’s motion, citing the “informer’s privilege.” MK subsequently
filed what the magistrate judge construed to be a motion for reconsideration,
which the magistrate judge denied. MK brought another motion, styled a motion
for reconsideration or an objection to the magistrate judge’s findings and
recommendations or an appeal to the district court, seeking further review of the
magistrate judge’s decision not to unseal the affidavits.
Noting that “the sole issue raised by Morrison Knudsen is Magistrate Judge
Joyner’s ruling that the government had not waived the ‘informant’s privilege’
through unsealing of the affidavit,” the district court ruled that “[t]he affidavits
will remain sealed.” Order at 2, Appellant’s App. at 82. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
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Procedurally, this case is unusual. Both parties assert that we have
jurisdiction, although the government raised serious questions below about the
jurisdiction of the magistrate judge and the district court over MK’s motions to
unseal the affidavits. Neither party elaborates on the basis for jurisdiction. We
have therefore undertaken our own independent inquiry, and we are satisfied that
we have jurisdiction over this appeal. See Lawmaster v. United States , 993 F.2d
773, 774-75 (10th Cir. 1993) (assuming jurisdiction in similar setting, noting that
appellant’s “motion is . . . civil in nature”); see also In re Eyecare Physicians of
America , 100 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 1996) (assuming jurisdiction when subject of
search filed motion to have warrant application and affidavit unsealed); White
Fabricating Co. v. United States , 903 F.2d 404, 407-08 (6th Cir. 1990)
(concluding court had jurisdiction over appeal of Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) motion
for return of property seized even though no criminal prosecution commenced on
theory that “plaintiffs’ motion here is, in effect, a civil action initiated after and
during a criminal investigation”).
As MK concedes, the only issue on appeal is whether the “informer’s
privilege” was waived or is, for some reason, unavailable. “What is usually
referred to as the informer’s privilege is in reality the Government’s privilege to
withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of
violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law.” Rovario v.
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United States , 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957). The privilege’s scope is “limited by its
underlying purpose.” Id. at 60. Accordingly, “where the disclosure of the
contents of a communication will not tend to reveal the identity of an informer,
the contents are not privileged.” Id. Similarly, “once the identity of the informer
has been disclosed to those who would have cause to resent the communication,
the privilege is no longer applicable.” Id.Fundamental fairness imposes another limitation on the informer’s
privilege: “[w]here the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of
his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is
essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.” Id. at
60-61. Thus, we have held that “[t]he party opposing the privilege may overcome
it upon showing his need for the information outweighs the government’s
entitlement to the privilege.” Lawmaster , 993 F.2d at 774 (quoting Dole v. Local
1942, IBEW , 870 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1989)). We also noted in Lawmaster
that while the informer’s privilege typically arises in criminal cases like Rovario ,
it may arise in civil contexts and that, in such cases, “the informer’s privilege is
arguably stronger, because the constitutional guarantees assured to criminal
defendants are inapplicable.” Id. at 775. 3
This case is, of course, more like Lawmaster than Rovario in that, although
3
a criminal investigation is apparently pending, no indictment or other criminal
(continued...)
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We agree with the district court and the magistrate judge that MK has
failed to make a sufficient showing of a need to know the identity of the
informants such that the informer’s privilege must give way or is otherwise no
longer applicable. Despite the brief unsealing of the affidavits and the
publication of the article describing the allegations in the affidavits, the identity
of the informants has never been revealed to MK. The circumstances surrounding
the brief unsealing of the affidavits do not compel a different conclusion than that
reached by the district court–i.e., that MK has simply failed to show a need to
know the identities of the informants sufficient to overcome the privilege.
We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s order determining that the
affidavits will remain sealed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
3
(...continued)
charge has been brought. However, unlike Lawmaster, the criminal investigation
has, apparently, not been terminated either.
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