Cesspooch v. Federal Bureau of Prisons

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 17 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ALFRED R. CESSPOOCH, SR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 02-1538
(D. Colo.)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; (D.Ct. No. 00-Z-1973)
JOEL KNOWLES, Warden and in
individual capacity; JACK B. DAVIS,
Associate Warden and in individual
capacity; THOMAS C. PETERSON,
Associate Warden and in individual
capacity; CHARLES ROWE,
Lieutenant and in individual capacity;
ROBERT LIMA, Lieutenant and in
individual capacity; DAVID
ARMSTRONG, Correctional Officer;
ANTHONY F. DIMARZO,
Correctional Officer; JAKE M.
GEIGER, Correctional Officer;
CHARLOTTE R. GUTIERREZ,
Correctional Officer; PAULA G.
PRICE, Correctional Officer;
WESLEY A. PUMMILL, Correctional
Officer; OFFICER SMITH,
Correctional Officer; OFFICER
WALKER, Correctional Officer;
OFFICER PLOESSEL, Correctional
Officer; OFFICER MOORE,
Correctional Officer,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, PORFILIO, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit
Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Alfred Cesspooch, a federal inmate appearing pro se, appeals a
district court order dismissing his civil rights suit against prison officials based
on an incident in which several officials allegedly stripped and beat him. We
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Background
Mr. Cesspooch filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado, alleging prison officials violated his constitutional rights by
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
-2-
stripping and beating him, while others ignored and concealed the incident. He
alleges the incident occurred February 6, 1997, but he did not initiate this action
until September 21, 2000. Mr. Cesspooch seeks money damages pursuant to
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388(1971).
The district court referred the complaint to a magistrate judge, who
recommended dismissing Mr. Cesspooch’s claims against the Federal Bureau of
Prisons as barred by sovereign immunity, and dismissing four of the individually
named defendants as barred by a two-year statute of limitations. The district
court adopted the recommendation and dismissed the claims as to the Federal
Bureau of Prisons and four of the individually named defendants. Because Mr.
Cesspooch did not effect service on the remaining defendants, the district court
did not address the claims against those parties. See Cesspooch v. Federal
Bureau of Prisons, 2003 WL 77606 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 2003) (unpublished). We
affirmed the district court’s action. Id.Shortly thereafter, the magistrate judge ordered Mr. Cesspooch to show
cause why the court should not dismiss his claims against the remaining
defendants on grounds (1) Mr. Cesspooch failed to effect service, prosecute his
-3-
claims, and comply with court orders; and (2) the claims are barred by sovereign
immunity and the statute of limitations. On September 30, 2002, after
considering Mr. Cesspooch’s response, the magistrate judge issued a thorough and
carefully reasoned recommendation to dismiss the complaint on the grounds stated
in its order to show cause. The recommendation advised the parties of their right
to file a written objection “[w]ithin ten days after service of a copy of the
Recommendation.”
On December 5, 2002, over two months after the magistrate judge issued
his recommendation, Mr. Cesspooch filed a “Motion of Notice of Appeals to the
Court of Appeals” and a “Motion Objecting the Magistrate Judge Decision in the
District Court of Colorado.” The district court issued an order in December
adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissing Mr. Cesspooch’s
complaint. The order noted Mr. Cesspooch filed an objection, but found the
objection was neither timely nor specific. The court thus concluded Mr.
Cesspooch was not entitled to de novo review of the magistrate judge’s
recommendation. Mr. Cesspooch subsequently filed a docketing statement and a
jurisdictional memorandum brief.
On appeal, Mr. Cesspooch does not specifically challenge the grounds the
-4-
district court relied on in dismissing his complaint. 1 Instead, he renews the
allegations in his complaint. He also argues the district court should have
appointed counsel to represent him, and should have held an evidentiary hearing
on his claims. We address the jurisdictional question and Mr. Cesspooch’s
arguments below.
Discussion
As a preliminary matter, we must determine if we have jurisdiction to
consider this appeal. Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, 286 F.3d 1195, 1201 (10th
Cir. 2002). Appellees Karl Ploessel and Gregory Walker argue we lack
jurisdiction to consider this appeal because Mr. Cesspooch’s “Motion of Notice of
Appeals to the Court of Appeals” appears to seek review of the magistrate judge’s
recommendation, which is not a “final decision.”See 28 U.S.C. § 1291(establishing “jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts
of the United States”).
We liberally construe documents filed by pro se litigants, including notices
1
Although we construe Mr. Cesspooch’s pro se brief liberally, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), we will not assume the role of advocate and address
issues not discussed in his brief, see Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1159
(10th Cir. 1991).
-5-
of appeal. See Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat’l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1036 n.3 (10th
Cir. 1993). We also liberally construe the technical requirements of a notice of
appeal to avoid injustice. See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248-49 (1992). From
pro se litigants, we have accepted docketing statements and motions on
jurisdiction as the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal. See Rodgers v.
Wyoming Attorney Gen., 205 F.3d 1201, 1204 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000), overruled on
other grounds, Moore v. Marr, 254 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 2001). Under
these principles, we interpret Mr. Cesspooch’s timely docketing statement and
jurisdictional memorandum brief as a notice of appeal of the district court’s order
dismissing his complaint. We therefore exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
We review the dismissal of a complaint for failure to effect service,
prosecute, and comply with court orders, for an abuse of discretion. Cf. Scott v.
Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 912 (10th Cir. 2000). However, we review de novo the
district court’s determination that a complaint is barred by the statute of
limitations, see Indus. Constructors Corp. v. United States Bureau of
Reclamation, 15 F.3d 963, 967 (10th Cir. 1994), and dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction on sovereign immunity, see Ordinance 59 Ass’n v. United
States Dept. of Interior, 163 F.3d 1150, 1152 (10th Cir. 1998).
-6-
With these standards in mind, we have carefully reviewed the magistrate
judge’s recommendations and the district court’s order dismissing the complaint
for failure to effectuate service, prosecute his claims, or comply with court orders,
and for failure to show his claims are not barred by sovereign immunity or the
applicable statute of limitations. This review, together with our thorough review
of the pleadings, briefs, and record on appeal, leads us to conclude the district
court properly dismissed Mr. Cesspooch’s complaint for the reasons stated.
While he does not challenge the specific grounds for dismissal of his
complaint, Mr. Cesspooch claims the district court erred by declining to appoint
counsel to represent him. In support of this position, Mr. Cesspooch states he
does not understand the law and has difficulty reading and writing. He believes
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and the Indian Civil Rights
Act of 1968 entitle him to appointed counsel. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; 25
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303.
“We review the denial of appointment of counsel in a civil case for an
abuse of discretion.” Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir.1995).
Neither the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 nor the Equal Protection Clause
guarantees the right to counsel in a civil case. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303;
-7-
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556 (1987). Although prisoners alleging
civil rights violations have no right to counsel, see Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d
504, 505 (10th Cir. 1969), the district court may appoint counsel if it determines
doing so would be appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). In making this
determination, the court considers “‘the merits of the litigant’s claims, the nature
of the factual issues raised in the claims, the litigant’s ability to present his
claims, and the complexity of the legal issues raised by the claims.’” Rucks, 57
F.3d at 979 (quoting Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 996 (10th Cir.1991)).
After reviewing Mr. Cesspooch’s claims and the entire record on appeal, we
conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Cesspooch’s
motion to appoint counsel.
Mr. Cesspooch also argues he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the
merits of his claim. We review a district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing
for an abuse of discretion. Lasiter v. Thomas, 89 F.3d 699, 702 (10th Cir.1996).
Because we determine the district court properly dismissed Mr. Cesspooch’s
claims on legal grounds that did not necessitate a hearing or introduction of
additional evidence, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
conduct an evidentiary hearing.
-8-
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, and for substantially the same reasons as those
stated by the district court, we AFFIRM the dismissal of Mr. Cesspooch’s
complaint. We further deny Mr. Cesspooch’s “Motion for Leave to Proceed on
Appeal.”
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
-9-