Dexter v. Ford Motor Company

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 12 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
KELVIN DEXTER,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
and
No. 02-4122
ARTYSHA HOLSTON, (D. Utah)
(D.Ct. No. 2:01-CV-595 C)
Plaintiff,
v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY; STATE
OF UTAH; HANK GALETKA,
Defendants,
and
JASON BOSKO, individually;
BARRY SANNS, individually,
Defendants - Appellants.
KELVIN DEXTER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
and
ARTYSHA HOLSTON, No. 02-4137
(D. Utah)
Plaintiff, (D.Ct. No. 2:01-CV-595 C)
v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY; STATE
OF UTAH; JASON BOSKO,
individually; BARRY SANNS,
individually,
Defendants,
and
HANK GALETKA,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and
O’BRIEN, Circuit Judge.
Jason Bosko and Barry Sanns appeal the district court’s denial of their
motions to dismiss Kelvin Dexter’s federal and state constitutional claims on the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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grounds of qualified immunity (Case No. 02-4122). 1 Dexter appeals the court’s
dismissal of his similar claims against Hank Galetka (certified under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 54(b) as a final judgment) on the grounds of qualified immunity (Case No. 02-
4137). The cases are consolidated on appeal. Exercising jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse the district court’s order denying qualified immunity to
Bosko and Sanns, and affirm its order granting qualified immunity to Galetka on
Dexter’s federal claims. We remand to the district court with instructions to
dismiss the supplemental state claims.
Factual Background
Dexter alleges the following facts in his amended complaint. On December
7, 2000, Dexter was an inmate at the Utah State Prison where Galetka served as
warden. Bosko and Sanns were correctional officers at the prison. They placed
Dexter, along with eight other inmates, in a fifteen passenger van equipped with
seatbelts for transport to the Beaver County Jail. The prison had a policy that all
inmates in transport were to be seatbelted. Because the inmates were handcuffed
and shackled, they were unable to seatbelt themselves. Some of the inmates
requested to be seatbelted (Dexter did not) but Bosko and Sanns did not honor the
inmates’ requests. Galetka was aware that officers routinely failed to seatbelt
1
An order denying qualified immunity is immediately appealable notwithstanding
the fact a final judgment has not been entered. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530
(1985); Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267, 1270 (10th Cir. 2001).
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inmates in transport, contrary to prison policy. During transport, Bosko drove,
accompanied by Sanns. Traveling south on Interstate 15, Bosko was speeding.
His attention was diverted from the highway when he reached for food or drink.
At this time, the van strayed onto the median, Bosko lost control of the van, and it
eventually rolled, ejecting Dexter. As a result of the accident, Dexter is now a
quadriplegic.
District Court
In his amended complaint, Dexter asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983alleging Galetka, Bosko and Sanns violated his rights under the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution by failing to seatbelt him during the
prison transport. He also claims the three defendants violated his
rights under the Utah Constitution. All three defendants filed motions to dismiss
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds of qualified immunity.
As to the federal claim, with respect to Bosko and Sanns, the district court
denied the motion to dismiss, concluding Dexter clearly established his Eighth
Amendment rights were violated by failure to seatbelt coupled with reckless
operation of the transport vehicle. With respect to Galetka, the district court
granted the motion to dismiss based on Dexter’s failure to allege that Galetka
knew the officers drove recklessly when transporting inmates. Based on similar
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reasoning, the district court denied qualified immunity for Bosko and Sanns and
upheld it for Galetka on Dexter’s state law claims.
Standard of Review
We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim. Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d
1226, 1236 (10 th Cir. 1999); see also Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 911 (10 th
Cir.) (standard of review of a 12(b)(6) dismissal on grounds of qualified immunity
is de novo), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1019 (2001)). “[A]ll well-pleaded factual
allegations in the amended complaint are accepted as true and viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1236. A 12(b)(6)
motion “admits all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as distinguished from
conclusory allegations.” Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1174 (10 th Cir. 2001)
(quotation omitted), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 823 (2002). Dismissal is not proper
“unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1236(quotations omitted).
Discussion
Qualified immunity, if established, defeats a claim because it is “an
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability . . . .” Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 200 (quotation and emphasis omitted), remanded to 262 F.3d 897-5-
(9th Cir. 2001). Whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity is based on
a two-tier inquiry. First, we ask whether the facts, “[t]aken in the light most
favorable to the party asserting the injury,” demonstrate that the defendant’s
conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. at 201. Second, we inquire “whether
the right was clearly established.” Id. The plaintiff carries the burden of proof on
each tier. Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534-35 (10 th Cir. 1995). If no
constitutional violation occurred, there is no need to determine whether the
constitutional right was clearly established. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
“A prison official's deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious
harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 828 (1994) (quotation omitted). Inmates must be “furnished with the basic
human needs, one of which is reasonable safety.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S.
25, 33 (1993) (quotation omitted). However, “only those deprivations denying the
minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to form the
basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298
(1991) (quotation and citation omitted). Nonetheless, the Eighth Amendment
protects against “sufficiently imminent dangers as well as current unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain and suffering . . . .” Helling, 509 U.S. at 34.
The test for an Eighth Amendment violation has both an objective and
subjective requirement. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The objective requirement is
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met when an inmate alleges a deprivation that is “sufficiently serious.” Id.(quotation omitted). For a claim based on failure to insure safety, “the inmate
must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of
serious harm,” id. at 834, otherwise described as an “excessive risk to inmate
health or safety,” id. at 837, one “sure or very likely to cause serious illness and
needless suffering.” Helling, 509 U.S. at 33. As to the subjective requirement,
“deliberate indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy than
negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, but “something less than acts or omissions
for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id.The test is not met “unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk
to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must
also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. In short, liability requires “consciousness of
a risk.” Id. at 840.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the claims of the parties and
conclude that Dexter has failed to meet the objective requirement for an Eighth
Amendment violation. This being so, we need not examine whether Dexter has
met the subjective requirement. Also, since Dexter has failed to establish the
officers violated a constitutional right, it is not necessary to inquire whether that
right was clearly established. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
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(A) Bosko and Sanns
We begin by observing that the district court incorrectly characterized
Dexter’s federal claim. According to the court, “Dexter contends that Defendants
violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment
pursuant to § 1983 when they failed to seat belt him while driving recklessly.”
(Appellant App. [02-4122] at 138.) Our review of the record, Dexter’s Answer
Brief (02-4122) and his Opening Brief (02-4137) uncovers no contention by
Dexter that failure to seatbelt, combined with reckless driving, undergirds his §
1983 claim. 2 He contends failure to seatbelt, standing alone, supports his claim.
Although Dexter does aver in his factual predicate that Bosko was speeding and
his attention was diverted from the road while he reached for food or drink, he
alleges these facts in the nature of explaining how the accident occurred–but Does
not allege reckless driving. 3 Dexter himself agrees an allegation of reckless
driving is not a part of his Eighth Amendment claim: “The district court
erroneously relied on a failure to seat belt along with reckless driving in order to
establish an Eighth Amendment violation.” (Appellant Br. [02-4137] at 6.) “[A]s
2
As we later discuss, Dexter alleges reckless driving only in his state claims.
3
We might ordinarily remand to provide Dexter an opportunity to amend his
complaint to state reckless driving as an element of his Eighth Amendment claim.
However, he did not move for an additional amendment of his complaint in the district
court, and the record and briefs are bereft of any indication Dexter advances this theory or
possesses sufficient facts to support it.
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argued in . . . Case No. 02-4122, the failure to seat belt [alone] deprives inmates of
reasonable safety measures and, hence, transgresses Eighth Amendment
protections.” (Id.) Accordingly, based on this record, we examine whether failure
to seatbelt, standing alone, states a constitutional violation. 4
We first examine the objective component of the test for an Eighth Amendment
violation, i.e., whether failure to seatbelt inmates poses a substantial risk of serious
harm. We conclude it does not. We have already indicated an Eighth Amendment
claim based on failure to insure inmate safety must allege a risk that has been
variously described as “life-threatening,” Helling, 509 U.S. at 33, “sufficiently
serious,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quotation omitted), “substantial,” id., “excessive,”
id. at 837, and “sure or very likely to cause” serious injury. Helling, 509 U.S. at 33.
These standards are not met in this case. The connection between a failure to seatbelt
and the risk of serious injury, even if arguably evident under state tort law, is
insufficient for purposes of constitutional analysis. 5 The risk of a motor vehicle
4
Dexter concedes that violation of an express prison policy requiring seatbelting of
inmates cannot provide the basis for establishing an Eighth Amendment violation.
(Appellant Reply Br. [02-4137] at 5.) See also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194
(1984) (“Officials sued for constitutional violations do not lose their qualified immunity
merely because their conduct violates some statutory or administrative provision.”). In a
related context (due process), the Supreme Court has held that “[t]he State may choose to
require procedures for reasons other than protection against deprivation of substantive
rights . . . but in making that choice the State does not create an independent substantive
right.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1983) (footnote omitted).
5
“Although a § 1983 claim has been described as a species of tort liability, it is
perfectly clear that not every injury in which a state official has played some part is
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accident is dependent upon a host of factors unrelated to the use of seatbelts, viz.,
vehicular condition, time of day, traffic, signage, warning lights, emergency
circumstances, weather, road conditions, and the conduct of other drivers. The
eventuality of an accident is not hastened or avoided by whether an inmate is
seatbelted. While the severity of harm should an accident occur may be exacerbated
by the failure to seatbelt, it is not directly occasioned by it and the other variables
must be included in the risk equation. Thus, we conclude a failure to seatbelt does
not, of itself, expose an inmate to risks of constitutional dimension. 6
actionable under that statute. To hold otherwise would render § 1983 and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution a font of tort law to be superimposed upon
whatever systems may already be administered by the States.” Norton v. Liddel, 620 F.2d
1375, 1378 (10th Cir. 1980) (quotations and citations omitted).
6
There has been some doubt expressed over the years as to whether the cruel and
unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment regulates prison conditions at all.
“For generations, judges and commentators regarded the Eighth Amendment as applying
only to torturous punishments meted out by statutes or sentencing judges, and not
generally to any hardship that might befall a prisoner during incarceration.” Hudson v.
McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 18 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). “[L]ower courts routinely
rejected ‘conditions of confinement’ claims well into this century . . . .” Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 39 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Although we recognize the
Supreme Court has extended the Eighth Amendment to remedy egregious prison
conditions, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976), we remain mindful that “[t]he
Constitution . . . does not mandate comfortable prisons, and only those deprivations
denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to form
the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)
(quotations and citations omitted). “[B]ecause deprivations of all sorts are the very
essence of imprisonment, we made explicit the serious deprivation requirement to ensure
that the Eighth Amendment did not transfer wholesale the regulation of prison life from
executive officials to judges.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 21-22 (emphasis omitted). “The
Eighth Amendment is not, and should not be turned into, a National Code of Prison
Regulation.” Id. at 28. It is one thing to countenance Eighth Amendment protection for
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We have identified no federal case holding that failure to seatbelt an inmate,
standing alone, violates the Eighth Amendment. 7 The Supreme Court has cautioned
that a determination of the objective component of an Eighth Amendment violation
requires a court to assess whether society considers the risk
that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates
contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone
unwillingly to such a risk. In other words, the prisoner must
show that the risk of which he complains is not one that
today's society chooses to tolerate.
Id. at 36. If state law in this circuit is any guide to contemporary standards of
decency, and we think it is, then clearly the risk of which Dexter complains is not so
grave as to amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. 8
In three states in our circuit (Kansas, Colorado and Oklahoma), the law, other
exposure to “sufficiently imminent dangers,” Helling, 509 U.S. at 34; it is quite another,
and a step we decline to take, to extend constitutional protection to exposure to a danger
that is inchoate and only tenuously connected to state action. To do so would require us
to extend the reach of the Eighth Amendment from substantial and known risks to
indefinable ones.
7
In finding an Eighth Amendment violation, the district court relied on Pendleton
v. Schroeder, No. C 980791 FMS, 1998 WL 273000 (N.D. Ca. May 22, 1998). However,
in Pendleton the complaint alleged an Eighth Amendment violation based on the
combined factors of failure to seatbelt and a prison practice to transport prisoners in vans
arranged convoy-style between other law enforcement vehicles. Id. at *2. According to
the alleged practice, the convoy deliberately operated at high speed to prevent civilian
vehicles from merging into it; as a result, when the front vehicle braked unexpectedly, all
of the trailing vehicles in the convoy collided with each other in turn. Id. at *1.
8
We emphasize that we do not suggest the risk of serious injury from an
automobile accident is not significantly increased by failure to seatbelt. We only suggest
that failure to seatbelt, standing alone, does not pose a grave risk of serious injury.
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than in the case of statutorily defined minor passengers, only requires the driver and
front seat passengers to be seatbelted. 9 In Kansas, the law does not even apply to
vehicles, like the one here, designed to carry eleven or more passengers. 10 In the
remaining three states in the circuit (Utah, Wyoming and New Mexico), although the
law requires all occupants of a motor vehicle to be seatbelted, it is the driver’s
responsibility to assure only his or her own seatbelting and that of statutorily defined
minor passengers. 11 In no state in the circuit is a driver required to seatbelt rear-
compartment passengers over the age of eighteen. And although the law in each state
requires a driver to assure toddlers are secured in child-restraint seats, 12 no comparable
statutes require a driver to seatbelt inmates in transit, or any other persons, such as
handicapped individuals, otherwise incapable of seatbelting themselves. The absence
of state statutes enacted for the protection of passengers helpless to seatbelt
themselves, other than in the case of toddlers, speaks mightily to the contemporary
9
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-2503; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 42-4-237; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
47, § 12-417.
10
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-2502.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-182 (driver must seatbelt passengers up to age sixteen);
11
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-1402 (driver must seatbelt passengers under age twelve); N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 66-7-372 (driver must seatbelt passengers less than eighteen).
12
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1344(a); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 42-4-236; Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 47, § 11-1112; Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-182(1)(b); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-1303; N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 66-7-369.
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standard of decency they might otherwise announce. 13 Moreover, there is no federal
statute mandating that the occupants of a motor vehicle, other than federal
employees, 14 be seatbelted. 15
In the context of this uneven statutory mosaic, and out of a sense of comity, we
are loathe to say unbelted inmates are exposed to risks society chooses not to
13
The absence of laws requiring the seatbelting of inmates for their own protection
in the event of an accident may be due to countervailing security concerns. In
MacCaffray v. United States, No. 2:97-CV-403, 1998 WL 560047 (D. Vt. Aug. 27, 1998),
an inmate was injured in an accident while he was being transported by the U.S. Marshals
Service. There was no federal statute or regulation requiring the Marshals Service to
seatbelt inmates in transit. Instead, the decision as to whether or not to do this was left up
to individual U.S. Marshals on a district-by-district basis.
The decision by the U.S. Marshals Service for the District of Vermont not
to install seat belts for prisoners in its transport vehicles was made in the
clear exercise of its judgment. Further, the decision was based upon sound
safety concerns involving the use by prisoners of the safety belts to break
handcuffs and escape, or any attempts to injure deputies who were fastening
and releasing their seat belts.
Id. at *3. The district court identified no Eighth Amendment violation in the failure to
seatbelt the injured inmate. Id. at *5.
14
Exercising direct authority through executive order, President Clinton enunciated
a policy, inter alia, to require seatbelt use by federal employees on official business and
by persons traveling in national parks. Exec. Order No. 13,043, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,217(Apr. 16, 1997).
Federal law is hortatory at best, and not entirely consistent. It authorizes the
15
Secretary of Transportation to award traffic safety grants to states with laws that forbid
operation of a motor vehicle unless the front seat passengers are seatbelted. 23 U.S.C. §
153(a). Elsewhere, it authorizes grants to implement programs to reduce highway deaths
conditioned on state laws requiring the operator to assure all passengers are seatbelted.
23 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1).
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tolerate. 16 As praiseworthy as buckling up may be, we hold that failure to seatbelt an
inmate does not violate the Constitution. 17 As plead, the amended complaint states a
case of negligence, at most. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (“Eighth Amendment
liability requires more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or
safety.”) (quotation omitted).
(B) Galetka
In his complaint, Dexter alleges Galetka, as warden of the state prison, knew of
the prison policy to seatbelt inmates and also knew that guards transporting inmates
16
The equivocal posture of state law in our circuit with respect to mandatory
seatbelting of some or all occupants of a motor vehicle is further evidenced by common
provisions limiting the evidentiary use of failure to seatbelt. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-
2504(c) (inadmissible for purposes of determining comparative negligence or mitigation
of damages); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 42-4-237(7) (admissible only to prove failure to
mitigate non-economic damages); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 12-420 (inadmissible in any
civil action); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-186 (inadmissible on issues of negligence, injury or
mitigation of damage); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-1402(f) (inadmissible in any civil action);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-7-373 (inadmissible to establish fault or negligence or to limit or
apportion damages). As the Utah Supreme Court has succinctly put it, a limitation like
the one expressed in § 41-6-186 “represents a pronouncement of legislative policy around
negligence and public safety.” Ryan v. Gold Cross Servs., Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 425 (Utah
1995). “We conclude that the legislature may legitimately set a public policy which
encourages seat belt use yet at the same time weigh the positive benefits of such a policy
against the severity of the penalties for noncompliance.” Id. at 428.
17
This case is easily distinguishable from DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974-75
(10th Cir. 2001) where we held that thirty-six hours’ exposure to human waste occasioned
by deliberate flooding of prison toilets stated an Eighth Amendment violation. Likewise,
the facts presented here are distinguishable from those presented in Helling, 509 U.S. at
33, where exposure to environmental tobacco smoke stated an Eighth Amendment
violation (prison officials could not “ignore a condition of confinement that is sure or
very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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regularly failed to honor it. Therefore, Dexter claims Galetka is liable under § 1983
for the alleged transgression of Dexter’s Eighth Amendment rights by Bosko and
Sanns. This claim fails, however, because “[a] claim of inadequate training,
supervision, and policies under § 1983 cannot be made out against a supervisory
authority absent a finding of a constitutional violation by the person supervised.”
Webber v. Mefford, 43 F.3d 1340, 1344-45 (10 th Cir. 1994). 18
(C) State Constitutional Claims
Dexter alleges that Bosko, Sanns and Galetka violated his rights under the cruel
and unusual punishment and unnecessary rigor provisions of the Utah Constitution, as
well as its due process clause. See Ut. Const. art. I, § 9 (“Excessive bail shall not be
required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with
unnecessary rigor.”); Ut. Const. art. I, § 7 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.”). He claims they demonstrated “reckless
intent or a deliberate indifference” (Appellant App. [02-4122] at 15) to his health and
safety by failing to seatbelt him, and that Bosko, with “reckless intent and deliberate
indifference” (id.) was speeding and distracted, resulting in an accident and injury.
Because we conclude Bosko, Sanns and Galetka are immune from suit on
18
“At the outset, Appellant admits that if there were no Eighth Amendment
violation by the prison guards in this case, then Galetka, as warden[,] cannot be held
liable either.” (Appellant Br. [02-4137] at 3.)
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Dexter’s federal claims, we see no reason to address his state claims.
Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of
comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them
a surer-footed reading of applicable law. Certainly, if the federal claims
are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional
sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (footnote
omitted). See also Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66, 72 (2d Cir.)
(“[S]ince we have dismissed plaintiff's federal claims for failure to state a cause of
action, we will avoid making needless decisions of state law and, exercising our
discretion, dismiss [the] pendent state claim.”) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 974 (1976).
Conclusion
As to Dexter’s federal claims, we REVERSE the district court’s order denying
qualified immunity to Bosko and Sanns and AFFIRM its order awarding qualified
immunity to Galetka. We REMAND with instructions to the district court to dismiss
Dexter’s state law claims.
Entered by the Court:
Terrence L. O’Brien
United States Circuit Judge
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