United States v. Tedford

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 8 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 03-7070
v. (D.C. No. 00-CR-61-S)
MISTY LEE TEDFORD, (E.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, MURPHY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this court has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
In October 2000, appellant Misty Tedford pleaded guilty to one count of
conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
21 U.S.C. § 846. Tedford was sentenced to a thirty-six-month term of
imprisonment and a sixty-month term of supervised release.
Tedford began serving her term of supervised release on September 16,
2002. On April 7, 2003, the United States Probation Office filed a petition in
federal district court recommending that Tedford’s supervised release be revoked.
The petition alleged that Tedford had violated four conditions of her release: (1)
she had been convicted of a state crime while on supervised release, (2) she
failed to notify her probation officer within seventy-two hours of her arrest on
the state charge, (3) she failed seven drug tests, and (4) she had continued a
relationship with a convicted felon.
A final hearing and sentencing on the revocation petition was held on June
3, 2003. At the hearing, Tedford stipulated that she had violated the terms of her
supervised release. After questioning Tedford, the district court concluded that
sufficient evidence existed to establish the violations set forth in the Petition and
it revoked Tedford’s term of supervised release. Although the United States
Sentencing Commission’s policy statement applicable to sentences to be imposed
following the revocation of supervised release recommended a sentence of five to
eleven months’ imprisonment, U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a), the court sentenced Tedford
to forty-eight months’ imprisonment.
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In this appeal, Tedford argues that the district court abused its discretion
when it imposed a sentence in excess of the range recommended in the
Sentencing Guidelines policy statement. “If the district court imposes a sentence
in excess of that recommended in Chapter 7, we will not reverse if it can be
determined from the record to have been reasoned and reasonable.” United
States v. Hurst , 78 F.3d 482, 483 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted). Tedford
asserts that the sentence imposed is unreasonable.
Although the policy statements contained in Chapter Seven of the
Sentencing Guidelines are merely advisory, the district court must consider them
when it imposes punishment for violations of conditions of supervised release.
United States v. Lee , 957 F.2d 770, 774 (10th Cir. 1992). It is clear from the
transcript of the sentencing hearing that the district court did consider the policy
statements. It referenced them immediately prior to imposing the sentence, and
informed Tedford during the colloquy that the recommended sentencing range
was five to eleven months. However, in the case of a revocation of supervised
release where the sentence imposed is outside the range described in an
applicable sentencing guideline or policy statement, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2)
requires the district court to state in open court “the specific reason for the
imposition of a sentence different from that described.” Further, before imposing
a sentence, the district court must also adequately consider the factors set forth in
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18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We have held that the court need not make specific factual
findings relating to each factor, United States v. Rose , 185 F.3d 1108, 1111 (10th
Cir. 1999), but it does have an obligation to explain its sentencing decision on
the record. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c); United States v. Zanghi , 209 F.3d 1201, 1204
(10th Cir. 2000).
In this case, the district court failed to give any explanation as to why it
sentenced Tedford to a 48-month term of incarceration, a sentence clearly
different from that recommended in the applicable Sentencing Guidelines policy
statement. After delineating the violations to which Tedford stipulated and
hearing testimony on Tedford’s current circumstances, the court simply stated, “it
is the judgment of this Court that the term of supervised release previously
imposed in case number CR-000061-003 is revoked and you are hereby
committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of
48 months.”
“[W]here there is no record of the judge’s decisionmaking process, our
review loses its appellate character and becomes instead a post hoc assumption of
the district court’s responsibilities.” Zanghi , 209 F.3d at 1204. The district
court’s failure to provide any explanation for the sentence it imposed renders
appellate review of Tedford’s sentence impossible. We therefore remand this
matter to the district court with instructions to resentence Tedford and to state on
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the record the reasons for the sentence it imposes, including, if applicable, an
explanation consistent with the mandate of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2).
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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