Natural Arch & Bridge Society v. Alston

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
MAR 23 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
NATURAL ARCH AND BRIDGE
SOCIETY, a Colorado non-profit
corporation; DAVID BRANDT-
ERICSON, an individual; HARVEY
LEAKE, an individual; EVELYN
JOHNSON, an individual; EARL
DEWAAL, an individual; ROBERT
MOORE, an individual,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. No. 02-4099
(D.C. No. 2:00-CV-191-J)
JOSEPH F. ALSTON, Superintendent, (Utah)
Rainbow Bridge National Monument;
ROBERT G. STANTON, Director,
National Park Service; NATIONAL
PARK SERVICE, an agency of the U.S.
Department of the Interior,
Defendants-Appellees.
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ASSOCIATION ON AMERICAN
INDIAN AFFAIRS, MEDICINE WHEEL
COALITION ON SACRED SITES OF
NORTH AMERICA, and NATIONAL
TRUST FOR HISTORIC
PRESERVATION,
Amici Curiae.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and O’BRIEN,
Circuit Judge.
By a complaint filed on March 3, 2000, the Natural Arch and Bridge Society, a
Colorado non-profit corporation; and David Brandt-Ericson, Harvey Leake, Evelyn
Johnson, Earl DeWaal, and Robert Moore, as individuals, brought suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah against Joseph F. Alston, the Superintendent
of the Rainbow Bridge National Monument, Robert G. Stanton, the Director of the
National Park Service, and the National Park Service (“Park Service”), an agency of the
U.S. Department of the Interior. The gist of the complaint was as follows:
This case concerns the management policies and
practices of Defendant National Park Service (Park Service)
that prevent visitors to the Rainbow Bridge National
Monument (Rainbow Bridge or Monument) from approaching
the rock span that is the central attraction of the Monument
unless those visitors are Native Americans or are engaging in
Native American religious ceremonies.
The first cause of action was based on an alleged violation of the Establishment
Clause in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. A second, and last,
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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cause of action was based on an alleged violation of “the Equal Protection component of
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Jurisdiction was based on 28
U.S.C. § 1331. On May 15, 2000, the defendants filed an answer to the complaint.
After discovery by both sides, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment
and the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The two motions were consolidated for
hearing. On April 5, 2002, the district court entered a memorandum opinion and order in
which it denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted defendants’ motion
to dismiss. Natural Arch and Bridge Society v. Alston, 209 F.Supp. 2d 1207 (D.Utah
2002). In line therewith, on April 9, 2002, the district court entered the following
judgment:
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED
that the claims of plaintiffs Moore, Brandt-Ericson, Leake,
Johnson and National Arch and Bridge Society are dismissed
for lack of standing; plaintiff DeWaal’s equal protection
claim is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. Judgment is entered in the favor of the
defendants on plaintiff DeWaal’s challenge to the 1993 GMP
and Interpretive Prospectus under the Administrative
Procedures Act. Plaintiff DeWaal’s claim of violation of the
First Amendment by employees of the National Park Service
is dismissed for failure to join the proper parties as
defendants.
On June 5, 2002, the plaintiffs, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, filed a notice of
appeal from the district court’s judgment entered on April 9, 2002. On July 1, 2002, the
district court entered a second memorandum opinion and order, which it labeled as being a
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“Corrective Text.” That order was “entered nunc pro tunc to 5th of April, 2002.” Natural
Arch v. Alston, No. 2:00-C-0191J, at #54 (D.Utah July 1, 2002).
As we understand it, the only persons named as plaintiffs in the complaint filed in
the district court who are pursuing this appeal, are Ms. Evelyn Johnson and Mr. Earl
DeWaal. Accordingly, we are not here concerned, as such, with the other plaintiffs named
in the complaint filed in the district court, i.e., National Arch and Bridge Society, Robert
Moore, David Brandt-Ericson, and Harvey Leake. Further, as we understand it, we are not
here concerned, as such, with the second cause of action in the complaint filed in the
district court, i.e., the cause which was based on the “equal protection” component of the
“due process” clause of the Fifth Amendment. Thus, we are only concerned here with
Johnson’s and DeWaal’s first cause of action, which was a challenge to the Park Service’s
policies and practices based on the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. As to
Johnson, the district court held that Johnson had no standing to assert a claim based on an
alleged violation of the Establishment Clause. However, as to DeWaal, the district court
held that while DeWaal did have standing to assert a claim based on the Establishment
Clause, he had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and his first
cause of action was subject to a motion to dismiss. In line therewith, the district court
denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.
As indicated at the outset, Johnson and DeWaal challenge the policies and practices
of the Park Service as such related to the Rainbow Bridge National Monument in Southern
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Utah, claiming that “the challenged policy violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment because that policy has the purpose and effect of endorsing American Indian
religion and results in excessive entanglement of the federal government in religious
matters.” In the complaint, the plaintiffs in challenging the practices and policies of the
Park Service alleged the following:
Pursuant to the General Management Plan the Park Service
placed signs around the Monument announcing the “sacred”
nature of Rainbow Bridge. Some of the signs read as follows:
“Neighboring Indian tribes consider Rainbow Bridge a sacred
religious site. Please respect these long-standing beliefs.
Please do not approach or walk under Rainbow Bridge.” “To
Native American tribes/nations, Rainbow Bridge is a sacred
religious site. In respect of these long-standing beliefs, we
request your voluntary compliance in not approaching or
walking under Rainbow Bridge.”
* * * * *
The Park Service has also posted two declarations on its
official Rainbow Bridge website that read as follows: “Please
visit Rainbow Bridge in a spirit that honors and respects the
cultures to whom it is sacred.” “To Native American nations,
Rainbow Bridge is sacred. Please respect these long-standing
beliefs. We request your voluntary compliance in not
approaching or walking under Rainbow Bridge.” (Emphasis
added.)
Germane to our discussion are the several “encounters” between Johnson and
DeWaal with park employees. In the complaint, Johnson alleged that in October, 1997,
the following encounter occurred between herself and park officials:
The same Ranger then approached Mrs.
Johnson’s group and ordered them to leave the area.
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When asked why they should move the Ranger told
them that their presence on the far side of Rainbow
Bridge had the effect of encouraging others to walk
underneath the bridge. Although they wanted to stay
where they were, Mrs. Johnson and the others were
compelled to comply with the Ranger’s demands.
In the complaint, DeWaal alleged an encounter with the park service
employees as follows:
On July 18, 1999, Earl DeWaal and members of his
family and friends traveled to Rainbow Bridge. While taking
in the view from the official viewing area, Mr. DeWaal asked
a Park Service Ranger if anyone was allowed to walk
underneath the Monument. The Ranger initially told Mr.
DeWaal that no one could approach the Monument.
However, when Mr. DeWaal asked for a reason, the Ranger
capitulated and told him that he (Mr. DeWaal) could use the
official trail to Rainbow Bridge, but threatened to cite or
arrest him if he stepped off of the trail. However, there was
no visible “trail” to Rainbow Bridge, and when Mr. DeWaal
asked the Ranger to point out the path the Ranger refused,
telling Mr. DeWaal that he should talk to a supervisor.
Immediately thereafter, Senior Ranger Mike Dedman
arrived. Mr. DeWaal informed Rander Dedman that
preventing visitors from approaching Rainbow Bridge was
unlawful. Ranger Dedman responded by offering to escort
Mr. DeWaal and some members of his group to Rainbow
Bridge. Just then, another group of people from an official
tour group arrived. Ranger Dedman withdrew his offer of
escort and told Mr. DeWaal that no one could use the trail.
When asked for a reason why, Ranger Dedman responded that
use of the trail was prohibited for reasons of protecting Native
American religion–specifically, in order to prevent
desecration of the site. Ranger Dedman confirmed that if Mr.
DeWaal attempted to approach Rainbow Bridge he would be
cited or arrested. Although he wanted to use the trail to walk
underneath Rainbow Bridge, Mr. DeWaal was compelled not
to for fear of being cited or arrested.
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In his deposition, DeWaal mentioned an additional encounter he had with the park
service in 1998. On appeal, counsel, in his brief, refers to that encounter as follows:
In July or August of 1998, Earl DeWaal traveled to the
Monument with his wife, Vickie, and several of their
children. A uniformed National Park Service
Interpreter/Ranger requested that Mr. DeWaal and his family
not approach or walk beneath Rainbow Bridge. . . . .
Although Mr. DeWaal and his family wanted to walk beneath
Rainbow Bridge, Mr. DeWaal and his family felt compelled
by the actions and authority of the National Park Service
Interpreter/Ranger and did not approach Rainbow Bridge. Id.The present case challenging the policies and practices of the Park Service was
brought pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (2000). The
plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief from those policies which informed
visitors to the Rainbow Bridge National Monument about the cultural and religious
significance of Rainbow Bridge to Native American tribes in the area, including a policy
of asking visitors to voluntarily refrain from approaching or walking under the Bridge.
(In this regard, the record indicates that, while the plaintiffs refrained from walking under
the bridge, the “policies and practices” of the Park Service wherein it asked visitors to
voluntarily comply did not deter many others who, in fact, did walk under the bridge.) In
support thereof, their complaint set forth the several “encounters” between Johnson, in
1997, and DeWaal, in 1999, and the park officials.
Johnson and DeWaal further alleged in their complaint that the Park Service’s
policy of encouraging visitors to refrain from walking under the Bridge violated the
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Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution because it had the
purpose and effort of advancing and endorsing Native American religion.
Although this is a review of an administrative policy pursuant to the
Administrative Procedures Act, the district court, with the consent of all parties, permitted
discovery, which included, inter alia, testimony concerning the “encounters” between
Johnson and DeWaal with park employees. It was in this setting that the defendants filed
a motion to dismiss and Johnson and DeWaal, and the other plaintiffs, filed a motion for
summary judgment. As indicated, the district court dismissed the claim of Johnson on the
grounds that she did not have standing. The district court also held that DeWaal did not
have standing based on his “encounter” with park officials in 1999, but that he did have
standing on his 1998 “encounter” with park officials. As to that aspect of the case, the
district court went on to hold that the policy and practice of the Park Service to ask
visitors to voluntarily refrain from walking under the Bridge did not violate the
Establishment Clause.
The first issue to be resolved is whether the district court erred in holding that
Johnson lacked standing, and that DeWaal had standing to bring this action. Our study of
the matter convinces us that the district court was correct in holding that Johnson lacked
standing, and that the district court erred in concluding that DeWaal had standing to
maintain the action.
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-1 (1992), the Supreme Court
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articulated the “irreducible constitutional minimum” necessary to Article III standing as
follows:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in
fact” - - an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent, not
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’[.]” Second, there must be a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of - - the injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to
the challenged action of the defendant . . . and not . . . th[e]
result [of] the independent action of some third party not
before the court.” Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to
merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a
favorable decision.” (Citations omitted.)
In line therewith, in Ash Creek Mining Co. v. Lujan, 969 F.2d 868, 874-5 (10th
Cir. 1992), we said that a party who would invoke federal jurisdiction “bears the burden
of establishing these elements” set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. In State of
Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1202 (10th Cir. 1998), we stated that “[s]tanding is not
measured by the intensity of a party’s commitment, fervor, or aggression in pursuit of its
alleged right and remedy.” In that same case, we went on to speak as follows:
“[the elements of constitutional standing] are not mere
pleading requirements but rather [are] an indispensable part of
the plaintiff’s case.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561,
112 S.Ct. at 2136. Consequently, “each element must be
supported in the same way as any other matter on which the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and
degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the
litigation.” Id.State of Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d at 1204.
As previously stated, in our view the district court was correct in holding that
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Johnson did not have standing to maintain this action and that, contrary to the holding of
the district court, DeWaal also did not have standing. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n. v.
Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1037 (2000), has particular
pertinency to the present case. The fact situation in Bear Lodge is quite similar to the fact
situation in the instant case. Bear Lodge concerned a national monument in Wyoming
where the Park Service had a policy of asking that climbers “voluntarily refrain from
climbing during the month of June when American Indians engage in The Sun Dance and
other ceremonies.” Id. at 815. The “climbers” challenged that policy and practice. In
Bear Lodge, the district court held that the plaintiffs there had standing to maintain the
action, but dismissed their claims on the merits. On appeal, we held that none of the
plaintiffs had standing, and we did not reach the merits of the case. In so doing, we spoke
in Bear Lodge as follows:
In short, the Climbers “claim that the Constitution has
been violated, [but] they claim nothing else. They fail to
identify any personal injury suffered by them as a
consequence of the alleged constitutional error.” Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation
of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485, 102 S.Ct. 752,
765, 70 L.Ed2d 700 (1982). The Climbers are clearly
incensed by the NPS’ request that they voluntarily limit their
climbing, but
standing is not measured by the intensity
of the litigant’s interest or the fervor of
his advocacy. That concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues, is the
anticipated consequence of proceedings
commenced by one who has been injured in
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fact; it is not a permissible substitute for the
showing of injury itself.
Id. at 486, 102 S.Ct. at 766 (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Because they have alleged no injury as a result of
their claim, the FCMP improperly establishes religion, we
hold the Climbers have no standing to sue in this case.
(Emphasis added.)
Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n. v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d at 822.
Counsel suggests that the present case is different from Bear Lodge. We disagree.
We believe this case is controlled by Bear Lodge. In short, under Bear Lodge, neither of
these plaintiffs has standing to challenge the “policy or practice” of the Park Service,
which asks visitors to “voluntarily” refrain from going to a certain area of the park out of
respect for the religious significance the particular area has for a Native American Indian
tribe, on First Amendment grounds.
Based on Bear Lodge, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Johnson’s claim
based on lack of standing, and, at the same time, we affirm the district court’s ultimate
dismissal of DeWaal’s claim. However, in connection with DeWaal, we, unlike the
district court, are of the view that he, too, lacked standing, and, as in Bear Lodge, we do
not reach the merits of his claim that the policies and practices of the Park Service asking
visitors to voluntarily refrain from approaching and walking under the bridge violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
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Judgment affirmed.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. McWilliams
Senior Circuit Judge
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