Scott v. City of Wichita

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 20 2004
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JEFFREY LYNN SCOTT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 03-3285
(D.C. No. 00-CV-3212-MLB)
CITY OF WICHITA; WICHITA (D. Kan.)
POLICE DEPARTMENT; NORMAN
WILLIAMS, Chief of Police, Wichita
Police Department; WILLIAM C.
WATSON, past Chief of Police,
Wichita Police Department; EDWYN
DIAZ, Officer of the City of Wichita
Police Department; GARY
KNOWLES, Officer, City of Wichita
Police Department,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , Chief Judge, MURPHY , Circuit Judge, and CAUTHRON , **
Chief District Judge.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable Robin J. Cauthron, Chief District Judge, United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Jeffrey Lynn Scott, proceeding pro se, brought this civil rights
case under 41 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants should be held liable for
unlawful arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution. Scott now appeals
the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment and the judgment entered
upon a jury verdict against Scott on his excessive force claim. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Scott claims that the defendant police officers Edwyn Diaz and Gary
Knowles entered his apartment, attacked him without provocation, assaulted his
then-wife Natalie (who was pregnant at the time), and arrested the couple without
probable cause. The officers’ version of the incident is quite different. They
deny using excessive force, stating that they came to the Scotts’ apartment on a
disturbance call and entered it through an open door. The officers state that they
only used physical force against the Scotts after the Scotts became physically
combative.
Scott was charged with aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer and
with aiding and abetting the crime of aggravated assault on a law enforcement
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officer; Mrs. Scott was charged with aggravated assault and aiding and abetting
an aggravated battery. Although the Scotts were bound over after a preliminary
hearing, the charges were eventually dismissed. Scott was convicted of murder
before the assault charges went to trial and is presently serving a life sentence in
Kansas state prison for a murder conviction. The Scotts’ marriage ended in
divorce.
Scott filed suit against the individual officers, William Watson and Norman
Williams (who both served as chief of police for the City of Wichita), and the
City of Wichita. He claimed arrest without probable cause; malicious
prosecution; excessive force on the part of the officers; failure to properly train or
discipline on the part of the police chiefs; authorization of excessive force by the
City; and conspiracy. 1
The district court dismissed or entered summary judgment
on all of Mr. Scott’s claims except his Fourth Amendment claim of excessive
force against the individual officers. That claim proceeded to a jury trial, during
which his ex-wife testified–apparently to the detriment of Scott’s position. The
jury entered a verdict for defendants and the district court denied Scott’s motion
for a new trial.
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Scott also attempted to name his ex-wife and infant son (who was born
almost six months after the incident) as plaintiffs. After the ex-wife filed an
affidavit stating that she had sole custody of the child, that she was not interested
in pursuing the lawsuit, and that she had not personally signed the pleadings, the
district court dismissed all claims by these two individuals.
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On appeal, Scott asserts the district court erred in: (1) entering a protective
order and stay of discovery; (2) granting summary judgment based on allegedly
inadmissible affidavits; (3) denying Scott’s motion to strike defendant Diaz’s
affidavit, based on allegations of perjury; (4) denying Scott’s repeated requests
for appointment of counsel; (5) denying Scott’s request to interview his ex-wife
before she testified; (6) refusing to admit evidence of dismissal of the criminal
charges that arose from Scott’s arrest; (7) informing the jury, through a jury
instruction, that Scott was incarcerated; and (8) denying Scott’s motion for a new
trial based on allegations of juror and judicial misconduct. Scott also renews his
request, denied by the district court, to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis , with
a transcript of the jury trial furnished at government expense.
DISCUSSION
We address all of Scott’s substantive appellate issues under the abuse of
discretion standard. See Johnson v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte County , 371
F.3d 723, 730 (10th Cir. 2004) (reviewing jury instructions); United States v.
Austin , 231 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir. 2000) (reviewing the denial of a motion
for new trial); United States v. Youts , 229 F.3d 1312, 1320 (10th Cir. 2000)
(reviewing a trial court’s decision as to how to proceed in response to allegations
of juror misconduct or bias); Gust v. Jones , 162 F.3d 587, 597 (10th Cir. 1998)
(reviewing district court decisions regarding the conduct of a trial); Kidd v. Taos
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Ski Valley, Inc. , 88 F.3d 848, 853 (10th Cir. 1996) (reviewing the decision of a
district court limiting or barring discovery); Cartier v. Jackson , 59 F.3d 1046,
1048 (10th Cir. 1995) (reviewing a district court’s evidentiary rulings); Rucks v.
Boergermann , 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir. 1995) (reviewing a district court’s
denial of a motion for appointment of counsel). “Under this standard, we will not
disturb a trial court’s decision absent a definite and firm conviction that the lower
court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible
choice in the circumstances.” Kidd , 88 F.3d at 853 (quotations omitted).
With the abuse of discretion standard in mind, we turn to Scott’s first two
issues. These issues require little discussion, in that they both relate to the
district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of the City and police chiefs.
Because a jury later determined that the individual officers did not use excessive
force, there is no need to parse Scott’s arguments about summary-judgment
procedure. The jury verdict forecloses Scott’s excessive force claim against the
municipality or supervisory defendants. See Myers v. Okla. County Bd. of County
Comm’rs , 151 F.3d 1313, 1316 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that “[i]t is well
established . . . that a municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 for
the acts of an employee if a jury finds that the municipal employee committed no
constitutional violation”); Winters v. Bd. of County Comm’rs , 4 F.3d 848, 855
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(10th Cir. 1993) (stating that supervisors may be liable only for participating or
acquiescing in a constitutional violation committed by subordinates).
Our analysis of Scott’s third claim is similar. Scott asserts that Diaz’s
affidavit, submitted in support of a summary judgment motion, was not made in
good faith and that the district court erred in considering it. There is no
indication that the district court abused its discretion in denying Scott’s motion to
strike. Further, the district court denied Diaz’s request for summary judgment, as
a consequence, the admission of the affidavit in no way prejudicially affected
Scott’s substantial rights. See Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control , 165 F.3d 767,
773, 776 (10th Cir. 1999).
Next, Scott argues that the district court improperly denied him
appointment of counsel. “There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in
a civil case.” Durre v. Dempsey , 869 F.2d 543, 547 (10th Cir. 1989). Under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), a district court is permitted to appoint counsel after
considering, “the merits of the litigant’s claims, the nature of the factual issues
raised in the claims, the litigant’s ability to present his claims, and the complexity
of the legal issues raised by the claims.” Rucks , 57 F.3d at 979 (quotation marks
and citation omitted). In this case, the district court considered these factors, and
found appointment of counsel unnecessary. We conclude the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Scott’s requests for appointment of counsel.
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In another argument, Scott asserts that his due-process rights were violated
when the district court refused his request to interview his ex-wife prior to her
testimony. The record shows that the ex-wife was subpoenaed by Scott and that
the district court observed that “[s]he was obviously terrified of plaintiff, and for
good reason.” R., vol. 8, doc. 281, at 1. Even in a criminal case, a witness may
“refuse to be interviewed” without violating a defendant’s rights. United States v.
Troutman , 814 F.2d 1428, 1453 (10th Cir. 1987). The court did not abuse its
discretion in deciding to comply with the ex-wife’s wishes.
Scott also argues error in the trial court’s decision to exclude as irrelevant
evidence of dismissal of the assault charges that arose from the incident. The
determination is supportable and is not indicative of an abuse of discretion.
Moreover, the ruling actually protected Scott from prejudice arising from
defendants’ proffered evidence that the assault charges were dismissed only
because Scott had been previously convicted of first-degree murder.
In a related issue, Scott asserts that the jury should not have been informed
that he is incarcerated. However, jury instructions on Scott’s incarceration were
relevant to the damage calculation for lost income. We see no abuse of discretion
in the giving of the challenged instructions.
Scott’s last claim on appeal is that he is entitled to a new trial, based on his
allegation that, when retiring to deliberate, a juror smiled and winked at the judge
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when retiring to deliberate. In light of the amorphous and speculative nature of
Scott’s allegation, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a
motion for new trial based on the alleged interaction.
As a final matter, we address Scott’s renewed request for a transcript at
government expense. The relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. § 753(f), provides: “Fees
for transcripts furnished in [noncriminal, nonhabeas corpus] proceedings to
persons permitted to appeal in forma pauperis shall . . . be paid by the United
States if the trial judge or a circuit judge certifies that the appeal is not frivolous
(but presents a substantial question).” In its order denying § 753(f) request, the
district court determined that Scott’s trial statement that he could pay a $2,500
expert-witness fee was inconsistent with indigency. Further, the court determined
that the case failed to present a substantial question for appeal. R., vol. 8, doc.
286, at 1-2. We agree with the district court’s denial of the motion for a free
transcript and we, in turn, deny the motion filed in this court.
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AFFIRMED . Scott’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on
appeal and for a government-paid transcript is DENIED . His motion for
submission of addendum attachments and motion to supplement the record are
GRANTED to the extent that the attachments are copies of documents contained
in the district court record.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha
Chief Judge
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