United States v. Aguilar

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 27 2004
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 03-6115
(D.C. Nos. 01-CV-338-M
v. &
98-CR-112-M)
RAMON AGUILAR, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , ANDERSON , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Petitioner Ramon Aguilar, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s
denial of his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255. In 1998, petitioner was sentenced to 125 months’
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
imprisonment, a special $100 assessment, and a four-year term of supervised
release after pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to
distribute. This court affirmed that sentence on appeal. United States v. Aquilar ,
No. 99-6004, 2000 WL 968662, at **1 (10th Cir. July 10, 2000).
In his § 2255 petition, petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of counsel
based upon (1) failure to object to the denial of a sentence reduction for
acceptance of responsibility; (2) failure to request a downward departure based on
petitioner’s deportable alien status; (3) failure to request a downward departure
based on petitioner’s cultural assimilation into the United States; and
(4) cumulative ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court found all
claims to be without merit and denied relief.
This court granted a certificate of appealability on two issues: (1) whether
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness when
he failed to request a downward departure based on petitioner’s deportable alien
status, and (2) whether the outcome of the proceedings would have been different
but for counsel’s failure to request a downward departure on that basis. In
reviewing a denial of a § 2255 motion, we review the district court’s factual
findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v.
Pearce , 146 F.3d 771, 774 (10th Cir. 1998). Because we find no error in the
determination of the district court, we affirm.
2
“Whether a defendant received effective assistance of counsel is a mixed
question of law and fact that we review de novo.” United States v. Prows ,
118 F.3d 686, 691 (10th Cir. 1997). To establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a petitioner must show both that his counsel’s performance was deficient,
and that this deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington ,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish prejudice, the petitioner “must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
In denying petitioner relief under § 2255, the district court relied, inter
alia , on United States v. Gomez-Sotelo , 18 Fed. Appx. 690 (10th Cir. Aug. 28,
2001), an unpublished decision of this court decided after petitioner had been
sentenced. Gomez-Sotelo held that, while “courts are not forbidden from
considering possible deportation as a basis for downward departure . . . possible
deportation may not be accepted as such a basis unless sanctioned by the Attorney
General in a specific case.” Id. at 692. Because there was no evidence in the
record of the Attorney General’s position regarding petitioner’s deportation, the
district court held that petitioner’s attorney would not have been justified in
bringing a motion for downward departure based on petitioner’s status as a
deportable alien. Counsel, therefore, was not ineffective.
3
Petitioner was sentenced on December 3, 1998. In 1990, in United States v.
Soto , 918 F.2d 882 (10th Cir. 1990), we held that a sentencing court could not
consider a defendant’s possible deportation as a basis for departing downward.
“Because Congress clearly reserved drug-related deportation decisions to the
Attorney General, a sentencing court shall not consider the possible deportation of
an alien resident for a drug conviction in deciding whether to depart downward
from the sentencing guidelines.” Id. at 885 (citation omitted).
Soto was overruled in part by the Supreme Court decision in Koon v. United
States , 518 U.S. 81, 109 (1996), limited overruling on other grounds noted by
United States v. Clough , 360 F.3d 967, 970 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004). Koon addressed
the circumstances under which special factors may warrant departure from the
sentencing guidelines. After Koon, a sentencing court, unless specifically
prohibited by the sentencing guidelines, may consider any factor as a potential
basis for departure. United States v. Fagan, 162 F.3d 1280, 1283 (10th Cir. 1998)
(citing Koon, 518 U.S. at 109).
In Gomez-Sotelo , 18 Fed. Appx. at 692, we explained the effect of Koon on
our prior ruling in Soto :
Koon prevents the Soto rule from remaining a categorical absolute;
hence, courts are not forbidden from considering possible deportation
as a basis for downward departure. However, possible deportation
may not be accepted as such a basis unless sanctioned by the
Attorney General in the specific case.
4
To the extent petitioner is arguing application of Gomez-Sotelo to his case is an
ex post facto violation, we reiterate our conclusion that the “principle enunciated
in Soto, which protects the policymaking authority of the Attorney General,
retains its validity.” Id. Because Gomez-Sotelo reiterates the portion of the Soto
holding requiring the Attorney General to determine deportation issues in the first
instance, there is no impermissible judicial ex post facto problem. Petitioner has
not been disadvantaged by the application of Gomez-Sotelo to his § 2255 petition.
Accordingly, because the sentencing court was prohibited from considering
petitioner’s alien status as grounds for a downward departure in the absence of
the Attorney General first determining petitioner’s alien status, his counsel was
not ineffective for failing to urge downward departure on that basis. See Cargle
v. Mullin , 317 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2003). Counsel’s performance,
therefore, did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, and the
outcome of petitioner’s sentencing proceeding would not have changed had
counsel requested the downward departure. 1
Petitioner also argues that the district court erred in ruling on his § 2255
motion without holding a hearing. The district court must hold a hearing on a
§ 2255 motion “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case
1
Petitioner’s offhand reference in his brief to his alienage as another a basis
for downward departure is insufficient to raise the issue on appeal. See Am.
Airlines v. Christensen , 967 F.2d 410, 415 n.8 (10th Cir. 1992).
5
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
As the district court found, the law conclusively establishes that petitioner is not
entitled to relief. The district court therefore did not err in failing to hold a
hearing.
Petitioner’s motion for a certificate of appealability on the issues of
whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the denial of a sentence
reduction for acceptance of responsibility and for failing to request a downward
departure based on petitioner’s cultural assimilation into the United States, as
well as on the issue of cumulative ineffective assistance, is DENIED. His motion
to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs and fees is GRANTED.
Petitioner is reminded that he is obligated to continue making partial payments
until the entire fee has been paid. The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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