United States v. Grams

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 28 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
No. 03-1332
MARK GRAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 1
Before TACHA , Chief Circuit Judge, LUCERO , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
Mark Grams entered a conditional guilty plea to transporting a fraudulent
security in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, which was the
consequence of his alleged theft of a $191,700 check from his employer. He
appeals the district court’s partial denial of his motion to suppress evidence as
well as the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment for
outrageous government conduct. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291and AFFIRM.
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This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
We summarily state the background facts and procedural history, which are
addressed in substantial detail in the district court’s Memorandum and Order of
February 10, 2003. On July 26, 1995, Grams, who was then treasurer of Beaver
Creek Resort Company and finance director of Vail Associates, diverted a
$191,700 check payable by Beaver Creek to Gillig Corporation, that had been
issued in connection with a negotiation for purchase of transportation buses for
Beaver Creek. No one had focused on the disappearance of the check until 1997,
when accountants inquired about the book entry of $191,700. In attempting to
obtain information about the check from Grams, it was determined that he had left
on vacation, a work break from which he apparently elected not to return. Over
the next eighteen months, investigations were launched by Vail Associates
personnel, federal, and state authorities. These various investigations gradually
uncovered evidence which led all to conclude that Grams was responsible for the
theft of the money.
On the basis of the evidence, which consisted of bank account numbers and
details of financial transactions through which Grams diverted the money in
question, the FBI issued a warrant for Grams’ arrest. Grams was arrested in
Jackson Hole, Wyoming on April 6, 1999. On November 12, 1999, Grams moved
to suppress the evidence under the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 3401-3421, and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. On
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March 23, 2001, Grams requested dismissal of the indictment.
After holding several hearings on Grams’ motions to suppress and to
dismiss the indictment, the district court issued a Memorandum and Order on
February 11, 2003, detailing its findings and conclusions and ultimately granting
in part and denying in part the motion to suppress. Specifically, the district court
found that the government had violated Grams’ Fourth Amendment rights by
directing Grams’ roommate to open his mail and issuing a federal grand jury
subpoena for the contents of Grams’ private mailbox. Thus, as to evidence which
the district court determined to have been derived from those violations, the
district court granted the motion to suppress.
On the other hand, the district court found much of the evidence against
Grams admissible against him despite the Fourth Amendment violations. It found
that as to some parts of the evidence, Grams failed to demonstrate a factual nexus
between the illegality and substantial portions of the challenged evidence. See
United States v. DeLuca, 269 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 2001). With respect to
other portions of the evidence, the district court found that it either was
discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation, see Nix
v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984); United States v. Griffin, 48 F.3d 1147,
1150 (10th Cir. 1995), or that it was sufficiently distinguishable from any
constitutional violation to be purged from the primary taint, Griffin, 48 F.3d at
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1150.
The district court also denied Grams’ motion to dismiss the indictment.
Grams filed a motion for reconsideration of that dismissal and reasserted that the
indictment should be dismissed, this time arguing that the government’s extreme
and outrageous conduct in its pursuit of him justified dismissal. On April 1,
2003, the district court orally denied Grams’ motion to reconsider.
Grams ultimately pled guilty to the charge of transportation in interstate
commerce of a stolen check in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, preserving his right
to appeal the denial of his suppression motions and his motion to dismiss the
indictment. Having been sentenced to a term of fifteen months in prison and
three years supervised release, Grams appealed, advancing two arguments of
district court error: (1) that the district court’s partial denial of Grams’ motion to
suppress was based on its erroneous finding of no factual nexus between the
Fourth Amendment violations and the warrants that led to the evidence against
him; and (2) that the court failed to take into account the government’s improper
conduct and therefore erred in refusing to dismiss the indictment.
With respect to the district court’s partial denial of Grams’ motion to
suppress, “[w]e consider the totality of the circumstances and view the evidence
in a light most favorable to the government.” United States v. Avery, 295 F.3d
1158, 1167 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). We review the district court’s
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factual determinations for clear error and “will not reweigh the evidence
presented to the district court, second guess the district court’s credibility
assessments, or question ‘reasonable inferences’ the district court drew from the
evidence.” Id. We review the ultimate determination of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment de novo. Id.Our review of the record convinces us that the district court’s consideration
of Grams’ motion to suppress was correct in all respects. The evidence that the
court refused to suppress either lacked a factual nexus to the Fourth Amendment
violations, was uncovered through independent and legitimate sources, or was
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged from the primary taint. For substantially
the same reasons relied upon by the district court in its Order and Memorandum
of Decision dated February 11, 2003, therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s
decision to partially deny Grams’ motions to suppress the evidence against him.
As to Grams’ appeal of the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss
for outrageous conduct, our review is de novo. United States v. Pedraza, 27 F.3d
1515, 1521 (10th Cir. 1994). We have explained that “[w]hen the government’s
conduct during an investigation is sufficiently outrageous, the courts will not
allow the government to prosecute offenses developed through that conduct.”
United States v. Sandia, 188 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation
omitted). “Government conduct is outrageous if considering the totality of the
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circumstances in any given case, the government’s conduct is so shocking,
outrageous, and intolerable that it offends the universal sense of justice.” Id.Moreover, “[o]utrageous conduct generally requires government creation of a
crime or substantial coercion to induce the crime.” Id.Having examined the record carefully and upon consideration of the
totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the government’s conduct in
prosecuting the instant case does not meet this extremely high standard.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Grams’ motion to dismiss
the indictment.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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