West v. Kolar

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 17 2004
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DOUGLAS WEST,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 03-6265
(D.C. No. 02-CV-1451-M)
DIANNE KOLAR, Law Library (W.D. Okla.)
Supervisor; FELIX KELLY,
Investigation officer; T JONES,
Sergeant disciplinary hearing officer;
REGINALD HINES, Warden;
KIMBERLY OWENS, Records;
MELINDA GUILFOYLE, Designee;
RONALD WARD, Director DOC State
of Oklahoma,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY , MURPHY , and TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Douglas West, an inmate of the State of Oklahoma proceeding pro se,
brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court
granted summary judgment to defendants on three of the claims in his complaint.
It dismissed his remaining claims because it found that West had not exhausted
his administrative remedies as to those claims. While we agree with the district
court that West did not exhaust all of the claims presented in his § 1983
complaint, a different disposition is required. The district court should have
either dismissed the entire complaint to permit West to exhaust his administrative
remedies or, in the alternative, have given West the opportunity to dismiss his
unexhausted claims and to proceed solely on those he had exhausted. For this
reason, we vacate the district court’s order and remand.
West’s complaint contains nine claims for relief. The magistrate judge
assigned to this case concluded that West failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies pertaining to Counts One, Two, Six, Seven, Eight, and Nine, and
recommended that these counts therefore be dismissed without prejudice. He
further recommended that summary judgment be granted to the defendants on the
exhausted claims, Counts Three, Four, and Five. The district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s recommendation.
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1. West’s challenge to exhaustion
West challenges the district court’s disposition of his complaint, contending
that all of his claims have been exhausted. We review de novo the issue of
whether West exhausted his administrative remedies. Jernigan v. Stuchell , 304
F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002). The pertinent statutory provision provides that
“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983
of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a).
The Oklahoma Department of Corrections provides a multi-step inmate
grievance procedure. See R. doc. 22, ex. A. Having reviewed the record in this
case, we agree with the district court that West failed to complete this grievance
procedure as to the claims raised in Counts One, Two, Six, Seven, Eight, and
Nine of his § 1983 complaint.
The district court concluded that no such exhaustion problem existed as to
Counts Three, Four, and Five of West’s complaint. These counts relate to a
disciplinary procedure instituted against West for lying to staff about having a
court deadline and needing additional library time. The grievance policy provides
that “[m]isconduct reports received through the department disciplinary
procedures may not be appealed through the grievance process,” but are instead
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appealed through the misconduct appeals process. Id. at 2 (Grievance Policy, Part
II(b)(1)). The record reflects that West completed the misconduct appeals process
as it relates to Counts Three, Four, and Five.
West contends, however, that he also raised the remaining six counts in his
§ 1983 complaint during the course of the misconduct appeals process. The
“Offender’s Misconduct Appeal Form” reflects that he did present the essence of
Counts One, Two, and at least a portion of Count Seven as part of his misconduct
appeal. See R. doc. 23, Att. K. These counts, however, concerned much broader
issues than those involved in the misconduct proceedings. Count One charged a
deprivation of meaningful access to the courts by denial of law library access.
Count Two asserted West’s right to assist other inmates with their legal work.
The first portion of Count Seven asserted a denial of law library access. These
counts should have been exhausted through the grievance procedure rather than as
part of the misconduct appeal, and they therefore remain unexhausted for
purposes of § 1997e(a). The remainder of Count Seven (pertaining to space in
the library, the ability to check out law library books, and the posted law library
hours) and the claims raised in Counts Eight and Nine were not even raised in the
misconduct appeal and therefore also remain unexhausted.
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2. Proper disposition of the complaint
West’s complaint is a “mixed” complaint, containing both exhausted and
unexhausted claims. We recently determined, analogizing to the rule for habeas
corpus cases established in Rose v. Lundy , 455 U.S. 509 (1982), that where an
inmate files a “mixed” § 1983 complaint, “the district court must ordinarily
dismiss the entire action without prejudice” to permit the inmate to exhaust his
unexhausted claims. Ross v. County of Bernalillo , 365 F.3d 1181, 1190 (10th Cir.
2004). It also follows from the adaptation of the rule in Rose v. Lundy that the
district court may permit an inmate who has filed a mixed complaint in a § 1983
complaint to dismiss voluntarily his unexhausted claims and to proceed only on
those he has exhausted. See Rose , 455 U.S. at 510. For these reasons, we must
vacate the district court’s order, to the extent it granted summary judgment on
West’s Counts Three, Four, and Five, and remand for either complete dismissal
for failure to exhaust or to give West an opportunity to voluntarily dismiss his
unexhausted claims.
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The judgment of the district court is VACATED, and the case is
REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this order and judgment.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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