United States v. Robinson

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
OCT 27 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 03-4296
v. (D.C. No. 2:01-CR-267-DAK)
(D. Utah)
HAROLD VINCENT ROBINSON,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, LUCERO, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Harold Vincent Robinson appeals his sentence of eighteen months
imprisonment followed by thirty-six months of supervised release for violating
the conditions of his supervised release. Robinson argues on appeal that his
*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
sentence is plainly unreasonable. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and AFFIRM.
In May 2001, Robinson was indicted for one count of possession of a short-
barreled shotgun in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Robinson pled guilty and
the district court sentenced him to forty-two months of probation with a special
condition that Robinson spend the first six months of his probation in a halfway
house. This sentence reflected a seven level downward departure by the district
court, reducing Robinson’s offense level from a level fifteen, as calculated in his
presentence report, to a level eight.
Robinson’s probation officer filed a petition for an arrest warrant for
Robinson in April 2003 for Robinson’s alleged violation of the conditions of his
probation. The district court held a probation-violation hearing in November
2003, during which Robinson acknowledged his guilty plea to a state court charge
of assault with substantial bodily injury. Robinson’s probation was revoked in
December 2003, and the district court sentenced him to serve eighteen months in
prison, with thirty-six months of supervised release to follow. This sentence
represents an upward departure from the recommended Guidelines range of three
to nine months. Robinson appeals this sentence, arguing that the district court
erred by not properly considering the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).
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This court will review a sentence only in limited circumstances, including
when a sentence was “imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing
guideline and is plainly unreasonable.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4). “Because there
is no applicable sentencing guideline for the sentence to be imposed after a
violation of supervised release,” we review the sentence to determine if it is
“plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir.
2004). We will not reverse a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised
release if the record reflects that the sentence is “reasoned and reasonable.”
United States v. Lee, 957 F.2d 770, 774 (10th Cir. 1992). Accepting the district
court’s findings of fact, unless clearly erroneous, we will review its interpretation
of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. Kelley, 359 F.3d at 1304.
A district court may revoke a term of supervised release and require the
defendant to serve time in prison if the court finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), the court may revoke a term of
supervised release only after considering the factors set forth in § 3553(a). Those
factors include, inter alia, 1) the nature and circumstances of the offense, 2) the
history and characteristics of the defendant, 3) the need for the sentence to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, 4) the need to protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant, 5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
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training, medical care, or correctional treatment, and 6) the sentencing range
established under the sentencing guidelines or the policy statements applicable to
a violation of supervised release. Kelley, 359 F.3d at 1304.
Most significant to the matter before us, a district court must consider the
policy statements in Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines before imposing a
sentence for violating the conditions of supervised release. § 3553(a)(4)(B); Lee,
957 F.2d at 774 (“[policy statements] must be considered by the trial court in its
deliberations concerning punishment for violation of conditions of supervised
release.”). The relevant policy statements “are advisory rather than mandatory in
nature.” Lee, 957 F.2d at 773. For example, U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 recommends terms
of imprisonment based on the defendant’s criminal history category and the grade
of the violation for which the defendant was sentenced to supervised release.
District courts must consider Chapter 7’s policy statements along with the
factors listed in § 3553(a) before issuing a sentence. Sentencing judges need not
consider each factor individually, “[r]ather it is enough if the district court
considers § 3553(a) en masse and states its reasons for imposing a given
sentence.” Kelley, 359 F. 3d at 1305.
In Lee, despite the sentencing court’s omission of any reference to § 7B1.4
in its order, we held that the court adequately considered the Chapter 7 policy
statements because the court stated at the revocation hearing: “I do not believe
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that the policy statements cited by counsel [U.S.S.G. Chapter 7] are mandatory.”
957 F.2d at 775. Additionally, because the sentencing court delineated the factors
it considered for sentencing, we held that the court satisfied the requirements of
§ 3583(e). In United States v. Brooks, 976 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1992), we held
that a district court’s decision to revoke a term of supervised release and impose
prison time was “reasoned and reasonable” because the court stated the basis for
its sentencing determination and said that “the commissions’s [sic] policy
statements are only that, they are only policy statements, they are not binding on
the court.” 976 F.2d at 1359. Finally, in Kelley, the district court “noted that it
considered the policy statements in Chapter 7,” Kelley, 359 F.3d at 1304, and
“explained the other factors it took into account,” Id. at 1305, leading us to
conclude that the “sentence was reasoned and reasonable . . . .” Id.The district court in the instant case relied on Chapter 7 of the Sentencing
Guidelines more explicitly than the courts in Lee, Brooks, or Kelley did. The
court began the sentencing hearing by noting: “[w]e have an original Offense
Level of 15 and original Criminal History Category of I, a grade violation C, a
guideline range of three to nine.” (III R. at 3.) The government referred the court
to Application Note 4 in the commentary to § 7B1.4 (III R. at 6-8) which states:
“[w]here the original sentence was the result of a downward departure . . . that
resulted in a sentence below the guideline range applicable to the defendant’s
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underlying conduct, an upward departure may be warranted.” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4,
cmt. n.4. When Robinson argued that the recommended sentencing range takes
into account his guilty plea to the state charge, the court responded, “[w]hat it
doesn’t take into account is the downward departure he previously received with
an admonition he stay out of trouble, which he obviously has not done.” (III R. at
12.) Finally, the court stated that it formulated Robinson’s sentence “under
7B1.4, Application Note 4.” (III R. at 16.)
The district court fulfilled the requirements of §§ 3583(e) and 3553(a).
Especially because we do not “demand that the district court recite any magic
words to show us that it fulfilled its responsibility to be mindful of the factors
that Congress has instructed it to consider,” Kelley, 359 F.3d at 1305 (quotations
omitted), we conclude that a sentence of eighteen months in prison with thirty-six
months of supervised release to follow is reasoned and reasonable in this case.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the sentence imposed by the district court.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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