United States v. Burton

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 20 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 04-7002
(E.D. Okla.)
SOLOMON TRANELL BURTON, (D.Ct. No. CR-03-66-P)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, and PORFILIO and BRORBY, Senior
Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Appellant Solomon Tranell Burton, a federal prisoner represented by
counsel, appeals his conviction for using or carrying a firearm during a crime of
violence (Count 2), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). We exercise
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm Mr. Burton’s conviction and
sentence.
I. Factual Background
The indictment against Mr. Burton charged him with bank robbery (Count
1) and using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence (Count 2). Mr.
Burton entered a plea of guilty to Count 1 for the bank robbery charge and
received a sentence of thirty-three months imprisonment. As to Count 2,
following a jury trial, Mr. Burton was convicted of using or carrying a firearm
during a crime of violence, for which the district court sentenced him to sixty
months imprisonment, to run consecutively to his other sentence.
Mr. Burton appeals only his jury conviction for using or carrying a firearm
during a crime of violence, and in so doing, contests the use of a jury instruction
which allowed the jury to consider escape or flight as a phase of the robbery for
the purpose of finding he carried a gun during or in relation to the robbery. The
following evidence, relevant to that issue and Mr. Burton’s appellate argument,
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was introduced at trial.
One customer testified that on June 13, 2003, as she was driving her son to
the bank, she nearly hit Mr. Burton with her car in the bank parking lot. She
testified Mr. Burton was wearing a black shirt with a backwards number “3” and
black wind pants with the seam ripped out in the seat, which was noticeable
because the lining was white. Neither she nor her son, who followed Mr. Burton
into the bank and stood behind him in line, noticed any bulges in his clothing
which might suggest the presence of a gun. The son noticed Mr. Burton wore a
black do-rag and cap on his head and black windbreaker pants.
A bank teller testified that, after waiting in line, Mr. Burton walked up to
him, said he would like to make a withdrawal, and then slid a handwritten note on
the counter, which said “Give me all tha money and you won’t get Hurt!!” The
bank teller noticed Mr. Burton wore a do-rag and jersey, but did not recall what
he wore on the bottom part of his body. Mr. Burton did not display a gun, and the
bank teller did not observe a bulge which might be a gun under the loose-fitting
jersey. On reading the note, the teller gave Mr. Burton $1,521 in cash. Once Mr.
Burton left, the teller activated the bank alarms. Other bank employees testified
the last surveillance photograph of the robbery was taken at 11:48:55 a.m., and
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that none of the photographs revealed Mr. Burton carried a gun.
The same customer who dropped off and was waiting for her son in the
bank parking lot saw Mr. Burton leave the bank with what appeared to be a roll of
money in his left pocket, and then saw him start running, but lost sight of him
near an alleyway. Police Officer Lance Whitman received information on the
bank robber’s location and identity, which included his gender, race, and a
description of his shirt as black with a backwards “B,” which he later
acknowledged was a backwards “3.” At approximately 11:55 a.m., he saw a man
matching the description about one-half mile from the bank. At that time, Mr.
Burton wore a black t-shirt with an embroidered “B” on it and black jeans with no
rip; no gun was visible and he was sweating “like somebody who had been
exerting themselves.”
Once Mr. Burton was handcuffed, the officer asked him if he possessed any
weapons, to which he answered, “Yeah,” and then motioned down toward his
waist. Officer Whitman put his hands on Burton’s waist, felt a lump, pulled up
his shirt, and found tucked in his waistband a loaded .9 mm semi-automatic pistol
with the safety feature off. Officer Whitman also recovered $1,521 in cash from
Mr. Burton’s left front pocket. Officers searched the alley near the bank for the
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black jersey, cap, and do-rag witnesses described him as wearing, but found only
the black jersey stashed in the alleyway located near the bank. Because officers
were unaware of the ripped wind pants, they did not search for them and did not
find them during the search for the other clothing articles. While the bank teller
immediately identified Mr. Burton as the robber, he noticed he was wearing a
different shirt at the time of his arrest than during the robbery.
Mr. Burton’s wife testified her husband owned a pair of black wind pants
with a rip in the seat area which she had not seen since the day of the robbery.
She also acknowledged the loose black jersey could have been worn over the
black shirt Mr. Burton wore at the time of his arrest. She further testified Mr.
Burton purchased a gun earlier in the year.
II. Jury Instruction Objection and Issue on Appeal
The district court provided jury instructions on the elements of the crime at
issue, which included a finding the defendant: 1) committed a crime of violence
as charged; and 2) used or carried a firearm during and in relation to such crime
of violence. The jury instructions also explained a bank robbery is a “crime of
violence” and that the defendant pled guilty to bank robbery.
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Additionally, the district court instructed the jury as to the following, to
which Mr. Burton did not object, and does not appeal, but which is important to
resolution of the issue presented on appeal:
To prove a person “used” a firearm during and in relation to a
crime of violence, the government must prove that a defendant
actively employed the firearm in the commission of the crime.
“Active employment” may include brandishing, displaying, referring
to, bartering, striking with, firing, or attempting to fire the firearm.
To prove a person “carried” a firearm, the government must
prove that the defendant carried the firearm in the ordinary meaning
of the word “carry,” such as by transporting a firearm on the person
or in a vehicle. A defendant’s carrying of the firearm cannot be
merely coincidental or unrelated to the crime of violence.
In determining whether the defendant used or carried a
firearm, you may consider all of the factors received in evidence in
the case, including the nature of the underlying crime of violence
alleged, the proximity of the defendant to the firearm in question, the
usefulness of the firearm to the crime alleged, and the circumstances
surrounding the presence of the firearm. The government is not
required to show that the defendant actually displayed or fired the
weapon. The government is required, however, to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the firearm was in the defendant’s control at
the time the crime of violence was committed.
The phrase “during and in relation to” means the firearm must
have some purpose or effect with respect to the crime of violence; its
presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or
coincidence.
Over the objection of Mr. Burton, the district court further instructed the
jury, “[a] bank robbery does not necessarily begin or end at the front doors of the
bank. The escape or flight phase of a crime is not an event occurring after the
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bank robbery, but is part of the bank robbery.” In overruling Mr. Burton’s
objection to the contested language on escape or flight, the judge noted the
contested language was based on and almost identical to the language used in
United States v. Von Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004, 1010 (10th Cir. 1970), vacated on
other grounds by Schreiner v. United States, 404 U.S. 67 (1971), in which this
court said, “[t]he escape phase of a crime is not ... an event occurring ‘after the
robbery.’ It is part of the robbery.” He further pointed out the evidence
presented to the jury reflected Mr. Burton “was arrested ... within five minutes of
the robbery, some few blocks away from the bank, which leads me to the
conclusion he was in the escape mode when he was found with the pistol in his
waistband, with nine or ten cartridges in the clip and one in the chamber, with the
safety off.”
Thereafter, during deliberations, the jury sent the court a note which stated,
“Judge, are we deciding that the end of the flight was when he was handcuffed?
*Also* are we to decide if the government was to prove while he was in the bank
he had a gun?” With the agreement of the parties, the court referred the jury to
the instructions it previously provided. Following its deliberations, the jury
rendered a guilty verdict.
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On appeal, Mr. Burton contends the contested escape or flight portion of
the instructions established an arbitrary, impermissibly vague standard for
determination of guilt because “escape or flight are expansive terms which could
apply to events far removed from the original crime ....” While he admits most
courts have declined to define when the flight or escape phase of a robbery
ceases, Mr. Burton nevertheless suggests the trial court should have included the
standard identified by the First Circuit in United States v. DeStefano, 59 F.3d 1,
2, 4 (1st Cir. 1995), where it upheld a jury instruction which stated, “[t]he crime
of aiding or assisting an escape cannot occur after the escapee reaches temporary
safety.” To prove his point, Mr. Burton claims the jury’s question about whether
flight extended to the time of arrest only highlights the problem created by the
disputed legal instruction. He further suggests the contested flight or escape
language should not apply in this case, given the lack of evidence showing he
carried the gun into the bank, and the fact he did not have on the wind pants at the
time of the arrest, suggesting he retrieved the gun from the alleyway where he
allegedly stashed the other pair of pants.
In opposition, the government points out most courts have generally
declined to explicate a bright line rule on when the escape or flight phase ends
because various unique factual scenarios underlie escape and flight cases.
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Moreover, it suggests that even if Mr. Burton did not have the gun on his person
when he robbed the bank, the evidence directly proved Mr. Burton carried a
firearm “during and in relation to the bank robbery” because he had the firearm
on his person “within inches of the robbery proceeds, within a few blocks of the
robbery, and not less than a few minutes after he left the bank premises.”
III. Discussion
With respect to our standard of review:
We review the district court's refusal to give a particular jury
instruction for abuse of discretion. In assessing whether the court
properly exercised that discretion, a reviewing court must examine
the instructions as a whole to determine if they sufficiently cover the
issues in the case and focus on the facts presented by the evidence.
The question of whether the jury was properly instructed is a
question of law, and thus, our review is de novo.
We consider all the jury heard and, from [the] standpoint of the jury,
decide not whether the charge was faultless in every particular but
whether the jury was misled in any way and whether it had
understanding of the issues and its duty to determine these issues. We
will reverse a conviction due to an erroneous instruction only if the
error was prejudicial when viewed in light of the entire record.
United States v. Nelson, 383 F.3d 1227, 1230 (10th Cir. 2004), quoting United
States v. Voss, 82 F.3d 1521, 1529 (10th Cir. 1996) (emphasis omitted) (alteration
in original).
As to the law on the issue of escape or flight, the district court correctly
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stated our position that “[t]he escape phase of a crime is not ... an event occurring
‘after the robbery.’ It is part of the robbery.” Von Roeder, 435 F.2d at 1010.
While we have not previously applied this proposition to facts similar to those
presented here, other circuits have. The Eighth Circuit applied the same
proposition to a robbery defendant who was apprehended fleeing with a gun in his
vehicle. See United States v. Pate, 932 F.2d 736, 737 (8th Cir. 1991). In so
doing, it held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) “reaches the possession of a firearm
which in any manner facilitates the execution of a felony” so that a reasonable
jury could find a defendant, who has a gun available during flight from a robbery,
used that weapon during and in relation to robbery of the bank. Id. at 737(quotation marks and citation omitted). Similarly, the Third Circuit has
determined a jury may reasonably conclude the presence of a gun in the getaway
car during flight from a robbery has the “potential of facilitating” the bank
robbery, and thereby constitutes the carrying of a firearm during and in relation to
a bank robbery, even if no evidence shows the firearm was carried into the bank.
See United States v. Williams, 344 F.3d 365, 370-72 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1167 (2004). The fact these robbers fled in a vehicle and Mr. Burton
fled on foot does not substantively affect the application of these cases to the one
at hand. Moreover, we find unconvincing Mr. Burton’s criticism that Pate and
Williams provide no definitive point when flight or escape ends. As the court in
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Williams suggests, “escape does end at some point, such that the concept of
‘during and in relation to’ will have some boundaries as a matter of common
sense. But we believe that it is a fact-based inquiry ....” 344 F.3d at 375.
After viewing the jury instructions as a whole, considering the law with
respect to escape or flight, and applying our de novo standard of review, we
cannot say the district court abused its discretion in not using the jury instruction
proposed by the defendant, nor can we say it otherwise erred in applying the
escape or flight language previously sanctioned by this court. Not only are we
bound by our court precedent, see In re Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993),
but we agree with the government that a bright line rule on when an escape or
flight phase ends might not adequately take into account some of the unique
factual scenarios underlying escape and flight cases.
We further believe the contested jury instruction language, when taken
together with the other instructions and viewed in light of the evidence, did not
mislead the jury. As the government contends, and the district court
acknowledged, the evidence directly proved Mr. Burton “carried” a firearm
“during and in relation to the bank robbery” because he had the firearm on his
person within inches of the robbery proceeds, within a few blocks of the robbery,
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and not less than a few minutes after he left the bank premises. The fact no one
saw a bulge under Mr. Burton’s wind pants or that he no longer wore the same
pants when arrested with the gun does not change our conclusion. Because
escape or flight is a phase of a robbery, and Mr. Burton possessed a gun while
obviously fleeing the robbery, we believe the jury could reasonably find Mr.
Burton carried a gun in violation of § 924(c), even if he did not carry the weapon
into the bank. See Williams, 344 F.3d at 370-72; Pate, 932 F.2d at 737. Our
holding is not altered by the question tendered by the jury during deliberation,
given that the instructions to which they were referred were sufficient to make a
determination. Besides properly including flight or escape as a phase of the
robbery, the instructions also clearly defined “carried,” explained the government
was not required to show Mr. Burton displayed the gun, and instructed the jury
that the gun must have some usefulness, purpose or effect with respect to the
crime. As previously indicated, a fair reading of the jury instructions, together
with the evidence presented, shows the jury could reasonably find Mr. Burton
guilty of the crime for which he was convicted.
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IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Mr. Burton’s conviction and
sentence.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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