United States v. Ivory

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 9 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 04-3233
v. (D.C. No. 03-20167-JWL)
(D. Kan.)
MAURICE IVORY,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, McWILLIAMS, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. **
The government appeals from the district court’s order granting
Defendant-Appellee Maurice Ivory’s motion to exclude evidence as a sanction for
a discovery violation. Mr. Ivory was indicted for possession with intent to
distribute crack cocaine, possession of a firearm in a drug trafficking crime, and
being a felon in possession of a firearm. The evidence excluded was DNA testing
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
tending to show that Mr. Ivory had handled a firearm. Our jurisdiction arises
under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, and we reverse. On remand the district court may
consider a lesser sanction than exclusion of the DNA evidence.
Background
On January 8, 2004, after arraignment, a standard order of discovery was
entered requiring the government to copy or let the defendant copy “[w]ithin a
reasonable time period after arraignment[:]”
[a]ny results or reports of . . . scientific tests or experiments, or
copies thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control of
the government, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise
of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the
government, and which are material to the preparation of a defense or
are intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the
trial.
Aplt. App. 17-18; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(F). With a jury trial
scheduled for July 6, 2004, defense counsel on June 2, 2004, sought to have an
independent fingerprint analysis performed on a gun found in a vehicle used by
Mr. Ivory. Although fingerprint and DNA testing by local law enforcement had
occurred in October 2003, the government contends that the report never made it
to its investigative file. Once the government obtained the report, it learned that
the gun had been swabbed for DNA, a procedure not requested by the
government.
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The government then advised defense counsel that the DNA swab was
being tested, and furnished the curriculum vitae of its DNA expert who was
scheduled to be on leave during the July 6, 2004, jury trial. Upon learning the
inculpatory results of the DNA test, the government advised defense counsel and
proposed various alternatives to the expert’s appearance at the July 6 trial.
Ultimately, defense counsel indicated that he would oppose a continuance or a
deposition of the DNA expert. The government filed a motion so requesting, and
defense counsel filed a motion to exclude the DNA evidence on the grounds that
the government had failed to comply with the discovery order.
The district court granted defense counsel’s motion, applying the factors in
United States v. Wicker, 848 F.2d 1059, 1061 (10th Cir. 1988); see also Fed. R.
Civ. P. 16(d)(2)(C). The court found that the government had violated the
discovery order by not exercising due diligence to obtain and produce the report
in a timely fashion, but it had not acted in bad faith. According to the district
court, Mr. Ivory was prejudiced because he did not receive the results of the DNA
test implicating him until June 22, leaving too little time for defense counsel to
procure an expert to meet the DNA evidence at trial. The court acknowledged
that it could continue the trial to allow Mr. Ivory an adequate time to prepare
consistent with the Speedy Trial Act. But the court held that such a continuance
would prejudice Mr. Ivory because, should he be unable to rebut the DNA
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evidence after a continuance, he would have been better off with the July 6 trial
date, as the government’s DNA expert was not available, or not available in
person.
In excluding the DNA evidence, the court placed the most weight on a
deterrence rationale–deterring the government’s future non-compliance with its
discovery orders. The court noted that in some cases a sanction may be necessary
even absent prejudice to the defendant. As support for this rationale, the court
catalogued discovery problems in four unrelated criminal cases. The court noted
that the government attorneys were overworked, but more attention needed to be
paid to complying with discovery obligations earlier, rather than later, so as to
avoid these disputes which often resulted in delay and continuances. Aplt. App.
167.
Discussion
We review the district court’s sanction for an abuse of discretion. Wicker,
848 F.2d at 1060. In Wicker, we explained:
When the government fails to comply with a discovery order, the
factors the district court should consider in determining if a sanction
is appropriate are (1) the reasons the government delayed producing
the requested materials, including whether or not the government
acted in bad faith when it failed to comply with the discovery order;
(2) the extent of prejudice to the defendant as a result of the
government's delay; and (3) the feasibility of curing the prejudice
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with a continuance. 1
Id. Though not delineating the bounds of the district court’s discretion, these
factors are subject to the principle that any sanction should be the least severe to
accomplish compliance with the court’s discovery orders. Id. at 1060. In the
absence of prejudice, the court must also consider whether such a sanction is
necessary to maintain the “integrity and schedule” of the court. Id. at 1061.
Judged against these principles, the district court abused its discretion. We
do not fault the district court in finding that its discovery order had been violated,
and that such violation, while not in bad faith, was a product of inattention. Nor
do we fault the district court for finding that Mr. Ivory needed additional time to
meet the government’s DNA evidence. The district court expressly found that it
could have remedied the preparation problem with the grant of a continuance.
Aplt. App. 163. In such circumstances, a continuance, or a lesser sanction
accompanied by a continuance, ought to occur. United States v. Golyansky, 291
F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d
1285, 1293 (10th Cir. 1999) (suggesting lesser sanctions such as censuring the
1
We have remarked that the third factor is “essentially irrelevant” when a
defendant opposes a continuance. United States v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1281 (10th
Cir. 1996). Ivy did not consider the interests of the government in curing any
prejudice with a continuance, as opposed to exclusion, and possible lesser
sanctions. Given the posture of this case (exclusion of evidence by the district
court), the government has raised these issues.
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government attorney). “It would be a rare case where, absent bad faith, a district
court should exclude evidence rather than continue the proceedings.” Golyansky,
291 F.3d at 1249. This is not that rare case, particularly given that trial was not
underway (nor had a jury been empaneled), and a relatively short continuance
(one month according to defense counsel at oral argument) would solve the
problem with respect to Mr. Ivory without impairing his speedy trial rights.
We reject the district court’s finding that Mr. Ivory would have suffered
prejudice because his trial date necessarily would have coincided with the absence
of the government’s DNA expert. See Aplt. App. 163 (“So ironically here while
the prejudice in that sense [inability to meet the DNA evidence] could be cured in
terms of giving the defendant some time to prepare, it would actually in many
ways work to the defendant’s disadvantage because it would play right into what
the government really wants to have, which is more time - - or, pardon me, an
opportunity to have the witness available in person.”). First, such a finding is
counter-factual. At the hearing, the government represented that its DNA expert
was under subpoena and would be at trial if the court refused to continue the trial
and would not allow for a deposition. Aplt. App. 154. Second, even assuming
that the witness would have been absent, such a claim of prejudice is inimical to
the truth-seeking function of a trial. Cf. Gonzales, 164 F.3d at 1292 (noting that
the discovery sanction must bear some relationship to the purposes the law is to
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serve including protection of the defendant and the public).
Even in the absence of bad faith and prejudice, our cases suggest that the
district court theoretically could impose such a sanction. United States v. Russell,
109 F.3d 1503, 1511 (10th Cir. 1997); Wicker, 848 F.2d at 1061; but see
Gonzales, 164 F.3d at 1292 (noting that the Supreme Court has never approved
exclusion of evidence as a sanction absent a constitutional or statutory violation);
United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1262 (10th Cir. 1999) (same). We see
two errors here. First, the court’s reliance upon four other cases involving the
government’s discovery conduct without prior notice to the government was error.
The government had no way of knowing that the district court would consider
these cases. Mr. Ivory certainly did not argue them in his motion. Aplt. App.
116-122. Thus, the government lacked any opportunity to discuss or distinguish
them. That has led to the government’s improper (but understandable) attempt to
supplement the record below and in this court and Mr. Ivory’s (also
understandable and legally justified) opposition. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(e)(1)
(permitting the district court to conform record to what occurred in district court);
United States v. Kennedy, 225 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 2000) (court of appeals
does not consider material not before the district court).
Second, we question whether this case is the proper vehicle for finding
heretofore unannounced discovery violations by the government in those other
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cases. The cases do not appear to be related except in the most general terms--
three of four involve different government counsel. Cf. Taylor v. Illinois, 484
U.S. 400, 416 n.22 (1988) (unrelated discovery violations in other cases by
defense counsel normally could not preclude defendant’s right to present a
complete defense). In light of our resolution, we need not pass on whether the
discovery sanction of exclusion of evidence in one case may ever be based upon
discovery violations in another. On remand, the district court may consider a
lesser sanction.
The dissent suggests that the district court’s suppression order should be
affirmed based upon its evaluation of the three Wicker factors. As discussed
above, we conclude that the district court’s evaluation of those factors was legally
erroneous. Alternatively, the dissent contends that the order is supported by
Taylor v. Illinois insofar as imposing a remedy of suppression and relying upon
discovery violations in other cases. Taylor is readily distinguishable and must be
read against its facts. That case involved a “willful and blatant” discovery
violation (failure to timely disclose a defense witness) that appeared to be an
attempt to gain tactical advantage and introduce fabricated testimony. Taylor,
484 U.S. at 416-417. These circumstances led the Court to conclude that “the
case fits into the category of willful misconduct in which the severest sanction is
appropriate.” Id. at 417. None of those circumstances are present here.
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The Court in Taylor rejected reliance upon unrelated discovery violations to
impose such a sanction, although it did leave the door open to discovery
violations by the same attorney. Id. at 416 n.21. The problem with the latter
rationale in this case is that the judge expressly found that the reason for non-
disclosure of fingerprint reports in the other case “was understandable” because a
report had “mistakenly indicated that the fingerprint examination was negative.”
Aplt. App. at 165. The court predicted that had there been earlier disclosure, the
government would have found the error “and might have been able to alleviate the
necessity of a last minute fight.” Id. at 166. Regardless, this combined with what
occurred in this case does not justify the drastic sanction of exclusion of evidence
without consideration of lesser sanctions. As for discovery violations involving
other attorneys in the U.S. Attorneys’ Office, we continue to believe that there
must be a more developed record with notice and an opportunity to be heard
before making that link. That said, we hope the government’s statement in its
brief will cap the matter: “By his decision in this case, [the trial judge] has sent
the message loudly and clearly that the United States must be more consistently
proactive in monitoring law enforcement’s investigation and reporting, and that
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message has been received and understood.” Aplt. Br. at 15.
REVERSED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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No. 04-3233, United States v. Ivory
Seymour, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Due to my disagreement with the majority’s conclusion that the district
court abused its discretion by excluding DNA evidence in response to the
government’s discovery violations, I respectfully dissent.
On the day of Mr. Ivory’s arraignment, January 8, 2004, the district court
entered a General Order of Discovery and Scheduling in which it instructed the
parties to comply with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, including Rule
16:
Within a reasonable time period after arraignment, the government
shall comply with Rules 12(d)(2) and 16 and Brady/Giglio. Pursuant
to Rule 16, the government shall copy for the defendant or permit the
defendant to inspect and copy or photograph: . . .
Any results or reports of physical or mental examinations and or
scientific tests or experiments, or copies thereof, which are within
the possession, custody or control of the government, the existence of
which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become
known . . . .
Aplt. App., vol. I, at 17-18. The Order also stated that a request is not necessary
to trigger the operation of the Rules and that absence of a request may not be
asserted as a reason for noncompliance. Id. at 17.
Nearly six months after the Order was issued, defense counsel sent the
government a written request to take possession of a firearm found in a vehicle
used by Mr. Ivory for independent fingerprint testing. Prompted by this request,
on June 10, 2004, the government provided defense counsel with reports
indicating that both a fingerprint analysis and DNA swabbing of the firearm had
been conducted in October 2003. The government also advised defense counsel
that their forensic expert’s report comparing the DNA on the firearms with Mr.
Ivory’s DNA would not be available until June 23, 2004. Trial was set to begin
July 6. Defense counsel filed a motion to exclude the DNA evidence, which the
district court granted, on the grounds that the government had violated the
discovery order and Rule 16. The question before this court is whether the
district court’s exclusionary sanction in response to the government’s unexcused
discovery violations constitutes an abuse of discretion. I conclude that it does
not.
Rule 16 warns the parties of the consequences of failing to comply with
discovery orders and invests the district court with broad discretion in coping
with discovery violations:
(2) Failure to Comply. If a party fails to comply with this rule, the
court may:
(A) order that party to permit the discovery or inspection;
specify its time, place, and manner; and prescribe other just
terms and condition;
(B) grant a continuance;
(C) prohibit that party from introducing the undisclosed
evidence; or
(D) enter any other order that is just under the circumstances.
F ED . R. C RIM . P. 16(d)(2) (emphasis added). As explained by the majority, the
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test for determining whether the district court properly excluded evidence
pursuant to Rule 16(d)(2) was expressed in United States v. Wicker, 848 F.2d
1059 (10th Cir. 1988):
When the government fails to comply with a discovery order, the
factors the district court should consider in determining if a sanction
is appropriate are (1) the reasons the government delayed producing
the requested materials, including whether or not the government
acted in bad faith when it failed to comply with the discovery order;
(2) the extent of prejudice to the defendant as a result of the
government’s delay; and (3) the feasibility of curing the prejudice
with a continuance.
Id. at 1061. In Wicker, the court went on to note that “these three factors should
merely guide the district court in its consideration of sanctions; they are not
intended to dictate the bounds of the court’s discretion.” Id.The record indicates that the district court weighed the first Wicker factor.
The court emphasized that although more than five months had passed since the
government knew or should have known about the scientific tests that had been
conducted on the firearm, the government provided no explanation for the delay
in notifying defense counsel. We have consistently held that a district court may
justifiably exclude evidence “on the basis of its unexplained untimeliness alone.”
See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d 1236, 1244 (10th Cir. 2001) (per
Kelly, J.). As the district court noted here, “[t]here is simply no explanation why
the government didn’t follow the order and make some inquiry at an earlier date.”
Aplt. App., vol. I, at 159. Thus, solely on the basis of the government’s excessive
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and unexcused delay, the district court was entitled to suppress the DNA
evidence.
The court also weighed the second Wicker factor and concluded that the
defendant was prejudiced because the government’s delay in producing the DNA
test results implicating Mr. Ivory left far too little time for defense counsel to
procure an expert of its own to rebut the government’s evidence at trial. The
government concedes that Mr. Ivory was so prejudiced.
Finally, the court analyzed the feasibility of curing the prejudice with a
continuance and decided that a continuance would not remedy the violation for
two reasons. First, because the United States Attorney’s Office had expressly
requested a continuance in order to have its DNA expert available for trial,
granting that request would have resulted in the bizarre outcome of rewarding –
rather than punishing – the government for its discovery violations. While the
government was prepared to subpoena the witness if the district court denied its
motion, it did not prefer this course of action given the short notice to the witness
and her family vacation plans. Second, because the government had failed to
provide evidence to defense counsel in a timely manner in several other cases
recently before the court, the evidence needed to be suppressed as a prophylactic
measure. The district court stated:
This is not the first time this kind of issue has come up before this
court. It’s not the first time even in a long time that this issue has
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come up. On repeated occasions over the last several weeks and
months this court has been confronted with the government having
been in a position where it did not supply information to the other
side in a way timely enough to have a proceeding go forward without
having some in depth discussion about why something wasn’t
disclosed, what the reasons were, what had happened, and so
forth. . . . [T]he cumulative effect of those cases is to tell me that a
continuance in this case would not help address the prophylactic
issue, and that is that I believe the government needs to get these
matters worked out earlier rather than later so that the court and the
defense counsel are not left scrambling at the last minute to deal with
the fact that the government has not looked at exhibits, found reports,
etc., until the last month before trial.
Aplt. App., vol. I, at 164.
We have repeatedly recognized that “[o]n occasion the district court may
need to suppress evidence that did not comply with discovery orders to maintain
the integrity and schedule of the court even though the defendant may not be
prejudiced.” Wicker, 848 F.2d at 1061 ; see also Adams, 271 F.3d at 1244 (“even
in the absence of prejudice, a district court may suppress evidence that ‘did not
comply with discovery orders to maintain the integrity and schedule of the
court’”); United States v. Russell, 109 F.3d 1503, 1512 (10th Cir. 1997)
(“Wicker’s admonition that the trial court must impose ‘the least severe sanction
that will accomplish . . . prompt and full compliance with the court’s discovery
orders’ . . . does not mean that a continuance is necessary just because it will cure
the prejudice.”). This is because a district court has “inherent power to control
and supervise its own proceedings.” United States v. Carrigan, 804 F.2d 599,
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603 (10th Cir. 1986).
The government contends, and the majority agrees, that the district court
did not have authority to rely on discovery violations in other cases in
determining sanctions in the present case. I reject this argument for two reasons.
First, even assuming the government is correct, the district court did not have to
rely on a pattern or practice of discovery violations on the part of the government
in order to justify its exclusion of the DNA evidence in this case. As discussed
above, the court’s determination that all three Wicker factors weighed in favor of
Mr. Ivory was more than enough to entitle it to suppress the evidence, a remedy
explicitly authorized by Rule 16. See F ED . R. C RIM . P. 16(d)(2)(C).
Second, Supreme Court case law strongly suggests the government’s
argument lacks merit given the particular circumstances of this case. In Taylor v.
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1988), the Court upheld the trial court’s refusal to
allow a witness to testify as a sanction for a defendant’s discovery violation. The
Court rejected an argument similar to the one advanced by the government here,
that the sanction was “unnecessarily harsh,” due to its concern with the impact of
the discovery violation on the “integrity of the judicial process.” Id. at 416.
According to the Court,
[i]t may well be true that alternative sanctions are adequate and
appropriate in most cases, but it is equally clear that they would be
less effective than the preclusion sanction and that there are instances
in which they would perpetuate rather than limit the prejudice [to the
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other party] and the harm to the adversary process.
Id. at 413. Moreover, in a footnote, the Court explained that the trial judge had
expressed concern about discovery violations in other trials and, while unrelated
violations in other cases would not normally provide a proper basis to exclude the
evidence, “[i]f those violations involved the same attorney . . . they were
relevant.” Id. at 416 n.22. Here, not only was the prosecutor in the instant
controversy involved in one of the other cases cited by the district court for a
pattern and practice of discovery violations, all of the cases involved attorneys
from the same office – the United States Attorneys’ Office for the District of
Kansas. Thus, the violations cited by the district court as a basis for its
prophylactic sanction were relevant, and not the sort of “[u]nrelated discovery
violations” on which it would have been improper for the district court to rely.
Id. In Taylor, the sanction was against defense counsel; obviously discovery
violations by other defense counsel in unrelated cases would be totally irrelevant.
I also disagree with the majority’s assertion that the district court’s
reliance, “without prior notice,” on four other cases involving the government’s
discovery conduct was error and forced the government to attempt to improperly
supplement the record on appeal. One of those prior cases involved the same
lawyer arguing the government’s motion for a continuance, so she clearly had
prior notice. Moreover, if the government wished to discuss or distinguish those
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prior cases, it should have filed a motion for reconsideration in the district court
before it filed its notice of appeal. Instead, it dilatorily waited six months to
attempt to supplement the record in the district court, an attempt the district court
justifiably dismissed as untimely. To reward the government under these
circumstances certainly runs counter to the district court’s right to protect the
integrity of its docket by sanctioning the government for a pattern and practice of
discovery violations.
In sum, because the government concedes it violated both the discovery
order and Rule 16, the district court properly considered each of the Wicker
factors, and the court determined that the maintenance of the integrity and
schedule of the court required suppression due to a pattern or practice of
discovery violations on the part of the United States Attorneys’ Officer for the
District of Kansas, I cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion.
That court is in the best position to assess the proper sanction to cure the
government’s pattern and practice of discovery violations, and I think we should
honor the court’s decision rather than undermine it. For the aforementioned
reasons, I dissent.
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