Baby C v. Price

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
June 10, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
IN THE MATTER OF BABY C, a
minor child,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 04-3299
v. (Kansas)
(D.Ct. No. 04-CV-4044-SAC)
ROSEMARY DENISE PRICE;
DAVID M. PRICE,
Defendants - Appellants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, LUCERO, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
The present case arises out of a dispute over the adoption of Baby C. Baby
C was given up for adoption to third-parties shortly after birth by the biological
mother. The biological father, David Price, and his wife, Rosemary, contested the
adoption in the Kansas state courts. After a series of adverse rulings in the state
courts, the Prices, appearing pro se, filed a notice of removal in the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 alleging a
multitude of federal and state constitutional and statutory violations. The district
court denied the attempt at removal and remanded the cases to the state courts.
This appeal followed. The Prices contest the district court’s remand of their cases
to state court and its award of attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm.
I. Background
The state court proceedings commenced on May 4, 2001, when the adoptive
parents filed a petition for the adoption of Baby C in the Shawnee County,
Kansas, District Court (“SCDC”) (Case No. 01 A 48). In that proceeding, the
biological mother consented to the adoption and the petition named David Price
as the biological father. On May 10, 2001, the adoptive parents petitioned the
SCDC to sever the father’s parental rights to Baby C. After a hearing on July 22-
23, 2002, 1 the SCDC entered an order terminating David Price’s parental rights to
1
Initially, the district court had severed David Price’s parental rights and entered
an adoption decree after he failed to appear at a hearing on June 22, 2001. On July 16,
2001, David Price successfully moved to have the court set aside the default termination
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Baby C and later denied his motion to reconsider.
David Price appealed the SCDC’s ruling to the Court of Appeals for the
State of Kansas, which affirmed on December 19, 2003 (Case No. 03 90035 A).
The Kansas Supreme Court denied David Price’s petition for review on March 30,
2004. On January 5, 2004, during the pendency of David Price’s appeal,
Rosemary Price filed a petition for stepparent adoption with the SCDC (Case No.
04 A 3). After the denial of review in the first case by the Kansas Supreme
Court, the adoption by the adoptive parents was finalized by the SCDC on April
23, 2004
On May 5, 2004, David and Rosemary Price, pro se, filed a Notice of
Removal in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas (“USDC”)
seeking to remove both David and Rosemary’s state cases (Case Nos. 01 A 48 &
04 A 3) as well as the appeal of David’s case (Case No. 03 90035 A). The Prices
raised a multitude of federal constitutional and statutory claims as well as state
constitutional and statutory claims based on the termination of David Price’s
parental rights and the adoption of Baby C. The adoptive parents filed a motion
for dismissal claiming procedural and jurisdictional defects with the notice of
removal.
On June 10, 2004, the USDC remanded the cases on three grounds: 1) the
and adoption orders.
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pleadings did not establish that the notice of removal had been filed within the
thirty-day time requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b); 2) the complaints and
petitions did not contain any questions arising under federal law; and 3) the notice
of removal did not satisfy the requirements for removal of a civil rights case
under 28 U.S.C. § 1443. The USDC also ordered the Prices to pay $1000 in
attorney’s fees and costs to the adoptive parents under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The
Prices filed a motion for reconsideration on June 22, 2004. The district court
denied the motion on July 27, 2004. The Prices filed a notice of appeal to this
Court on August 9, 2004. They challenge the remand of their cases and the award
of attorney’s fees and costs. 2
II. Discussion
A. Remand
“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 a defendant in state court may remove the case to
federal court when a federal court would have had jurisdiction if the case had
been filed there originally.” Johnson, 404 F.3d at 1247. Under § 1446(b), a
2
This Court has recently held that remand orders for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction involving cases originally removed under § 1441 are insulated from review.
Topeka Housing Auth. v. Johnson, 404 F.3d 1245, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 2005). However,
certain civil rights cases removed under § 1443 are not subject to this bar. Id. at 1248.
Here, the Prices attempted to remove their cases under § 1441 but raised several civil
rights claims which the district court discussed under § 1443. Additionally, the award of
fees and costs are still reviewable as well as the underlying legal analysis supporting the
award. Id. Accordingly, we review the district court’s order denying removal and
remanding the cases to state court.
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defendant in a state court action desiring to remove a civil action must file the
notice of removal:
within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or
otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for
relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty
days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial
pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on
the defendant, whichever period is shorter.
In order to establish federal question jurisdiction, the federal question must be
“presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar
Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Except for narrow circumstances not
present here, “a case may not be removed to federal court solely because of a
defense or counterclaim arising under federal law.” Johnson, 404 F.3d at 1247;
see also Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826,
830-31 & n.2 (2002). Generally, the presumption is “against removal
jurisdiction.” Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1995). The
removing party has the burden to demonstrate the appropriateness of removal
from state to federal court. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298
U.S. 178, 189 (1936). Thus, doubtful cases must be resolved in favor of remand.
With these principles in mind, we have carefully reviewed the record, and
agree with the district court’s conclusions. First, as a procedural matter, the
Prices have not complied with the requirements of § 1446(b). According to the
record, David Price received notice of the petition for adoption filed in the
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Shawnee County District Court on May 12, 2001. Under § 1446(b), he had 30
days to file a notice of removal. He did not actually file his notice of removal
until May 5, 2004, almost three years after he had received notice of the petition
for adoption. In the interim, the state court proceeding was completed, Price
appealed, the Court of Appeals for the State of Kansas affirmed the district
court’s ruling, and the Kansas Supreme Court denied review. The removal
statutes are not a mechanism for relitigating cases already decided by state courts,
nor for removing cases on appeal in the state courts. 3 Finally, Rosemary Price
cannot remove her state court adoption petition (Case No. 04 A 3) to federal court
simply because she is not the defendant in that case. She voluntarily chose to file
her case in state court and is ineligible to remove it. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)
(“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court . . . may be removed by the defendant
or defendants . . . .”) (emphasis added).
Second, and equally fatal, the underlying state court adoption case did not
state a federal question on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint;
here the adoptive parents’ petition for adoption. Adoption is quintessentially a
3
By attempting to remove state court cases that have already been concluded, the
Prices are attempting an end-run around the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Rooker-Feldman
precludes the losing party in a state court action from filing suit in federal court to set
aside the state court judgment. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 125
S. Ct. 1517, 1522-23 (2005). This is precisely what the Prices are trying to do and their
attempt cannot be countenanced.
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state law issue and all of the Price’s claims in federal court constitute putative
defenses or counterclaims to the adoption based on federal law. Moreover, many
of the putative defenses or counterclaims are suspect. For example, the Prices
argue the federal courts should step in because “new laws need to be written
and/or adopted to protect a third party of interest, namely the intended
mother/step-mother, in an ‘at birth adoption?’” (Appellants’ Br. 22.) This is
precisely the type of case that is meant to be excluded from removal by the
properly pleaded plaintiff’s complaint rule articulated in Caterpillar. Thus, the
district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and was correct to remand the
cases to state court based on procedural defects and lack of jurisdiction.
B. Attorney Fees
The Prices also challenge the district court’s award of $1000 in costs to the
adoptive parents. Section 1447(c) allows a court to “require payment of just cost
and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the
removal.” A court’s decision to grant a fee award “is reviewed for abuse of
discretion while the underlying legal analysis is reviewed de novo.” Suder v. Blue
Circle, Inc., 116 F.3d 1351, 1352 (10th Cir. 1997). “No showing of bad faith is
necessary to justify the award,” Johnson, 404 F.3d at 1248, only “a showing that
the removal was improper ab initio.” Suder, 116 F.3d at 1352. That the Prices
are pro se litigants does not prevent the court from imposing sanctions. Johnson,
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404 F.3d at 1248; Haworth v. Royal, 347 F.3d 1189, 1192 (10th Cir. 2003). The
district court determined that $1000 was “less than the actual expenses and costs
incurred by the adoptive parents in challenging federal jurisdiction over these
removed cases” and that “the award of $1000 is fair and reasonable in light of the
pro se status of the removing parties.” (R., Doc. 6 at 7 n.1.) We cannot say the
district court abused its discretion in awarding this sum and there was no
reasonable argument for removal. See Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd. P’ship, 262
F.3d 1128, 1135 (10th Cir. 2001) (review for reasonableness under § 1447(c)).
III. Conclusion
The district court’s order remanding the cases to state court is AFFIRMED.
The district court’s order awarding attorney’s fees and costs to the adoptive
parents is AFFIRMED.
The Prices have also filed three Motions to Supplement the Record
regarding case numbers DA 8893 and DA 9076, In the Matter of Bret D. Landrith.
Because they fail to address the defects discussed above, the motions are
DENIED.
Price’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
Entered by the Court:
Terrence L. O’Brien
United States Circuit Judge
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