Clark v. Colorado Department of Corrections

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
June 11, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
O RLA N DO CO RTEZ C LA RK ,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 05-1121
v. (D. Colorado)
C OLO RA D O D EPA RTM EN T OF (D.C. No. 04-Z-2414)
CO RRECTION S; DR . NW EKE,
C.C.C.F. M edical; DR.
FALLHOUSE, C.C.C.F. M edical;
DR. JOSEPH W ERNER, A.V.C.F.
M edical; CIND RA M AR TINEZ,
M RT II, A.V.C.F. M edical;
A N TH O NY DEC ESA RO , C DOC
GRIEVANCE OFFICER; DR.
RAYM OND L. LILLY; and DR.
KENNETH D. DANYLCHUCK;
Defendants-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before H E N RY, M cKA Y, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. **
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See F ED . R.A PP . P. 34( F ) and 10 TH C IR . R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Orlando Cortez Clark, a Colorado state prisoner appearing pro se, filed this
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the Colorado Department of Corrections and
various employees. He alleged that the defendant officials w ere deliberately
indifferent to his medical needs. The district court dismissed his complaint on the
grounds that M r. Clark had not exhausted one of his claims. In a prior order and
judgment, this court affirmed that decision. See Clark v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr. 151
Fed. Appx. 630 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Clark I”).
M r. Clark filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court. The Court granted M r. Clark’s petition, vacated our order and
judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration. See Clark v. Colo.
Dep’t of C orr., 127 S. Ct. 1352 (2007) (“Clark II”).
On M arch 30, 2007, this court entered an order (a) recalling the October 25,
2005 mandate that we issued to the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado and (b) vacating our prior order and judgment. Subsequently, M r. Clark
filed a motion seeking reimbursement from the defendants-appellees for his costs
on appeal, specifically the filing fees.
For the reasons set forth below , we now: (a) vacate the district court’s
February 2005 Order and Judgment of Dismissal; (b) remand the case to the
district court for further proceedings in light of Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910(2007), Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2007), and
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Roberts v. Barreras, __ F.3d __, No. 05-2373, 2007 W L 1113956 (10th Cir. Apr.
16, 2007); and (c) deny M r. Clark’s motion for costs, without prejudice to his
seeking reimbursement for costs taxable in the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
M r. Clark, proceeding pro se, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in 2004,
naming as defendants the Colorado Department of Corrections and various
employees. He alleged that the defendant officials were deliberately indifferent
to his medical needs because (1) he was denied effective medication for severe
back and leg pain for an extended period of time, and his necessary back surgery
was improperly delayed; and (2) after his eventual surgery, he did not receive in a
timely manner prescribed pain medication, orthopedic shoes, certain hose for his
legs, a leg brace, or a medical pillow.
The district court dismissed M r. Clark’s claims without prejudice because
he failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to his first claim. In a prior order
and judgment, we affirmed the district court’s decision. See Clark I, 151 Fed.
Appx. 630. W e reasoned that “the [Prison Litigation Reform Act] contains a total
exhaustion requirement, and . . . the presence of unexhausted claims in [a
prisoner]’s complaint require[s][a] district court to dismiss his action in its
entirety without prejudice.” Id. at 632 (quoting Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365
F.3d 1181, 1189 (10th Cir. 2004)).
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In its order granting M r. Clark’s petition for a writ of certiorari, the
Supreme Court instructed this court to reconsider his claims in light Jones v.
Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910 (2007). Clark II, 127 S. Ct. 1352.
II. D ISC USSIO N
1. Reconsideration of M r. Clark’s claims
In Jones, the Supreme Court held that prisoners need not specially plead
that they have exhausted administrative remedies. See id. at 921. Instead, under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is
an affirmative defense. Id.The C ourt also disagreed with the “total exhaustion” requirement that we
established in Ross. Instead, the Supreme Court held “if a complaint contains
both good and bad claims, . . . court[s] proceed[ ] with the good and leave[ ] the
bad.” Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 924. See Freeman v. W atkins, 479 F.3d 1257, 1259
(10th Cir. 2007) (observing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones
“effectively overruled” our decision in Ross ).
Although Jones did not specifically address the issue of the burden of
proving exhaustion, we have subsequently held that, as an affirmative defense,
exhaustion must be raised and proven by the defendants. Roberts, __ F.3d __ at
*4.
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However, we have also held that, if it is clear from on the face of a
prisoner’s complaint that he has not exhausted his administrative remedies, then
the district court may raise the exhaustion question sua sponte, consistent with 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, and seek additional
information from the prisoner. A quilar-Avellaveda, 478 F.3d at 1226.
Importantly, “[a] district court cannot dismiss the complaint without first giving
the inmate an opportunity to address the [exhaustion] issue.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). M oreover, “only in rare cases will a district court be
able to conclude from the face of the complaint that a prisoner has not exhausted
his administrative remedies and that he is without a valid excuse.” Id. at 1225.
W e therefore conclude that this case should be remanded to the district
court for further proceedings in light of Jones, Roberts, and Aquilar-Avellaveda.
2. M r. Clark’s motion for costs
M r. Clark has filed a motion seeking reimbursement from Appellees of his
costs on appeal, specifically the filing fees. Costs are taxed against an appellee
“if a judgment is reversed.” F ED . R. A PP . P. 39(a)(3). In this instance, however,
we have not reversed the judgment of the district court. Instead, we have vacated
our judgment and remanded to the district court for consideration of precedent
that did not exist at the time the district court entered its judgment.
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W hen a judgment is vacated, “costs are taxed only as the court orders.” Id.
39(a)(4). As a general matter, the only recoverable costs are those incurred in
copying documents that this court requires parties to file. See id. 39(c); 10 TH
C IR . R. 39.1. M r. Clark has not provided an itemized and verified bill of costs
demonstrating that he incurred any such costs. F ED . R. A PP . P. 39(d)(1). M ore
importantly, however, even if he had incurred such costs, the circumstances under
which w e vacated our judgment are not such that an aw ard of costs to M r. Clark
would be warranted.
To the extent that M r. Clark seeks reimbursement for costs taxable in the
district court, such as filing fees, see id. 39(e), the motion is denied without
prejudice to refiling in the district court. To the extent that M r. Clark seeks
reimbursement for costs taxable in this court, the motion is denied.
III. C ON CLU SIO N
Accordingly, we V ACATE the district court’s dismissal of M r. Clark’s
complaint and remand the case for further consideration in accordance with
Jones, Roberts, and Aquilar-Avellaveda. W e DENY M r. Clark’s motion for costs,
without prejudice to his seeking costs taxable in the district court.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
United States Circuit Judge
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