United States v. Medrano

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
January 24, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 05-2057
v. (D.C. No. CR-03-895-LH)
(New Mexico)
JOSE MEDRANO,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, HARTZ, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Jose Medrano brings this appeal asserting he was sentenced in violation of
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). We review “the district court’s
legal interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines de novo . . . .”
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
United States v. Henry, 164 F.3d 1304, 1310 (10th Cir. 1999). Because the
district court did not run afoul of Booker in sentencing Mr. Medrano, we affirm
his sentence.
Mr. Medrano was indicted by a grand jury of a single count of distribution
of five grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)
and (b)(1)(B). In April 2004, he was found guilty by a jury. Soon thereafter, the
Supreme Court issued its decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
Mr. Medrano objected to his pre-sentence report (PSR), claiming in part that
under Blakely his offense level should be calculated solely by the amount of
substance containing methamphetamine alleged in his indictment and found by the
jury rather than the weight of the substance set forth in the PSR. He also objected
to the PSR’s recommendation for an offense level increase for obstruction of
justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
The district court postponed sentencing to await the Supreme Court’s
decision in Booker. At sentencing, Mr. Medrano’s attorney reasserted his
objections to the PSR, arguing that calculation of Mr. Medrano’s offense level
should be limited to the facts found by the jury rather than facts found by the
judge by relying on the PSR. Mr. Medrano’s attorney did not challenge the
accuracy of the drug amounts listed in the PSR, however, and conceded that after
Booker the sentencing guidelines are advisory.
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After hearing arguments, the district court declined to increase Mr.
Medrano’s offense level for obstruction of justice. But the court determined that
based on the amount of methamphetamine involved in the transaction as asserted
in the PSR, Mr. Medrano’s offense level should be 30. The court concluded that
Mr. Medrano’s total offense level, coupled with his criminal history category of I,
subjected him to an advisory sentencing range of 97 to 121 months in prison. The
court sentenced Mr. Medrano to 97 months.
On appeal, Mr. Medrano contends the district court violated Booker by
calculating his offense level based on judge found facts rather than solely on facts
found by the jury. This argument highlights Mr. Medrano’s misunderstanding
Booker, which held “that mandatory application of the Guidelines violates the
Sixth Amendment when judge-found facts, other than those of prior convictions,
are employed to enhance a sentence.” United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d
727, 731 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (emphasis added). In order to save guideline
sentencing from ultimate demise, the Court made the guidelines “effectively
advisory.” Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756-57. Therefore, after Booker, a judge may
sentence a defendant based on judge-found facts so long as the court does not
apply the guidelines in a mandatory fashion. As we said in United States v.
Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 685 (10th Cir. 2005):
[D]istrict courts are still required to consider Guideline ranges,
which are determined through application of the preponderance
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standard, just as they were before. The only difference is that the
court has latitude, subject to reasonableness review, to depart from
the resulting Guideline ranges. . . . [W]hen a district court makes a
determination of sentencing facts by a preponderance test under the
now-advisory Guidelines, it is not bound by jury determinations
reached through application of the more onerous reasonable doubt
standard. In this respect, the prior Guidelines scheme is unchanged
by the seeming revolution of Booker.
Id. at 685 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Gonzalez-Huerta, 403
F.3d at 731 (“[C]ourts are still required to consider the Guidelines in determining
sentences, but they are not required to impose a sentence within the Guideline
range.”).
The district court did not depart from the procedure detailed in Magallanez
when it sentenced Mr. Medrano. It made findings to determine Mr. Medrano’s
offense level and criminal history category in order to reach the applicable
advisory guidelines range. Mr. Medrano’s attorney expressly agreed to the
court’s calculations. See Aplt. App., tab 5 at 42. The court then sentenced Mr.
Medrano to a reasonable sentence within that range. This process was in full
accord with Booker and Magallanez.
In the alternative, Mr. Medrano contends his sentence is nevertheless
unlawful because the district court treated the guidelines as mandatory in setting
his sentence. He does not argue that his post-Booker sentence is unreasonable.
See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 767 (“The courts of appeals review sentencing decisions
for unreasonableness.”). Rather, he posits that the district court erred by
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complying with the notes in the guidelines’ Drug Quantity Table. Note B directs
that “in the case of a mixture or substance containing . . . methamphetamine, use
the offense level determined by the entire weight of the mixture or substance, or
the offense level determined by the weight of the . . . methamphetamine (actual),
whichever is greater.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 n.B. The actual weight of the
methamphetamine in Mr. Medrano’s case was 34.2 grams, while the weight of the
entire mixture containing the methamphetamine was 389.3 grams. In accordance
with Note B, the district court calculated Mr. Medrano’s offense level based on
the larger amount. Mr. Medrano argues that because the guidelines are now
advisory, the district court was wrong to comply with the directions provided in
Note B. In essence, he appears to contend that the district court was at liberty to
disregard the offense level calculation methodology outlined in the guidelines and
arrive at a lower offense level for Mr. Medrano by calculating his offense level
based on the actual weight of the methamphetamine rather than the entire weight
of the methamphetamine mixture.
Again, Mr. Medrano’s argument exposes his misconception of post-Booker
sentencing. While the ultimate guidelines imprisonment range is now advisory,
see Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756–57, the process of determining the correct guideline
range is the same as it was before Booker. Id. at 767 (“The district courts, while
not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them
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into account when sentencing.”); see also Magallanez, 408 F.3d at 685 (“district
courts are still required to consider Guideline ranges”); United States v. Mares,
402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[The] duty to ‘consider’ the Guidelines will
ordinarily require the sentencing judge to determine the applicable Guideline
range even though the judge is not required to sentence within that range. The
Guideline range should be determined in the same manner as before
Booker/Fanfan.”). The district court did not err in relying on Note B to the Drug
Quantity Table to determine Mr. Medrano’s guideline offense level. See United
States v. Brooks, 161 F.3d 1240, 1248 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[N]otes or commentary
to the sentencing guidelines are considered binding authority unless either
violative of the Constitution or a federal statute, or clearly inconsistent with the
guideline commentary [it] purports to explain.”).
We AFFIRM.
SUBMITTED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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