United States v. Trujillo

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
July 24, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 06-1501
v. (D.Ct. No. 05-cr-00374-EW N-21)
(D . Colo.)
M ANUEL TRUJILLO, a/k/a M anny,
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before TA CH A, Chief Circuit Judge, and BARRETT and BROR BY, Senior
Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant M anuel Trujillo pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
with intent to distribute and to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(ii) and 846. 1 He now appeals
his sixty-month sentence on grounds his sentence is unreasonable under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) because, in granting his request for a downward departure based on his
terminal illness, the district court sentenced him to a sixty-month sentence rather
than a term of home detention or a lesser term of imprisonment. W e exercise
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm M r.
Trujillo’s sentence.
I. Factual Background
As stipulated by M r. Trujillo, an investigation began in July 2003 involving
several individuals involved in drug trafficking, including members of a gang
known as the “Gallant Knights Insane.” 2 Between June 15 and July 2, 2005, as
part of the ongoing investigation, authorities intercepted several calls between
Victor Valdez and M r. Trujillo which established M r. Trujillo began purchasing
multi-ounce quantities of cocaine from M r. V aldez.
1
This appeal is related to another appeal before this court, United States v.
Lucero, No. 06-1414, in which Adam Lucero was also indicted regarding the
same drug trafficking investigation. However, our dispositions in each case are
written separately given the facts and sentencing issues involved are
comparatively distinct.
2
The indictment brought forty drug trafficking and related charges against
tw enty-three defendants; count one implicated M r. Trujillo.
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II. Procedural Background
The final superceding indictment charged M r. Trujillo with distribution of
five kilograms or more of powder cocaine and fifty grams or more of crack
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii), and (b)(1)(A)(iii),
and 846. After his arrest, M r. Trujillo was released on bond so he could receive
medical treatment for a pre-existing liver condition. He then began associating
with his former gang members and violated the conditions of his release by: 1)
failing to appear for his pre-trial proceedings in the instant case; 2) violating his
parole in a state case; and 3) failing to maintain contact with his federal probation
officer or notify her of new felony charges pending against him when he was
arrested in the company of other gang members. Following these violations, M r.
Trujillo was taken into federal custody and then transferred to the Jefferson
County Detention Center where he received medical attention for his liver
disease.
Ultimately, M r. Trujillo entered a guilty plea; in his plea agreement, he
agreed to plead guilty to the lesser offense of distributing 500 grams or more of
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(ii) and 846. The
government and M r. Trujillo also stipulated that he suffers from Hepatitis C and
chronic liver disease and “obtained opinions from his treating physicians that his
medical condition is terminal” and “that a pre-sentence evaluation of [his]
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medical condition is appropriate and necessary to determine the extent to which a
departure may be warranted under § 5H1.4.” R., Vol. 1, Doc. 972 at 4-5.
Following M r. Trujillo’s guilty plea, a probation officer prepared a
presentence report and arrived at a base offense level of 30 and a two-level
enhancement for obstruction of justice based on his failure to appear for the pre-
trial proceedings after being released on bond. However, the probation officer
reduced his offense level by three levels for acceptance of responsibility, for a
total offense level of 29, which, together with a criminal history category of V I,
resulted in an advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or
“U.S.S.G.”) range of 151 to 188 months imprisonment.
Relying on a review of M r. Trujillo’s medical records and discussion with a
counselor in the Jefferson County Detention Center, the probation officer also
detailed M r. Trujillo’s medical condition, confirming he suffers from chronic,
advanced liver disease for which he has received medical treatment and noting a
downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4 for his physical condition might be
appropriate. 3 Neither party objected to the presentence report.
3
The probation officer also noted M r. Trujillo’s belief he was receiving
inadequate medical treatment while incarcerated at the Jefferson County
Detention Center. However, nothing in the record suggests M r. Trujillo would
receive inadequate treatment at a federal facility after his sentencing.
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Prior to the sentencing hearing M r. Trujillo filed a motion for downward
departure under § 5H1.4, explaining his terminal liver disease constituted an
extraordinary physical impairment which warranted supervised release for the
purpose of residing with his mother-in-law, or for an unspecified “short term of
imprisonment.” A t the sentencing hearing, a medical doctor treating M r. Trujillo
at the Jefferson County Detention Center testified M r. Trujillo suffered from
severe, advanced liver disease related to Hepatitis C and had a life expectancy of
a few years to under five years. 4 Based on this testimony, M r. Trujillo renewed
his request for a downward departure under § 5H1.4 for the purpose of allowing
him to reside at home with his mother-in-law rather than serve a prison sentence.
In response, the district court stated:
I’m more interested in how ... M r. Trujillo deals with the breach of
faith with this court when he was allowed for this very reason to be
released on pretrial detention in the face of overwhelming evidence
and in the face of serious involvement by him, and he disappeared.
I think he’s manipulated the Court. I don’t doubt that the
doctor says he doesn’t have long to live. That’s sad, but that’s no
reason for me to let him loose, on home detention or any other non-
custody arrangement.
R., Vol. 2 at 14. The government, in opposing M r. Trujillo’s request to remain at
4
The doctor also testified it would be difficult for M r. Trujillo to w ork
because of his illness and that he must be housed by himself because the disease
is contagious and he has episodes of bleeding and bouts of excreting body fluids
which might transmit the disease to other people.
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home, pointed out he was released on bond because of his medical condition but
absconded without government approval and began associating with his former
gang members. Nevertheless, it did not oppose a reduction in his sentence term
based on his medical condition. It further recommended a departure under
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 for a ninety-one- to ninety-five-month sentence based on M r.
Trujillo’s assistance in the case. The government also explained medical
treatment at a federal facility like the one in Rochester, M innesota, which has an
affiliation with the M ayo Clinic, or others associated or affiliated with medical
facilities would be available during his incarceration, as w ell as hospice care
through a compassionate release program. However, the government explained
that to be eligible for compassionate release hospice care M r. Trujillo must have a
medical diagnosis of a life expectancy of six months or less at the time of his
request and that he could make such a request at a future date, which the
government would not oppose.
In sentencing M r. Trujillo, the district court adopted the undisputed
calculations of the presentence report, considered the applicable Guidelines, and
discussed the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In so doing, the
district court pointed to M r. Trujillo’s criminal history category of VI, noting it
was “most serious” under the Guidelines and that it would be difficult to “imagine
circumstances under which a man or woman with this criminal history would not
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be incarcerated.” R., Vol. 2 at 27-28. In discussing the sentencing factors under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court found the most significant factors in M r.
Trujillo’s case included the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of his
offense and to protect the public from his future crimes. In support of these
findings, the district court recounted the fact M r. Trujillo obtained release on
bond based on his plea about his deteriorating health but then failed to follow the
conditions of his pre-trial release, in part by involving himself in further crimes
by being arrested in the company of his former gang members. The district court
explained that based on this conduct it had “less sympathy” for a departure based
on his terminal illness.
After discussing M r. Trujillo’s conduct during his release, the district court
acknowledged M r. Trujillo’s substantial assistance to the government, agreeing it
warranted a reduction in his sentence to ninety-one to ninety-five months.
Turning to M r. Trujillo’s request for a downward departure under U.S.S.G.
§ 5H1.4, it found he suffered from Hepatitis C and a terminal liver disease.
Recognizing the extraordinary circumstance of M r. Trujillo’s terminal illness and
noting the government did not oppose some degree of additional departure, the
district court found such an illness warranted a departure as an impairment under
U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4, but explained it did not justify a sentence of probation or “a
sentence other than a sentence of incarceration, when all of the statutory purposes
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of sentencing are considered.” R., Vol. 2 at 32. After balancing all the criteria
discussed, the district court imposed a sentence of sixty months imprisonment and
noted its “intention” for M r. Trujillo to “spend the rest of his life in prison for the
protection of society.” Id.
III. Discussion
On appeal, M r. Trujillo asserts the district court “imposed an unreasonable
sentence by sentencing [him] to sixty months of incarceration and denying his
request for a home detention based on his terminal illness that constituted an
extraordinary physical impairment pursuant to [U.S.S.G.] § 5H1.4.” Apt. Br. at 1.
In support, he points to the district court’s intention for M r. Trujillo to spend the
rest of his life in prison even though it found he qualified for a downward
departure under § 5H1.4. Pointing out he received a five-year sentence even
though his life expectancy is under five years, M r. Trujillo argues, “[t]he United
States Code does not authorize a life sentence for the crime [he] plead guilty to
and therefore the intention of the court in imposing what amounts to and was
intended to be a life sentence is unreasonable.” Id. at 11. W ithout further
discussion he also summarily contends, “[t]he sentence was also unreasonable as
it was greater than necessary to comply with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).” Id.-8-
W e begin our discussion by clarifying that a sentence above or below the
recommended Guidelines range based on an application of Chapters Four or Five
of the Guidelines is referred to as a “departure,” while a sentence above or below
the recommended Guidelines range through application of the sentencing factors
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 5 is called a “variance.” United States v. Atencio, 476 F.3d
1099, 1101 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007). It is evident M r. Trujillo is now also claiming
his sentence is unreasonable under the § 3553(a) factors based on the same illness
he previously raised to support his downward departure request under U.S.S.G.
§ 5H1.4. W hile M r. Trujillo may not have previously framed his objections
expressly in the context of a variance under § 3553(a), we do not require a
defendant to make such an objection in order to preserve a claim his sentence is
5
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) provides, in part, the court shall consider:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed--
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;
and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available; ...
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
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unreasonably long under those factors. See United States v. Torres-Duenas, 461
F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2007 W L 1854536
(U.S. Jun. 29, 2007) (No. 06-7990). Instead, we review for reasonableness the
sentence’s length, as guided by the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See id. These
factors “include the nature of the offense and characteristics of the defendant, as
well as the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the crime, to provide
adequate deterrence, to protect the public, and to provide the defendant with
needed training or treatment ....” United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1053
(10th Cir. 2006).
W e require reasonableness in two respects: “the length of the sentence, as
well as the method by which the sentence was calculated.” Id. at 1055 (emphasis
omitted). In determining whether the district court properly applied the
Guidelines, we review its legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for
clear error. Id. at 1054. W e have also held “the sentencing factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) must be considered by the district court itself when imposing a
sentence.” United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1115 (10th Cir.
2006).
[W ]here a defendant has raised a nonfrivolous argument that the
§ 3553(a) factors warrant a below-Guidelines sentence and has
expressly requested such a sentence, we must be able to discern from
the record that the sentencing judge did not rest on the guidelines
alone, but considered whether the guidelines sentence actually
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conforms, in the circumstances, to the statutory factors.
Id. at 1117 (quotation marks, alterations and citation omitted).
W ith these principles in mind, we turn to M r. Trujillo’s health, which is but
one of the factors the district court was required to consider together with the
other § 3553(a) factors. In this case, it is clear the district court weighed M r.
Trujillo’s terminal illness with the other § 3553(a) factors, such as the serious
nature of his offense and his other characteristics and history, including his
extensive criminal history, placing him in the highest criminal history category.
The district court also weighed M r. Trujillo’s health against the need for his
sentence to provide adequate deterrence, to protect the public, and to provide him
with needed treatment. In that regard, the district court participated in a
discussion about M r. Trujillo receiving medical and hospice care during his
incarceration, repeatedly highlighted M r. Trujillo’s continued criminal activity
after his release for the purpose of receiving medical care, and indicated the need
to place M r. Trujillo in prison for “the rest of his life” for “the protection of
society.” Thus, it is clear the district court reasonably believed M r. Trujillo’s
criminal conduct during his release pending trial demonstrated: 1) his strong
propensity to continue his criminal activity despite his terminal condition and
medical care needs; and 2) the need to protect the public from his ongoing
criminal activity. Based on these factors, together with the other factors
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considered, including the assurance of medical care while incarcerated, we cannot
say the district court’s rejection of M r. Trujillo’s request for supervised release,
presumably under the care of his mother-in-law, was unreasonable. W hile M r.
Trujillo suggests he essentially received a “life sentence” for his drug crime, he in
fact received a downward departure related to his health which resulted in his
receiving a sentence significantly less than what his conduct in the instant crime
warranted without such a departure. Thus, M r. Trujillo has not demonstrated his
illness, when view ed in light of the other § 3553(a) factors, is sufficiently
compelling for the purpose of determining that a sentence of sixty months
imprisonment is unreasonable under the circumstances presented.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM M r. Trujillo’s sentence.
Entered by the C ourt:
W ADE BRO RBY
United States Circuit Judge
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