United States v. Davidson

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 27, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 07-4216
v. (D.C. No. 2:07-CR-350-TC-1)
(D. Utah)
MICHAEL L. DAVIDSON, a/k/a
Michael L. Peterson,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, EBEL, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Michael Davidson pleaded guilty to one count of
escaping from federal custody in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). The district
court sentenced Mr. Davidson to 33 months’ imprisonment and three years’
supervised release. On appeal, Mr. Davidson challenges the district court’s
application of a 2-level upward adjustment pursuant to § 3C1.2 of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) for reckless endangerment during
flight. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. §
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
3742(a) and affirm.
Background
On June 21, 2002, Mr. Davidson was sentenced by a district court to 60
months’ imprisonment for possession of a firearm while drug trafficking. After
serving most of his sentence, he was furloughed from a federal penitentiary in
Atwater, California and was required to self-report to a halfway house in Salt
Lake City, Utah on April 19, 2007. Mr. Davidson notified the halfway house that
he had been bumped from his bus in Las Vegas, Nevada in the early morning of
April 19, but he did not arrive later that day.
Law enforcement had no contact with Mr. Davidson until May 19, 2007, a
month later, when police officers in Salt Lake City noticed a suspicious person
sitting in a vehicle in a grocery store parking lot. Due to the person’s suspicious
behavior, the officers checked the license plate on the vehicle which revealed that
the vehicle was stolen. As the officers activated their lights and siren, Mr.
Davidson quickly drove the vehicle across the parking lot nearly striking the
officers’ vehicle. Because many vehicles and pedestrians populated the parking
lot, the officers did not continue their pursuit. Mr. Davidson then slammed on the
brakes, stopping before driving off a small cement wall into cross traffic. Mr.
Davidson then fled on foot and hid behind a trash container where the officers
apprehended him. When asked why he fled, Mr. Davidson explained “I saw the
-2-
cops and did not want to get caught.” III R. at 3. A search of the vehicle
revealed an empty pack of cigarettes containing a green leafy substance (later
tested as marijuana), two drug pipe screens, a small bag with marijuana leaves
colored on it, and a capped syringe. Mr. Davidson admitted the marijuana was
his, but not the syringe.
At sentencing, Mr. Davidson objected to the application of a 2-level
upward adjustment under § 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment during flight,
arguing that a nexus must exist between his flight from the officers and the crime
of conviction, i.e., his escape from the halfway house. The district court rejected
this argument concluding that the Tenth Circuit has never required a nexus under
§ 3C1.2, applied the enhancement, and sentenced Mr. Davidson to 33 months’
imprisonment, the low end of the applicable guidelines range, and three years’
supervised release.
Discussion
We review the district court’s application of the Guidelines de novo and
any factual findings for clear error. United States v. Wolfe, 435 F.3d 1289, 1295
(10th Cir. 2006). We give due deference to the district court’s application of the
Guidelines to the facts. Id.Section 3C1.2 of the Guidelines adjusts a defendant’s offense level upward
two levels “[i]f the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or
-3-
serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law
enforcement officer.” On appeal, Mr. Davidson argues that the district court
erred by not requiring that a nexus exist under § 3C1.2 between his flight from
the officers and his escape from the halfway house. Mr. Davidson argues that
§ 1B1.3 requires that all enhancements applied under Chapter Three of the
Guidelines relate to the offense of conviction. Section 1B1.3(a) provides in
relevant part,
Unless otherwise specified, . . . adjustments in Chapter Three[] shall be
determined on the basis of the following:
(1)(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant;
...
that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in
preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid
detection or responsibility for that offense.
Mr. Davidson argues that the section refers specifically to the offense of
conviction and requires a nexus with that offense, and that such a nexus is
missing in this case.
We have previously addressed arguments similar to Mr. Davidson’s on at
least two occasions in unpublished opinions. First, we rejected the argument that
the reckless endangerment must occur during the flight to avoid arrest for the
particular offense of conviction. United States v. Green, No. 98-5256, 2001 WL
50754, *2 (10th Cir. 1999) (unpublished). Instead, the enhancement is simply
-4-
part of the relevant conduct a district court may consider under § 1B1.3 in
determining the appropriate offense level and criminal history. See id. Second,
another unpublished Tenth Circuit case held that a district court did not commit
plain error in concluding that § 3C1.2 does not contain a nexus requirement,
reasoning that even though § 1B1.3 may suggest a nexus, it does not
unequivocally state such a requirement and, at that time, no circuit had required a
nexus. United States v. Weathersby, 89 F. App’x 683, 689 (10th Cir. 2004)
(unpublished).
Section § 3C1.2 has also received varying treatment by the circuits. The
Ninth Circuit has assumed without deciding that § 3C1.2 requires a nexus
between the crime of conviction and the reckless endangerment. See United
States v. Duran, 37 F.3d 557, 559–60 (9th Cir. 1994). The Sixth Circuit decided
that § 3C1.2 does not require a nexus in an unpublished opinion, United States v.
Lykes, 71 F. App’x 543, 553 n.7 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished), but then reversed
itself in a published opinion concluding that the section does have a nexus
requirement, United States v. Dial, 524 F.3d 783, 787 & n.2 (6th Cir. 2008). The
Fifth Circuit has also found a nexus requirement in § 3C1.2. United States v.
Southerland, 405 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir. 2005).
We have doubts whether there is a nexus requirement since reckless
endangerment may simply be part of relevant conduct under § 1B1.3, but we need
not weigh in on the question today. We will assume, without deciding, that
-5-
§ 3C1.2 does require a nexus between the offense of conviction and the flight, and
conclude that plainly there is a nexus between Mr. Davidson’s escape from the
halfway house and his flight from the officers. Mr. Davidson’s offense, escape
from federal custody under § 751(a), is a continuing offense. United States v.
Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413 (1980). Because escape is a continuing offense, Mr.
Davidson’s escape “occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction”
as required by § 1B1.3. This conclusion accords with our precedent where we
have held that “escape presents a continuing threat of violence until the escapee is
safely returned to custody.” United States v. Brown, 314 F.3d 1216, 1224 (10th
Cir. 2003).
Mr. Davidson argues that Brown requires further analysis whether the
offense is sufficiently connected to the escape even after finding the escape to be
continuing. Cf. id. at 1225. However, unlike § 3C1.2, the section at issue in
Brown, § 2K2.1(b)(5) (redesignated as § 2K2.1(b)(6) by the 2006 Amendments to
the Guidelines), contains language requiring a nexus, i.e., the defendant’s use of
the firearm or ammunition must be “in connection with” another felony offense.
Further, Mr. Davidson’s flight “occurred during the commission” of escape and
“in the course of attempting to avoid detection” because he was still in the course
of committing the offense of escape by fleeing from the officers. U.S.S.G. §
1B1.3(a)(1). This outcome is distinguishable from the facts and analysis in
Southerland where the Fifth Circuit specifically noted that “the discrete,
-6-
noncontinuing offense was complete prior to the chase.” 405 F.3d at 268. Mr.
Davidson did not object to any of the factual findings in the presentence report
regarding his flight from the officers across the parking lot. Although counsel
points out that the evidence suggests that Mr. Davidson fled to avoid being
arrested with drugs in possession, while he was high, and while driving a car with
a stolen license plate, the evidence also suggests that he fled to avoid getting
caught, a reason which surely encompasses his escape from federal custody. The
district court did not err in concluding that the enhancement under § 3C1.2 was
proper in this case.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
-7-