United States v. Pearson, Dominic

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
SEP 15 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 97-3271
DOMINIC G. PEARSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. No. 97-10026-01-MLB)
Roger L. Falk of the Law Office of Roger L. Falk, P.A., Wichita, Kansas, for
Defendant-Appellant.
Lanny D. Welch, Assistant United States Attorney (Jackie N. Williams, United
States Attorney, with him on the brief), Wichita, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before EBEL , HENRY , and BRISCO E, Circuit Judges.
HENRY , Circuit Judge.
A jury convicted Dominic Pearson of one count of conspiracy to obstruct
commerce by robbery and one count of obstruction of commerce by robbery, both
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (the Hobbes Act), and one count of carrying or
using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence resulting in the
murder of a person through use of a firearm, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)
and (j)(1). The court sentenced Mr. Pearson to concurrent sentences of 240
months for each of the § 1951 violations and 360 months for the § 924 violation.
Mr. Pearson appeals his convictions on the grounds that (1) Congress did
not have the constitutional authority to enact § 1951, (2) the district court
erroneously refused to allow Mr. Pearson to submit a tardy alibi defense, (3) the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on any count, (4) the district
court erroneously instructed the jury on the elements of felony murder, and (5) the
district court erroneously refused to submit Mr. Pearson’s requested lesser
included offense instructions to the jury. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Two men, one wielding a handgun, robbed Mr. Goodcents Subs & Pastas in
Wichita, Kansas, around 9:55 p.m. on Monday, February 17, 1997. As the men
were emptying the cash register and safe, the handgun accidentally discharged,
and the bullet from the gun hit and killed Amie Montgomery, the nineteen-year-
old shift supervisor who was on duty. The robbers fled with roughly $2,500.
Dominic Pearson and several others were arrested and charged in relation
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to the events at Mr. Goodcents. Some of those charged pleaded guilty and agreed
to testify at Dominic’s trial. Among those testifying was Deborah Meyer, an
assistant manager at Mr. Goodcents, who stated that her boyfriend, Eric Pearson,
had discussed with her various plans to rob the store. She testified that she also
met with Eric and his cousin Dominic and talked about where the store kept its
money and when would be the best time to rob the store. She stated that before
the date of the robbery, the Pearsons left her house intending to rob the store but
later told her they could not complete the crime because there were police around
the restaurant. However, according to Ms. Meyer, Eric Pearson continued to plan
to take money from Mr. Goodcents until February 17.
Another accomplice, Courtney Martin, testified that he had robbed the
restaurant with Dominic while Eric waited in the car. Mr. Martin averred that
Dominic picked him up at Mr. Martin’s girlfriend’s house at around 8:30 p.m. on
the night of the robbery. He stated that they drove around, smoking marijuana,
prior to going to Eric’s, where Eric and Dominic went into another room and
talked before emerging to discuss the robbery with him. Mr. Martin claimed that
Eric assured him that the robbery would go well because Ms. Meyer had given
him detailed information about how to commit the crime. He stated that Eric then
gave him clothing to wear, drove him and Dominic to Mr. Goodcents, waited in
the car, and drove them away after the crime. Mr. Martin admitted that Dominic
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handed him the gun to use in the robbery and that he was holding the gun when it
fired, killing Ms. Montgomery. He also said that the three of them split the
robbery proceeds later that evening at Eric’s house.
The government presented witnesses not involved in the crime, including
Angela Starks, who was working with Ms. Montgomery at the time of the robbery,
and Steve Peterson, the owner of Mr. Goodcents. Ms. Starks testified to the
details of the robbery and then identified Dominic as the unarmed robber.
However, as she acknowledged on cross-examination, Ms. Starks had been unable
to pick Dominic out of a photo array soon after the robbery and had seen his
picture on television in connection with the robbery before her in-court
identification. Additionally, Dominic was the only black male in the courtroom
who was of the right age to be a suspect in the crime. In contrast, Ms. Starks had
picked Mr. Martin out of a photo array as the armed robber. Mr. Peterson
testified that Mr. Goodcents is part of a national chain and purchases goods from
both Kansas and out-of-state companies for sale to customers. According to Mr.
Peterson, business suffered after the robbery and killing, and the stolen money
would have been used to purchase goods produced outside of Kansas.
Dominic testified in his own defense. He swore that he had driven by Mr.
Goodcents with Eric several days before the robbery and that Eric was trying to
convince him to rob the restaurant; however, he told Eric he would not participate
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in the robbery. He claimed that he did not help in the robbery on February 17.
To rebut Mr. Martin’s testimony that he and Dominic were riding around together
before going to Eric’s house, he testified that he was at a mall jewelry store
having his watch repaired at around 9:00 p.m. He introduced into evidence a
watch store receipt that an employee of the store testified was a record of payment
for watch sizing and battery replacement. The jewelry store employee also stated
that he had done the work on the watch, believed the watch had been dropped off
just before the store closed at 9:00 p.m. on the seventeenth, and remembered that
the watch wasn’t picked up until five or ten minutes later, after closing. Although
the employee could not identify the person who had brought the watch in and
picked it up, he recalled that the person was a black male. Dominic also produced
evidence showing that Eric had called Dominic’s pager at 9:00 p.m. on the
seventeenth.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1951Mr. Pearson moved to dismiss the indictment claiming that Congress lacked
the constitutional authority to enact § 1951. The district court denied his motion.
“We review challenges to the constitutionality of a statute de novo.” United
States v. Bolton , 68 F.3d 396, 398 (10th Cir. 1995). We have previously
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concluded that § 1951 “regulates activities which in aggregate have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.” Id. at 399. Therefore, § 1951 “represents a
permissible exercise of the authority granted to Congress under the Commerce
Clause.” Id. ; see also , United States v. Romero , 122 F.3d 1334, 1340 (10th Cir.
1997), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 1310 (1998); United States v. Shinault , No. 97-
3061, 1998 WL 378119, at *12 (10th Cir. July 8, 1998). Because § 1951 is within
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, Mr. Pearson’s constitutional challenge to
his convictions fails.
B. Mr. Pearson’s alibi
Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.1(a), the government requested notice of
Mr. Pearson’s alibi defenses on April 17, 1997. Mr. Pearson’s attorney did not
respond with notice of an alibi within the ten days required by Rule 12.1(a) and,
in fact, told the government on at least two occasions that Mr. Pearson had no
alibi defense. However, on June 12, Mr. Pearson’s counsel learned that Mr.
Pearson’s mother wished to testify that Mr. Pearson was at her house between
9:45 and 10:00 p.m. on the night of the robbery and murder. Because the trial
was scheduled to begin on June 16, Mr. Pearson’s attorney moved for a
continuance so that he could develop the alibi defense and for permission to use
the alibi defense despite failure to give timely notice to the government. After
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hearing argument, the court denied both motions.
We review the district court’s decision to exclude alibi evidence for abuse
of discretion. See United States v. Davis , 40 F.3d 1069, 1076 (10th Cir. 1994).
Rule 12.1(a) states that, within ten days of a written demand from the
government, the defendant must give notice of his intention to offer an alibi
defense. Rule 12.1(b) places a reciprocal witness identification requirement on
the government, requiring it to disclose witnesses it intends to use to establish the
defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime and any other witnesses it will rely
on to rebut the testimony of the defendant’s alibi witnesses. Rule 12.1(c) places
on the parties a continuing duty to disclose according to 12(a) and (b). Rule
12.1(d) allows the court to exclude the testimony of any witness not identified in
compliance with Rule 12.1(a) or (b), and Rule 12.1(e) allows the court to grant, if
good cause is shown, an exception to 12.1(a) through (d).
Addressing a similar state alibi witness disclosure rule, the Supreme Court
identified the interests vindicated by such rules:
Given the ease with which an alibi can be fabricated, the
State’s interest in protecting itself against an eleventh-hour defense
is both obvious and legitimate. Reflecting this interest, notice-of-
alibi provisions, dating at least from 1927, are now in existence in a
substantial number of States. The adversary system of trial is hardly
an end in itself; it is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an
absolute right always to conceal their cards until played. We find
ample room in that system, at least as far as “due process” is
concerned, for the [alibi witness disclosure] rule, which is designed
to enhance the search for truth in the criminal trial by insuring both
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the defendant and the State ample opportunity to investigate certain
facts crucial to the determination of guilt or innocence.
Williams v. Florida , 399 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1970) (footnotes omitted). The
Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 12.1 also offer compelling justification for
alibi witness disclosure:
There are cases in which the identity of defense witnesses may be
known, but it may come as a surprise to the government that they
intend to testify as to an alibi and there may be no advance notice of
the details of the claimed alibi. The result often is an unnecessary
interruption and delay in the trial to enable the government to
conduct an appropriate investigation. The objective of rule 12.1 is to
prevent this . . . .
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.1 Advisory Committee Notes.
Our circuit considered Rule 12.1(d) exclusion of alibi witness testimony in
Davis , 40 F.3d at 1069, and United States v. Fitts , 576 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1978).
Mr. Pearson notes that in Davis and Fitts , the defendants’ attorneys were at fault
for failing to comply with Rule 12.1(a). See Davis , 40 F.3d at 1076; Fitts , 576
F.2d at 838. In contrast, “[d]efense counsel in the present case attempted to
comply with the dictates of Rule 12.1 as soon as he became aware of the mere
possibility of an alibi defense.” Aplt’s Br. at 34. We agree with Mr. Pearson that
his attorney acted diligently in informing the government and the district court of
Mr. Person’s alibi witness as soon as defense counsel learned of the witness.
However, his attorney’s diligence does not excuse Mr. Pearson’s negligence.
“[Mr. Pearson], through his attorney, advised the government on at least two
8
occasions that he did not intend to offer an alibi defense. Thereafter, on June 12,
1997, defense counsel became aware that an alibi defense may exist in this
matter.” Id. at 32. Defense counsel “became aware that an alibi defense may
exist” on June 12 because that is the first date Mr. Pearson or his mother bothered
to tell counsel 1
of her alibi testimony—that she had seen her son standing in her
kitchen at the exact time and on the exact date of the robbery and killing—despite
its obvious importance. Nor had Mr. Pearson’s mother exculpated her son on the
several occasions when she was questioned by the government during its
investigation. As the very nature of Mr. Pearson’s alleged alibi confirms that he
and his mother would have known of it long before the deadline for submitting
his alibi defense, he cannot show good cause, as required by Fed. R. Crim. P.
12.1(e), for failure to comply with Rule 12.1(a). The district court did not abuse
its discretion in excluding Mr. Pearson’s alibi testimony.
C. Sufficiency of the evidence
Mr. Pearson made oral and written motions for judgment of acquittal due to
1
Both in his brief and at oral argument, Mr. Pearson’s attorney was
careful to protect his client’s privilege in their communications regarding Mr.
Pearson’s defense. However, Mr. Pearson’s counsel appropriately informed us
that he could not claim that he had knowledge of Mr. Pearson’s alibi witness
before July 12 but simply failed, through his own fault, to inform the government.
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insufficiency of the evidence, which the trial court denied. When reviewing a
jury’s verdict for sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the record de novo and
ask whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a
reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
See United States v. Voss , 82 F.3d 1521, 1524-25 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 117 S.
Ct. 226 (1996).
The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Viewed in a light
most favorable to the government, the testimony of Dominic’s accomplices shows
(1) that he discussed and planned the robbery with Eric several days before and
on the day of the robbery and (2) handed an armed accomplice a gun and assisted
in a robbery that obstructed interstate commerce and caused the death of Ms.
Montgomery. Admittedly, Ms. Starks could not pick Dominic out of a photo array
and helped the police construct a composite sketch of the unarmed robber that did
not resemble Dominic. However, these facts do not force a contrary result
because those most likely to recognize him, his cohorts, placed him at the scene
of the crimes. Additionally, his testimony and receipt, offered as proof that he
was at a jewelry store sometime around 9:00 p.m. on the night of the murder, are
not exculpatory because the robbery didn’t take place until around 10:00 p.m.
Further, to the extent that Dominic’s testimony contradicts Mr. Martin’s testimony
that he and Dominic drove around together from around 8:30 to around 9:00 p.m.,
10
a rational jury could have believed Mr. Martin or simply not cared about the
conflicting testimony on this irrelevant point. After examining the record de novo
and taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we
conclude that a reasonable jury could have found Dominic guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
D. Jury instructions on felony murder
Mr. Pearson contends that the felony murder jury instruction was erroneous.
The instruction read, in relevant part: “A killing is done with malice aforethought
when it is done deliberately and with the intent to kill another person, or if it
results from the commission of a robbery.” Rec. vol. I, doc. 189, Instruction No.
26. In essence, the instruction followed the traditional felony murder rule by
allowing the jury to find “malice aforethought” from Mr. Pearson’s commission
of the underlying felony. Mr. Pearson contends that the federal murder statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1111(a), requires the jury to find “malice aforethought” independent of
the commission of the underlying felony.
“We review de novo a timely challenge to a jury instruction to determine
whether, considering the instructions as a whole, the jury was misled. . . .
[R]eversal is not appropriate unless we have substantial doubt that the jury was
fairly guided.” United States v. Winchell , 129 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 1997)
11
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
We have no doubt that the jury was fairly guided. Section 1111(a)
incorporates the definition of murder, i.e., “the unlawful killing of a human being
with malice aforethought,” into its definition of felony murder. However, we
interpret the “malice aforethought” requirement in § 1111 by reference to the
common law, see Montoya v. United States Parole Comm’n , 908 F.2d 635, 638
(10th Cir. 1990), and at common law, “malice aforethought” is a term of art
which has several definitions, including, in the felony murder context, proof of
commission of the specified felony. See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott,
Jr., Criminal Law §§ 7.1(a), 7.5(e)-(h) (2d Ed. 1986).
At common law, the author of an unintended homicide is guilty
of murder if the killing takes place in the perpetration of a felony.
This in essence constitutes the doctrine of felony-murder (also known
as the doctrine of constructive malice).
....
In the typical case of felony murder, there is no malice in
“fact” with respect to the homicide; the malice is supplied by the
“law.” There is an intended felony and an unintended homicide. The
malice which plays a part in the commission of the felony is
transferred by the law to the homicide. As a result of the fictional
transfer, the homicide is deemed committed with malice; and a
homicide with malice is, by definition, common-law murder.
2 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 147 (15th ed. 1994).
Thus, to prove the “malice aforethought” element of felony murder, the
prosecution only need show commission of the specified felony. See Montoya ,
908 F.2d at 638; United States v. Flores , 63 F.3d 1342, 1371 (5th Cir. 1995);
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United States v. Chischilly , 30 F.3d 1144, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Thomas , 34 F.3d 44, 48-49 (2nd Cir. 1994); cf. United States v. Sides , 944
F.2d 1554, 1558 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that defendant’s continuing
participation in an armed robbery despite the fact that he was aware of a serious
risk of death to the victims satisfied the element of malice aforethought);
Michigan v. Aaron , 299 N.W.2d 304 (Mich. 1980) (providing a very
comprehensive exploration of the history and rationale behind the felony murder
doctrine). Therefore, we hold that the district court properly instructed the jurors
that they could find Mr. Pearson guilty of § 1111(a) felony murder if they
determined that Ms. Montgomery’s killing resulted from the commission of a
robbery.
E. Mr. Pearson’s requested lesser included offense instructions
Mr. Pearson asked the district court to instruct the jury on second degree
murder and manslaughter as lesser included offenses to felony murder. The
district court refused. “Whether an offense for which an instruction is sought
actually qualifies as a lesser included offense of the offense charged is a question
of law that we review de novo. However, we review the district court’s decision
as to whether there is enough evidence to justify a lesser included offense
instruction for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Duran , 127 F.3d 911, 914
13
(10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 1389 (1998).
[A] [d]efendant is entitled to a lesser included offense
instruction if (1) there was a proper request; (2) the lesser included
offense includes some but not all of the elements of the offense
charged; (3) the elements differentiating the two offenses are in
dispute; and (4) a jury could rationally convict the defendant of the
lesser offense and acquit him of the greater offense.
United States v. Moore , 108 F.3d 270, 272 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Fitzgerald v.
United States , 719 F.2d 1069, 1071 (10th Cir. 1983)). The district court properly
denied Mr. Pearson’s requested lesser included offense instructions because both
fail the first half of the fourth Moore requirement: A jury could not rationally
convict him of either second degree murder or manslaughter.
After 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) defines first degree murder, it describes second
degree murder as “[a]ny other murder.” Replacing the word “murder” with its
definition, found in the first sentence of § 1111(a), results in the reconstituted
statutory expression of second degree murder as “any other unlawful killing of a
human being with malice aforethought.” However, we must again look to the
common law to satisfy the definition of “malice aforethought” as a term of art
used to satisfy second degree murder.
Malice aforethought as an element of second degree murder is, as in felony
murder, a type of constructive or implied malice. See LaFave & Scott, supra , at
606-07; Torcia, supra , at 246-50. However, whereas the commission of the
specified felony supplies the constructive or implied malice necessary to satisfy
14
the malice aforethought element of § 1111(a) felony murder, second degree
murder’s malice aforethought element is satisfied by: (1) intent-to-kill without the
added ingredients of premeditation and deliberation; (2) intent-to-do-serious-
bodily-injury; (3) depraved-heart; or (4) commission of a felony when the felony
in question is not one of those specified in the first degree murder paragraph of §
1111(a). See LaFave & Scott, supra , at 648.
Under the facts of this case, a jury could not rationally convict Mr. Pearson
of second degree murder because the robbery and accidental killing do not satisfy
any of the types of implied malice aforethought required to prove the crime. Mr.
Martin testified, and neither Mr. Pearson nor the government disputed, that he
accidentally fired the shot that killed Ms. Montgomery. Thus, the only reason the
government was able to convict Mr. Pearson of first degree murder was because
Mr. Pearson’s commission of the robbery constructively supplied the malice
aforethought required to satisfy the definition of “murder” in § 1111(a). While
the underlying robbery is constructive or implied malice aforethought for first
degree felony murder, neither the robbery nor the accidental killing satisfies the
types of constructive or implied malice aforethought described above that are
required to prove second degree murder. Because Mr. Pearson’s criminal acts do
not satisfy any of the types of implied second degree murder malice aforethought,
Mr. Pearson cannot be guilty of that crime.
15
His request for a manslaughter instruction also fails Moore ’s fourth
requirement. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1112 defines manslaughter:
(a) Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice. It is of two kinds:
Voluntary–Upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
Involuntary–In the commission of an unlawful act not
amounting to a felony, or in the commission in an unlawful manner,
or without due caution and circumspection, of a lawful act which
might produce death.
18 U.S.C. §1112(a). The accidental discharge of the gun in the commission of the
robbery (1) does not constitute voluntary manslaughter under § 1112 because
there was no sudden quarrel or heat of passion and (2) does not constitute
involuntary manslaughter under § 1112 because robbery is an unlawful act that is
a felony. Thus, a jury could not rationally convict Mr. Pearson of either type of
manslaughter.
Because we conclude that both of Mr. Pearson’s requested lesser included
offense instructions fail Moore ’s fourth requirement, we need not consider
whether they satisfy Moore ’s other prongs. The district court did not err in
refusing to submit to the jury Mr. Pearson’s requested lesser included offense
instructions.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm Mr. Pearson’s convictions because Congress did have the
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constitutional authority to enact § 1951, because the evidence was sufficient to
support the convictions, and because the district court did not err when it refused
to allow Mr. Pearson to submit a tardy alibi defense, instructed the jury on the
elements of felony murder, and declined to submit Mr. Pearson’s requested lesser
included offense instructions to the jury.
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