Smith v. Rail Link, Inc.

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 23, 2012
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
PUBLISH Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
BRIDGET SMITH
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
No. 11-8011
RAIL LINK, INC.; GENESEE &
WYOMING, INC.,
Defendants - Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING
(D.C. No. 2:10-CV-00156-NDF)
Marc Wietzke of The Law Offices of Michael Flynn, PC, Garden City, New York (Jubin
& Zerga, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming with him on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Melisa G. Thompson of Bates Carey Nicolaides LLP, Chicago, Illinois (Scott L. Carey of
Bates Carey Nicolaides LLP, Chicago, Illinois; Larry B. Kehl and J. James Learned of
Buchhammer & Kehl, Cheyenne, Wyoming, with her on the brief), for Defendants-
Appellees.
Before MURPHY, HOLLOWAY, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant Bridget Smith worked for Rail Link, Inc. (“Rail Link”) as a
freight operator at the Belle Ayre Mine in Wyoming. She was injured on the job, and
subsequently sued Rail Link and its corporate parent Genessee & Wyoming, Inc.
(“GWI”) in federal district court, asserting that the companies were liable for her injuries
under the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”). FELA provides, in certain
circumstances, a federal cause of action for injured employees of common carriers by
railroad.
The Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that they were not
subject to FELA liability for Ms. Smith’s injuries because FELA only applies where a
defendant is the injured worker’s employer and is a common carrier. Rail Link argued it
was a not a common carrier, and GWI argued it was neither a common carrier nor Ms.
Smith’s employer. The district court agreed granted summary judgment for both
Defendants. Ms. Smith appeals that ruling. We AFFIRM.
I. Background
A. Rail Link’s and GWI’s operations.
Rail Link is a railroad switching company inter alia. A switching company
facilitates the internal movement of railcars within a certain location, such as a coal mine.
Rail Link contracts with private businesses to provide on-site operational assistance at
industrial facilities. At the Belle Ayre Mine, a coal mine located in the Powder River
Basin near Gillette, Wyoming, Rail Link has a contract with Foundation Coal West, Inc.
(“Foundation Coal”). Pursuant to that contract, Rail Link handles Foundation Coal’s
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shipments into and out of the Belle Ayre Mine. The shipments are carried on track
owned or leased by Foundation Coal, and the equipment used is neither owned nor leased
by Rail Link. Under the contract with Foundation Coal, Rail Link’s fee depends on the
quantity of material it moves within the mine.
In addition to the services provided at the Belle Ayre Mine, Rail Link also
provides management and oversight services for railroad terminals. Rail Link’s clients
include the Corpus Christi Terminal Railroad, the Savannah Port Terminal Railroad, the
Golden Isles Terminal Railroad, and the York Railway Company.
Rail Link is also a corporate parent to two short-line railroad companies, which
make their rail services available for hire by the public at set tariffs — Commonwealth
Railway, Inc. (“Commonwealth”) and Talleyrand Terminal Railroad, Inc. (“Talleyrand”).
These short-line railroads provide the connection between long haul railroad companies
(such as Norfolk Southern and CSX) and railroad terminals, where trains are loaded,
unloaded, and redirected to new destinations. Rail Link owns some locomotives but does
not own any rail cars or track.
GWI is Rail Link’s corporate parent and is a corporate holding company. Its
wholly-owned subsidiaries include numerous railroads which, like Commonwealth and
Talleyrand, make themselves available for hire by the public for published tariffs. GWI
also owns a company called Genessee & Wyoming Rail Services Inc. (GWRSI), which
provides administrative and management services to many or all of GWI’s corporate
subsidiaries, including Rail Link. For example, GWRSI, acting in the name of GWI,
3
manages many of the human resources affairs of Rail Link (as well as other GWI
subsidiaries) and promulgates safety regulations that Rail Link’s (and other subsidiaries’)
employees are ultimately expected to follow. GWI, GWRSI, Rail Link, Commonwealth,
Talleyrand, and other GWI subsidiaries have substantial overlap amongst their managers
and directors. In other words, many managers and directors serve similar roles for
multiple companies in the GWI corporate family.
B. Ms. Smith’s lawsuit against Rail Link and GWI.
Ms. Smith worked for Rail Link as a freight train operator at the Belle Ayre mine.
In August 2007, she was injured on the job. She instituted this action against Rail Link
and GWI, asserting a cause of action pursuant to FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 51. The essence of
her claim is that Rail Link and GWI — both alleged to be common carriers by railroad —
simultaneously employed her at the Belle Ayre Mine and acted negligently, resulting in
the severe injuries she suffered at the mine.
Rail Link and GWI jointly moved for summary judgment. Rail Link argued that it
was not a “common carrier” as a matter of law. GWI argued that it was not Ms. Smith’s
“employer” as a matter of law.1 Because each of those statuses is required to maintain a
negligence action pursuant to FELA, the Defendants argued that Ms. Smith’s suit could
not be maintained against either of them. The district court granted their motion for
1
GWI also argued — and continues to argue on appeal — that it was not a
“common carrier,” but the district court did not address that argument, and we have no
need to in light of our affirmance of the district court, which is based on GWI’s
alternative argument.
4
summary judgment and entered final judgment in their favor. II Appx. 545-557. Ms.
Smith appeals that decision.
C. FELA background.
The FELA provides that:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in [interstate or foreign]
commerce . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is
employed by such carrier in such commerce [where the injury resulted from
negligence or defective equipment] . . . .
45 U.S.C. § 51.
Thus, there are three basic prerequisites to FELA liability. The defendant must, at
the time of the plaintiff’s injury, be (1) a common carrier, (2) employing the plaintiff,
(3) in furtherance of interstate commerce. The absence of elements one (as to Rail Link)
and two (as to GWI) formed the basis for the district court’s summary judgment ruling in
favor of the Defendants in this case.
II. Summary Judgment for Rail Link
The district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Rail Link was based on
a finding that Ms. Smith had not produced evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Rail Link is a common carrier. Initially, we note that the text
of the FELA statute does not say that the injured worker must be acting in furtherance of
the employer’s common carrier status when she is hurt in order for a cause of action to
lie. Rather, the injured worker must simply be furthering the employer’s engagement in
interstate commerce. Congress could have limited the scope of FELA to cover only those
injured employees who were furthering their employer’s operations as a common carrier
5
when they were hurt. Instead, however, Congress imposed liability on a whole class of
companies through FELA, and only exempted claims by employees of common carriers
who are hurt when doing something other than furthering interstate commerce — not
those employees who are hurt when doing something other than furthering common
carrier activities. See 45 U.S.C. § 51.
Thus Rail Link’s potential liability in this case turns not on whether Rail Link was
acting as a common carrier at the Belle Ayre Mine where Ms. Smith was injured – Ms.
Smith does not dispute that it was not so acting there – but instead depends on whether
Rail Link was a common carrier at other facilities. That Ms. Smith never worked at those
facilities is of no moment. An employer is a common carrier everywhere for FELA
purposes if its operations — wherever executed — are those of a common carrier. See
Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 52 (“[T]he liability
which [FELA] creates is imposed only on interstate carriers by railroad . . . and is
imposed for the benefit of all employees of such carriers by railroad who are employed in
interstate commerce, although some are not subjected to the peculiar hazards incident to
the operation of trains . . . .”) (emphasis added).
A. The standard for determining whether an entity is a “common” carrier.
Under FELA, a common carrier is “one who operates a railroad as a means of
carrying for the public — that is to say, a railroad company acting as a common carrier.”
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175, 187 (1920). “[T]here exist a number of
activities and facilities which, while used in conjunction with railroads and closely related
6
to railroading, are yet not railroading itself.” Edwards v. Pac. Fruit Express Co., 390
U.S. 538, 540 (1968). Other courts of appeal have formulated intricate tests to aid in the
inquiry whether an entity is a common carrier under FELA. See Lone Star Steel Co. v.
McGee, 380 F.2d 640, 647 (5th Cir. 1967) (establishing a four-part test to aid in
answering the question whether an entity is a common carrier); Kieronski v. Wyandotte
Terminal R.R., 806 F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1986) (defining entities as private carriers,
linking carriers, and in-plant operators and using that classification to determine whether
an entity is a common carrier under FELA).
Our court has eschewed exclusive adoption of any such test and instead relies on a
more fundamental inquiry: Does the defendant “operate[] a going railroad that carries for
the public”? Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 930 F.2d 798, 800 (10th Cir. 1991). Rail
Link certainly does not do this at the Belle Ayre Mine, where it has one contractual
relationship with one client and is paid pursuant to a contractually negotiated formula.
Ms. Smith does not argue to the contrary, and instead asks us to consider Rail Link’s
activities elsewhere in determining its common carrier status. But the only evidence on
this point is that Rail Link provides management and oversight services at various
railroad terminals. Oversight and management services necessarily implicate the
existence of some underlying carrier whose operations are being overseen. The
underlying company — the true carrier by rail — is the one which is subject to FELA
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liability, not the company (Rail Link) which is called upon for advice and consultation in
ensuring that the carrier’s workers operate efficiently.2
B. Rail Link’s advertisement of its capabilities at other locations.
In addition to Ms. Smith’s argument that Rail Link is a common carrier by virtue
of its nationwide operations, she also argues that Rail Link is a common carrier as a result
of the kind of services it holds itself out to the public as able to provide. In support of this
position, Ms. Smith points to GWI’s website, as well as filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission which state, inter alia, “As a common carrier by rail, we are
required to transport hazardous materials, regardless of risk.” Aplt. Br. at 22. But this
evidence only shows what GWI does and does not reveal anything about Rail Link’s
operations.
2
The record indicates that a local business journal reported that Rail Link
“operates” at the Corpus Christi Terminal Railroad, Galveston Railroad, and Port of San
Antonio. II Appx. 355. While we acknowledge that this is a scintilla of evidence that
Rail Link actually operates as a common carrier, it cannot be squared with the
overwhelming weight of evidence that Rail Link does not operate as a common carrier at
any location, including the listed terminals and port. A mere scintilla of evidence will not
suffice to allow a nonmoving party to survive summary judgment. E.g., Lanman v.
Johnson County, 393 F.3d 1151, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 2004).
8
Ms. Smith also points out that Rail Link and GWI advertise Rail Link’s control
over common carriers. But as Ms. Smith herself notes, common carrier status is about
what a company actually does, not what it says it does, whether in statements to investors
or representations to the public on its website. While there is some allure to a rule —
perhaps derived from principles of estoppel — that a company should be taken at its word
when it boasts about its experience as a common carrier, the FELA statute requires us to
look to what the company actually does in the field. Likewise, the fact that Rail Link is a
corporate parent of common carriers (Commonwealth and Talleyrand) does not
automatically implicate Rail Link as a common carrier.
Ms. Smith might succeed if she could show that this corporate structure was
established as a means of evading FELA liability. See 45 U.S.C. § 55 (“Any contract,
rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable
any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this chapter, shall to
that extent be void,” subject to offsets for amounts paid by the shielded common carrier.).
But Ms. Smith has made no effort at such a showing.
C. Rail Link’s contracts to provide rail support services to BNSF and other
railroads.
Rail Link also has contracts under which it provides a host of other services at
various sites around the country. For example, Rail Link inspects rail cars for Burlington
Northern Santa Fe (“BNSF”) to ensure that BNSF — undoubtedly a common carrier by
rail — complies with federal railroading regulations. Ms. Smith points to these kinds of
contracts (we will discuss only the BNSF contract for simplicity’s sake) as a further
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reason for us to find that Rail Link is a common carrier. As with Rail Link’s oversight
services at various locations around the country, the services provided under the BNSF
contract do not make Rail Link a common carrier.
Under the BNSF contract, there is no relationship between Rail Link and any
member of the public. Instead, Rail Link operates only at BNSF’s pleasure. The contract
does nothing to diminish or eliminate BNSF’s status as a common carrier. If BNSF
contracted with Rail Link to actually run BNSF’s rail operations, there might be a
stronger case that Rail Link is a common carrier. But FELA deals with precisely this
scenario by voiding “[a]ny contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or
intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability
created by this chapter.” 45 U.S.C. § 55. Section 55 has no bearing on the BNSF-Rail
Link contract, which affords no shield from liability. The company which does the vast
majority of the work in providing rail services to the public (BNSF) bears potential FELA
liability. The company which does technical work and has no interaction with the public
(Rail Link) does not.
D. Conclusions reached by other courts as to Rail Link’s status.
Our conclusion is consistent with those of various trial courts which have
addressed the issue. See Wolf v. Reliance Ins. Co., No. 99-CV-40-B, Summary Judgment
Memorandum and Order, slip op. at 12-26 (D. Wyo. Jan. 3, 2000); Erwin v. Rail Link,
Inc., No. CIV-93-160-3, Order Granting Rail Link, Inc. Summary Judgment (Cir. Ct.
Jefferson County, Ark., June 8, 1994); Waters v. Rail Link, Inc., No. 91-26837, Order
10
Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (D. Ct. Harris County, Tex., May
21, 1992).3 While the decisions of these trial courts have no force under the doctrines of
issue preclusion or res judicata, we find particularly persuasive the analysis by the federal
district court in Wolf.
In Wolf, the parties made substantially the same arguments about Rail Link’s
common carrier status as the parties have made in this case. I Appx. at 79-91. The
district court ruled that Rail Link was not a common carrier due to its activities at the site
of an employee’s injuries or its ownership of subsidiaries which operate short-line
railroads. Id. Reasoning that Rail Link did not offer rail services to the general public at
the site, the court concluded that Rail Link’s private contracts to provide rail services at a
chemical plant did not make it a common carrier. Id. at 78-86. The court also rejected
the contention that Rail Link’s ownership and control over subsidiaries which operate
short-line railroads made it a common carrier, noting that such ownership was only
relevant if there was some evidence that Rail Link’s own operations were intertwined
with those of its subsidiary railroads. Id. at 86-91.
We agree with both of these strands of analysis by the court in Wolf. And as we
have explained above, we also conclude that Rail Link’s oversight services around the
country do not amount to operation of a railroad as contemplated by FELA. Accordingly,
we affirm the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Rail Link.
III. Summary Judgment for GWI
3
Copies of these decisions and associated filings are also contained in the record
on appeal. I Appx. 66-132.
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A. Procedural background.
Ms. Smith acknowledges that Rail Link employed her but asserts that GWI was
also her employer under common law master-servant principles. On appeal, Ms. Smith
relies on Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 318 (1974), in support of this theory.
Specifically, she suggests that she was acting for two masters (GWI and Rail Link)
simultaneously, or that she was a servant of Rail Link, which she says, was a servant of
GWI. In Ms. Smith’s complaint, she alleged that at the time of her injuries, she “was also
working for the benefit of and subject to the control of Defendant [GWI], under its
direction, supervision and control as a de facto employee of [GWI] and in furtherance of
[GWI’s] business in interstate commerce.” I Appx. 13.
In Ms. Smith’s memorandum opposing the Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, she argued:
On the issue of GWI as employer of Plaintiff, the paperwork is again
critical. Plaintiff filled out all of her new hire paperwork with GWI. She
completed her direct deposit form with GWI. She received and was tested
on GWI safety rules and ethics rules. She had to acknowledge a different
GWI rule of the day every day on the job. She was invited to participate in
the GWI employee stock purchase program. She received direct deposits
into her checking account from [Rail Link] and from GWI. She filled out
insurance forms specifically listing GWI as employer. In fact, even the
paperwork separating her from employment after the accident, specifically
advising her of the termination of her life insurance coverage, came from
GWI.
Dkt. 44, at 24-25.
The district court rejected Ms. Smith’s argument.
B. GWI’s employment relationship with Ms. Smith.
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Ms. Smith concedes that she was nominally employed by Rail Link, but asserts
that GWI was also her employer as far as FELA is concerned. She argues that (1) she
was simultaneously a servant for GWI and Rail Link; or (2) Rail Link was a servant of
GWI under common law employment principles.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that FELA applies not only to “nominal”
employers of an injured plaintiff, but also to “common-law” employers. Kelley, 419 U.S.
at 324. FELA’s requirement that a plaintiff’s injury take place while employed by a
common carrier compels the plaintiff to prove a master-servant relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant railroad. Kelley, 419 U.S. at 323. In FELA cases, “the
question of employment, or master-servant status,” is “determined by reference to
common-law principles.” Id. This test of employment “turns on the degree of control the
[railroad] company exerts over the physical conduct of the worker in the performance of
services.” Schmidt v. Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry., 605 F.3d 686, 689 (9th Cir. 2010)
(citing Kelley, 419 U.S. at 324). Thus Ms. Smith must prove that GWI controlled or had
the right to control the physical conduct of Rail Link’s employees at the site of the injury.
Ms. Smith presents the following evidence in an attempt to show that GWI
actually controlled or had the right to control her physical conduct:
 GWI issues safety, ethics, and administrative rules which Rail Link
employees are required to follow;
 GWI reviews and has the right to change all of Rail Link’s budget
submissions;
 GWI regularly issues employment correspondence to Rail Link employees;
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 GWI advised Ms. Smith about her ineligibility for life insurance due to her
time away from Rail Link;
 GWI sometimes made direct deposits of Ms. Smith’s paycheck into her
bank account;
 GWI listed itself as Ms. Smith’s employer on group life insurance
paperwork; and
 some of Rail Link’s executive officers also hold executive positions with
GWI.
Essentially, Ms. Smith contends that GWI has such substantial administrative control
over Rail Link — control which is enabled by its corporate ownership — that it has the
power to compel Rail Link employees to do whatever GWI pleases. For its part, GWI
asserts that it “does not control the day-to-day operations of any of its subsidiaries” and
that Ms. Smith “did not report to anyone at GWI.” Aplee. Br. at 3, 7.
Ms. Smith has offered substantial evidence that GWI exercised control over
administrative tasks. While this kind of administrative control could serve to enable
physical control over employees, in this case Ms. Smith has not shown any connection
between GWI’s bearing of some administrative burdens of Rail Link and control over
what Rail Link’s employees actually do in the field on a day-to-day basis.
The closest Ms. Smith comes to succeeding in such a showing is the admission by
a GWI executive officer, Andrew Chunko, that a Rail Link employee would follow his
orders. This is not particularly probative, however, because Mr. Chunko is also an
executive of Rail Link. Quite significantly, Mr. Chunko himself did not even know that
he was an officer of GWI. Mr. Chunko’s admission, then, only allows us to conclude that
14
a Rail Link employee would respond to the directive of a Rail Link executive officer who
also holds a title with Rail Link’s corporate parent, GWI.
In order to rule in Ms. Smith’s favor, we would need to look not at whether GWI
exercised physical control over Rail Link employees by GWI, but instead rely on
administrative management by GWI. But under Kelley, we may not do so. Ms. Smith
has offered no evidence to support an inference that GWI’s control over administrative
functions ever affected any physical conduct of Rail Link employees. For example, even
accepting as true the allegation that safety guidelines were issued by GWI, as we must,
there is no evidence that a violation of safety rules which happened to be promulgated by
GWI would result in discipline by anyone other than Rail Link at Rail Link
management’s sole discretion.
The concept of employment under FELA is a broad one, but to show an
employment relationship a plaintiff still must offer some evidence that physical conduct
was or could have been controlled by an alleged employer. The record here is lacking in
this regard, compelling a ruling in GWI’s favor.4
4
Because we conclude that GWI was not Ms. Smith’s employer, we do not
address her additional argument that GWI is a common carrier subject to FELA liability.
15
IV. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Before concluding, we must confront a potential jurisdictional problem which
presents itself in this case. Although neither party raised this concern below or on appeal,
it relates to subject-matter jurisdiction, so we address it sua sponte.
Rail Link and GWI jointly moved for summary judgment in the district court. The
district court granted their motion and entered final judgment in the Defendants’ favor.
However, if the plaintiff’s status as an “employee” of a “common carrier” is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to a FELA claim, the district court had no jurisdiction to enter a
final judgment in this tort action, and the proper course would have been dismissal.
In Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 930 F.2d 798, 802-03 (10th Cir. 1991), we noted
that federal question jurisdiction exists so long as the essential elements of an FELA
claim — including the defendant’s common carrier and employer status — are alleged.
However, neither party disputed the threshold question of federal subject matter
jurisdiction, and we accepted that view without meaningful discussion. Notably, we did
not explicitly analyze the “subject-matter jurisdiction/ingredient-of-claim-for-relief
dichotomy” (to borrow the terminology of the Supreme Court in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,
546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006)). In light of the absence of discussion on the jurisdictional
question in Sullivan, and subsequent Supreme Court teachings on the point (e.g.,
Arbaugh), we might question the precedential value of Sullivan’s holding on this narrow
question.
16
Nevertheless, because the FELA statute does not speak to these elements in
jurisdictional terms, we see no reason to disturb the implicit conclusion reached in
Sullivan.5 Accord Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511 (directing federal courts to focus on
provisions of a statute explicitly speaking in jurisdictional terms when distinguishing
between essential ingredients of a claim and jurisdictional requirements).6 Accordingly,
5
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed this question, it has
hinted that these elements are essential ingredients of a claim for relief under FELA rather
than prerequisites to the exercise of federal question jurisdiction. See CSX
Transportation, Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2644 (2011) (speaking to “limitations”
— as opposed to jurisdictional barriers — on “who may sue, and for what” when
referring to a defendant’s common carrier and employer status).
The Court has suggested that the requirement that an employee be engaged in
interstate commerce at the time of injury is a jurisdictional requirement. See Reed v.
Pennsylvania Rail Co., 351 U.S. 502, 508 (1956) (upholding district court’s exercise of
federal question jurisdiction over a FELA claim on the ground that the plaintiff’s
employment duties were in furtherance of interstate commerce operations of a defendant
who was undisputedly a common carrier employer). But it is logical to distinguish the
“interstate commerce” element from the “common carrier” and “employer” elements
given that the former justifies Congress legislating in this field in the first place under the
Constitution’s Commerce Clause, while the latter are requirements that Congress chose to
impose separate from establishing its power to legislate.
In this case, there is no dispute whether Ms. Smith was furthering interstate
commerce when she was injured — she was facilitating the loading of coal that will
eventually be distributed around the country.
6
We recognize that holdings from other circuits suggest that these requirements
are jurisdictional in nature. See Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344,
1346 (3d Cir. 1991) (affirming district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction where the case was brought under FELA and the trial court concluded that the
defendant was not the plaintiff’s employer as a matter of law); Mickler v. Nimishillen &
Tuscarawas Railway Co., 13 F.3d 184 (6th Cir. 1993) (“The sole basis for federal
jurisdiction in this case is FELA. Because defendant is not a common carrier and FELA
does not apply, there is no federal question.”); Aho v. Erie Mining Co., 466 F.2d 539 (8th
Cir. 1972) (affirming district court’s determination that jurisdiction was lacking where
defendant in a FELA action was not a common carrier).
(continued...)
17
consistent with Sullivan, we conclude that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction
to hear this case, and thus had the power to enter final judgment.
* * *
In sum, the judgment entered by the district court is AFFIRMED.
6
(...continued)
While there is substantial authority from our sibling circuits suggesting a
conclusion different from the one we reaffirm today, we think that Sullivan’s holding
better accords with the Supreme Court’s most recent teachings on the difference between
essential elements of a claim (which are not jurisdictional) and jurisdictional
requirements. Accordingly, we do not disturb it.
18