United States v. Claycomb

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 24, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSElisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 13-8029
v. (D. Wyoming)
JASON CLAYCOMB, (D.C. No. 2:11-CV-00229-CAB;
No. 2:07-CR-00196-CAB-5)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
Before TYMKOVICH, ANDERSON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
Jason Claycomb was convicted in federal district court on drug-and-gun
charges. After unsuccessfully appealing, he moved to vacate his conviction under
28 U.S.C. § 2255. With only partial relief, Mr. Claycomb appeals based on
ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied a certificate of
appealability, and Mr. Claycomb asks us to issue the certificate.
In asking for a certificate of appealability, Mr. Claycomb alleges that: (1) his
trial and appellate attorneys should have challenged the admissibility of expert
testimony about the weight of the methamphetamine and cocaine being sold, and
(2) his appellate counsel should have challenged the government’s proof on
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res
judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive
value consistent with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 and TENTH CIR. R. 32.1.
possession of a machine gun because it fell outside the time period alleged in the
indictment. We conclude that the alleged deficiencies were not prejudicial
because: (1) the government had ample other evidence regarding the weight of the
drugs, and (2) evidence involving the machine gun had covered the time period
alleged in the indictment. Thus, we deny the request for a certificate of
appealability and, as a result, dismiss the appeal.
I. The Proceedings
Mr. Claycomb was convicted of:
! conspiring to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and
cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 846),
! distributing methamphetamine and cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)),
! possessing a machine gun in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime
(18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii)), and
! possessing a firearm not registered in the National Firearms
Registration and Transfer Record (26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5845(a), and
5861(d)).
The district court sentenced Mr. Claycomb to a term of 360 months’ imprisonment
on the conspiracy count, a consecutive term of 360 months’ imprisonment on the
§ 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) count, and a concurrent term of 120 months’ imprisonment on
the gun-registration count.
Mr. Claycomb appealed the conviction, and we affirmed. United States v.
Claycomb, 372 F. App’x 832, 837-41 (10th Cir. 2010). He then filed a § 2255
motion, challenging the conviction on each count. In the motion, he alleged
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ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and contended that his counsel
had failed to:
! object to testimony from law enforcement agents regarding the
quantity of methamphetamine and cocaine involved in the conspiracy,
! object to the admission of a government exhibit deemed a “certificate
of non-existence of a record,” which stated that the machine gun was
not registered to Mr. Claycomb, and
! challenge the sufficiency of the evidence regarding possession of a
machine gun between August 2006 and November 2006.
The district court granted Mr. Claycomb’s § 2255 motion with respect to his
conviction for possessing an unregistered firearm, ruling that admission of the
“certificate of non-existence of a record” had violated the Confrontation Clause.
As a result, the court vacated the conviction for possession of an unregistered
firearm. On the other counts, however, the court denied Mr. Claycomb’s § 2255
motion and his application for a certificate of appealability.
II. Standard for a Certificate of Appealability
To appeal the district court’s denial of relief under § 2255, Mr. Claycomb
must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” and obtain
a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B), (c)(2) (2006). We may
grant a certificate of appealability only if the applicant demonstrates that
“reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition
should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were
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‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (citation omitted).
III. Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Claycomb must show that:
! his counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness;” and
! “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). The court need not
address the first component “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim
on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice.” Id. at 697.
IV. Ineffective-Assistance Claim Regarding Drug Quantity
Mr. Claycomb argues in part that his trial and appellate counsel failed to
challenge testimony from law enforcement officers regarding the quantity of
methamphetamine and cocaine distributed through the conspiracy.
A state agent testified that he and his colleagues had: (1) stopped a car driven
by one of Mr. Claycomb’s conspirators, and (2) seized approximately one-half
pound of a substance believed to be methamphetamine. A chemist testified that he
had tested a 218.6-gram sample of the substance and identified it as
methamphetamine. The chemist’s testimony about the weight, however, was based
on someone else’s report.
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A police detective also testified about the seizure of more methamphetamine
during another traffic stop. According to the police detective, this seizure involved
285 grams. A chemist testified that he had performed tests indicating that the 285-
gram sample contained methamphetamine, but added that someone else had done
the weighing.
According to Mr. Claycomb, his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to object to the testimony based on the Confrontation Clause. He notes that
the government did not offer testimony from the individuals who had weighed the
substances. Thus, the weights were based on second-hand reports. Mr. Claycomb
argues that if his counsel had objected under the Confrontation Clause, the
prosecutor could not have established possession of more than 500 grams of a
substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine and cocaine. This
argument is unconvincing because the alleged omission did not prejudice Mr.
Claycomb.
In our circuit, the prosecutor need not use scientific evidence to prove the
identity of a substance. United States v. Sanchez DeFundora, 893 F.2d 1173, 1175
(10th Cir. 1990). Instead, the prosecutor may rely on lay testimony or
circumstantial evidence. Id.The prosecutor used lay testimony here to show the weights and identify the
substances as methamphetamine and cocaine. From that evidence, the jury would
likely have found (even without the expert testimony) that Mr. Claycomb
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participated in a conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams of a substance
containing methamphetamine and cocaine.
For example, one conspirator testified about “either five or six trips” to Mr.
Claycomb to buy “a half pound apiece” of methamphetamine. Tr. Trans. vol. IV at
128. Another conspirator reported that he had obtained approximately three to five
pounds of cocaine from Mr. Claycomb to distribute in Wyoming. See Tr. Trans.
vol. III at 95-96.
The prosecutor also used lay testimony to show that the substances consisted
of methamphetamine and cocaine. See, e.g., Tr. Trans. vol. III at 85, 96, 114-15,
135 (testimony from an admitted user of cocaine that the defendant had provided
him with the drug); id. at 174-75, 177-79 (testimony from an admitted
methamphetamine addict that Mr. Claycomb had provided her with the drug). And,
one witness testified that the drug ring had “regular customers” in Wyoming. Id. at
94. From this evidence, the jury likely would have concluded that the substances
were actually methamphetamine and cocaine even if defense counsel had
successfully objected to the expert testimony. See United States v. Sanchez
DeFundora, 893 F.2d 1173, 1175 (10th Cir. 1990). In these circumstances, appeal
counsel’s alleged omission did not prejudice Mr. Claycomb. Accordingly, he is not
entitled to a certificate of appealability regarding the ineffective-assistance claim
involving a failure to challenge the government’s evidence on drug quantity.
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V. Ineffective-Assistance Claim Regarding Possession of a Firearm in
Furtherance of a Drug-Trafficking Crime
Mr. Claycomb further contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective by
failing to challenge the evidence supporting the § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) count as an
improper variance from the indictment. In Mr. Claycomb’s view, the evidence did
not show use of a machine gun in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime between
August 2006 and November 2006 (as alleged in the Third Superceding Indictment).
Mr. Claycomb does not challenge the evidence that he possessed the machine gun.
Instead, he argues only that the government failed to establish possession during the
alleged period. In our view, however, the alleged omission in the appeal was not
prejudicial.
If counsel had raised the issue on direct appeal, we could have reversed only
if we found a variance that had proven fatal. See United States v. Williamson, 53
F.3d 1500, 1513 (10th Cir. 1995). Thus, for prejudice, Mr. Claycomb must show a
reasonable probability that counsel could have shown a fatal variance in the direct
appeal. See Olden v. United States, 224 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 2000) (rejecting an
ineffective-assistance claim based on the failure to establish prejudice from a
purported variance).
A variance takes place when the charge stays the same and the trial evidence
proves facts materially different from those in the indictment. Hunter v. New
Mexico, 916 F.2d 595, 598-99 (10th Cir. 1990). A variance becomes fatal only if:
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! the defendant could not have anticipated the eventual evidence at trial
or
! the conviction would not have prevented a subsequent prosecution.
United States v. Rinke, 778 F.2d 581, 590 (10th Cir. 1985). We conclude that Mr.
Claycomb has not shown a variance, much less one that is fatal.
To determine whether a variance exists, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government and give it the benefit of all reasonable
inferences. United States v. Fishman, 645 F.3d 1175, 1189 (10th Cir. 2011). This
evidence included testimony by Alan Engdahl and Detective Scott Gammon, who
indicated that Mr. Claycomb had possessed the machine gun 5-6 weeks before his
arrest on November 15, 2006. Tr. Trans. vol. IV at 122-23 (Engdahl); Tr. Trans.
vol. V at 127-28 (Gammon). If the jury had credited this testimony, it would likely
have found guilt on the charged offense because the indictment covered the 5-6
week period before the arrest.
Mr. Claycomb points to contrary evidence from other witnesses, but we must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. And, viewing the
evidence in this manner, we do not think any reasonable jurists would have expected
us to find a variance if appellate counsel had raised the issue.
Even if a variance existed, however, Mr. Claycomb has not shown that it
would be fatal. Though he argues that the evidence went beyond the time period in
the indictment, he does not suggest an inability to anticipate the eventual testimony
or a risk of future prosecution for the same acts. As a result, no reasonable jurist
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would have expected us to find a fatal variance if appellate counsel had raised the
issue.
In these circumstances, Mr. Claycomb is not entitled to a certificate of
appealability on his ineffective-assistance claim regarding the failure to appeal
based on an improper variance.
VI. Conclusion
We deny Mr. Claycomb’s application for a certificate of appealability and
dismiss this appeal.
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
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