United States v. Kuhn

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 5, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 13-6260
(D.C. No. 5:13-CR-00111-F-1)
ROGER PRESTON KUHN, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before LUCERO, O’BRIEN, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
Roger Preston Kuhn pleaded guilty to receipt of child pornography and
possession of child pornography, and received concurrent sentences of 210 months
and 120 months of imprisonment. In a plea agreement, Mr. Kuhn “knowingly and
voluntarily” waived his right to appeal “his guilty plea, sentence and restitution
imposed, and any other aspect of his conviction.” Dist. Ct. Doc. 21, at 7. As to
*
This panel has determined that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The
case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment
is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
sentence, he waived his right to appeal the “sentence as imposed by the Court and the
manner in which [it] is determined, provided [it] is within the advisory guideline
range determined by the Court to apply to this case.” Id. He further stated that “this
waiver remains in full force and effect and is enforceable, even if the Court rejects
one or more of the positions of the United States or defendant” with respect to
various offense-level adjustments. Id. He also acknowledged that the court was not
bound by the parties’ agreements or recommendations regarding the sentencing
guidelines, id. at 6, that the court had authority to impose any sentence within the
statutory maximum, id. at 6-7, and that the sentence to be imposed was within the
sole discretion of the court, id. at 9. Notwithstanding his appeal waiver, Mr. Kuhn
filed this appeal following the entry of the judgment of conviction. The government
has now moved to enforce his appeal waiver. We grant the motion.
The government’s motion demonstrates, in a facially sufficient manner, that
the waiver in the plea agreement applies to this appeal, that the waiver was knowing
and voluntary, and that there are no circumstances evident on the existing record to
suggest a miscarriage of justice. See generally United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315,
1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam) (summarizing three components of
court’s inquiry when enforcing appeal waiver). In his response, Mr. Kuhn raises
three points to circumvent the consequences of his appeal waiver.
First, he contends his waiver was not knowing and voluntary because it was
based on a misunderstanding of the relevant guideline range due to counsel’s
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underestimation of offense and criminal history levels. But erroneous guideline
predictions by counsel do not make a plea unknowing or involuntary, at least where
the defendant acknowledged he knew that the applicable guideline range could not be
predicted with certainty because it is solely within the discretion of the district court.
United States v. Silva, 430 F.3d 1096, 1099-1100 (10th Cir. 2005). That was the case
here. In addition to the pertinent provisions of the plea agreement cited above, the
plea petition recognized that the court’s exclusive discretion over the sentencing
determination meant that no one had authority to make favorable promises or
predictions as to sentencing. Pet. to Enter Plea of Guilty, at 10.
Second, Mr. Kuhn contends there is a “miscarriage of justice” exempting him
from his waiver, because the district court relied on an “impermissible factor” in
imposing sentence. See Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327 (recognizing this waiver exception).
The impermissible factor he cites is the court’s alleged reliance on unproven bad acts
in setting his offense level. Actually, although Mr. Kuhn loosely characterizes these
acts as “unproven,” he notes they are based on admissions attributed to him in police
reports (which he disavows), so his objection goes to the weight, not the absence, of
evidence supporting the court’s findings. In any event, however characterized, his
contention rests on a basic misunderstanding of the impermissible-factor exception.
We have indicated the sort of factor that could fall within this limited exception by
the illustrative phrase “such as race.” Id.; see also United States v. Salas-Garcia,
698 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2012). Nothing remotely like that is involved here.
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Rather, all we have is an unremarkable allegation that the court erred in finding
certain relevant conduct when determining the offense level. Garden variety
sentencing objections of this sort hardly involve reliance on an impermissible factor
such as race; indeed, if they did, this miscarriage-of-justice exception would exempt
from a typical appeal waiver a large portion of the objections it is clearly meant to
bar. Mr. Kuhn cites no authority for this facially untenable position.
Finally, Mr. Kuhn contends that counsel rendered ineffective assistance with
respect to negotiating the appeal waiver, referring again to counsel’s miscalculation
of the applicable offense and criminal history levels. He does not indicate that these
(unspecified) miscalculations are evidenced anywhere in the existing record, nor does
the docket reflect any effort to raise this alleged ineffective-assistance claim to the
district court. Accordingly, the claim is not available for appeal. See United States
v. Flood, 635 F.3d 1255, 1260 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting ineffective assistance claims
may be heard on direct appeal “only where the issue was raised before and ruled
upon by the district court and a sufficient factual record exists”). This rule of
unavailability applies even though the ineffective-assistance claim is invoked in an
effort to invalidate an appeal waiver under the miscarriage-of-justice exception.
See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1143-44 (10th Cir. 2005). Under such
circumstances, we properly enforce the appeal waiver on direct appeal, see id., but do
not thereby prejudice the defendant’s ability to pursue an ineffective-assistance claim
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on collateral review, see, e.g., United States v. Polly, 630 F.3d 991, 1003 (10th Cir.
2011).
The government’s motion to enforce the appeal waiver is granted and the
appeal is dismissed. This disposition is without prejudice to any motion brought by
Mr. Kuhn under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 asserting ineffective assistance of counsel.
Entered for the Court
Per Curiam
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