United States v. Prieto-Chavez

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 23, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 07-2151
v. (D. New Mexico)
ERNESTO PRIETO-CHAVEZ, (D.C. No. CR-06-2375-WJ)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant and defendant Ernesto Prieto-Chavez pled guilty to one count of
illegal reentry by an alien who had previously been deported following conviction
for an aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1), (2) and (b)(2). He
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
sought a downward departure from the Guidelines range provided by the advisory
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) (2006), and
also requested a downward variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Following his
sentencing hearing, Prieto-Chavez was sentenced to fifty-seven months’
imprisonment. He appeals, arguing his sentence is both procedurally and
substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 1996, Prieto-Chavez broke into a home in Ruidoso Downs, New Mexico,
and stole a VCR machine. He was convicted of felony residential burglary,
felony larceny, and misdemeanor criminal damage to property, for which he
received a deferred sentence and three years of probation. Approximately one
month later, Prieto-Chavez resisted, obstructed and evaded an officer, for which a
New Mexico state court sentenced him to thirty days in jail. When Prieto-Chavez
was released from jail for that offense, his residential burglary probation was
revoked and he was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. After his release
from prison, immigration authorities removed Prieto-Chavez to Mexico on
December 12, 1998.
Prieto-Chavez subsequently reentered the United States illegally, and was
found by immigration authorities in the Lincoln County, New Mexico, jail on
July 12, 2002. A federal district court sentenced him to fifteen months’
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imprisonment for illegal reentry and, upon his release, he was again removed to
Mexico on August 15, 2003.
In September 2003, while in Mexico, Prieto-Chavez was hit by a car and
suffered a broken hip or hips and legs. He has continued to experience medical
complications from that injury. Prieto-Chavez admitted he returned once again
illegally to the United States in September 2005. On July 10, 2006, Ruidoso,
New Mexico, police officers arrested Prieto-Chavez for battery and concealing his
identity. He was convicted of both state offenses, and was then turned over to
immigration authorities on the instant illegal reentry offense. As indicated above,
he subsequently pled guilty to the charge.
In preparation for sentencing, the United States Probation Office prepared a
presentence report (“PSR”). The PSR calculated that Prieto-Chavez’s base
offense level under the advisory Guidelines was eight. It then recommended an
increase of sixteen levels because Prieto-Chavez’s prior residential burglary
qualified as a crime of violence under USSG §2L1.2(b)(1)(A). The PSR further
recommended a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under USSG
§3E1.1, resulting in a total adjusted offense level of twenty-one. Prieto-Chavez
had a criminal history category V, which, combined with an offense level of
twenty-one, yielded an advisory Guidelines range of seventy to eighty-seven
months. The PSR also listed several factors which might warrant a departure
from that advisory Guidelines range. Thus, the PSR considered Prieto-Chavez’s
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cultural assimilation argument, 1 his argument about his chronic medical condition
resulting from the car accident, and whether his criminal history might be over-
stated. The PSR concluded that Prieto-Chavez’s criminal history was more
similar to a defendant in category IV than in category V, but it found no other
grounds for departure.
Prieto-Chavez filed a sentencing memorandum and motion for a sentence
varying from the Guidelines range, in which he asked for a variance based on
several factors. 2 He sought a sentence of twelve months and one day, arguing that
sentence “would comply with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) by imposing
1
Prieto-Chavez moved from Mexico to the United States when he was eight
years old, and has spent the remainder of his life thus far in the United States,
except for the periods when he was removed to Mexico. Additionally, virtually
his entire family, including siblings, lives in the United States.
2
In his sentencing memorandum and motion for a variance, Prieto-Chavez
did not actually move for any downward “departure” from the advisory
Guidelines range suggested by the PSR. In his brief on appeal, however, Prieto-
Chavez interchangeably uses the terms “downward departure” and “variance,” and
he asserts that he moved in the district court for a “downward departure” as well
as a “variance.” Departures and variances are two different things. A departure
occurs “when a court reaches a sentence above or below the recommended
Guidelines range through application of Chapters Four or Five of the Sentencing
Guidelines.” United States v. Atencio, 476 F.3d 1099, 1101 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007).
A variance occurs “[w]hen a court enhances or detracts from the recommended
range through application of § 3553(a) factors.” Id. Following United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), we continue to hold that we lack jurisdiction to
review discretionary decisions not to depart downward from a Guidelines
sentencing range. United States v. Chavez-Diaz, 444 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir.
2006). However, we retain jurisdiction to review a sentence for reasonableness,
“tak[ing] into account [the defendant’s] asserted grounds for departure” when
conducting that reasonableness review. Id.-4-
a sentence ‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the
purposes’ of sentencing set forth in the statute.” Def.’s Sent. Mem. and Mot. for
Sentence Varying from the Guideline Range at 1, R. Vol. I, tab 22 (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)). Specifically, he argued that by counting his prior felony
burglary conviction both as grounds for the sixteen-level increase in his base
offense level and as contributing to his criminal history category, the court would
impermissibly “double-count” that conviction and impose a sentence far more
than necessary to accomplish the sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He
also argued his significant medical problems stemming from the car accident
merited a downward variance, that he was not a dangerous individual, and that he
was culturally assimilated to the United States, given that he had lived in the
United States since the age of eight, he spoke fluent English, and virtually his
entire family lived in the country.
In response, the government noted that our circuit had already rejected the
double-counting argument, in United States v. Florentino, 922 F.2d 1443 (10th
Cir. 1990). The government further agreed with the PSR’s conclusion that Prieto-
Chavez’s criminal history was overstated and that he appropriately was placed in
a category IV, rather than V. The government erroneously represented to the
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court that a presumption of reasonableness attached in the district court to a
correctly-calculated within-Guidelines sentencing range. 3
At sentencing, the government reiterated its view that the district court
should apply a presumption of reasonableness to a correctly-calculated Guidelines
sentence. The government then turned to the issue of Prieto-Chavez’s medical
condition, stating “[u]nder the guidelines, under 5H1.4, I believe, it’s normally
discouraged as a factor for departure; however, I think under Booker, the Court
could still consider it, certainly, under the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C.
3553(a).” Tr. of Sentencing Proceedings at 5-6, R. Vol. III. Both defense
counsel and the prosecution acknowledged that Prieto-Chavez’s medical condition
was a “double-edged sword” in that it was likely he could get better treatment for
it in the Bureau Prisons than in Mexico, but that would mean he was not at liberty
while seeking medical care. Defense counsel then argued that Prieto-Chavez had
experienced a “significant level of cultural assimilation,” although he
acknowledged it was “maybe not one that rises to the level of requiring a
departure under the guidelines.” Id. at 7-8.
In pronouncing sentence, the district court stated as follows:
I’ve considered the . . . Presentence Report’s factual findings. I’ve
considered the sentencing guideline applications and the factors of 18
U.S.C. 3553(a)(1) through (7). Also, we took a break in the
3
As we explain more fully below, that presumption of reasonableness is an
appellate presumption, not a district court presumption. See Rita v. United States,
127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
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sentencing, and I complement and commend counsel. . . for the very
well thought out briefing, and . . . both sides made some very strong
and compelling arguments on both issues; that is, issues in favor of
the defendant and issues in favor of the government.
Now, under the law, I’m required to first arrive at a
defendant’s guideline sentence. . . .
. . . On the cultural assimilation, the problem with that is . . .
Mr. Prieto-Chavez’s case, in my view, is not out of the heartland of
cases. Certainly, a lot of individuals who have been long-time
residents of the United States and are deported based on a felony
conviction, I mean, his situation is by no means unique. And if you
start lowering the sentence because [of] the issues of cultural
assimilation for one, you have to do it for all defendants, and so I
don’t see that as a grounds for departure.
Id. at 9-10. With respect to the double-counting argument, the district court
acknowledged that Tenth Circuit precedent barred that argument, but concluded
that “to the extent that double counting is something that I feel should be
addressed, I think it should be addressed in the context of the overall reasonable
analysis that I’m required to do, reciting, relying on the sentencing factors.” Id.
at 11.
The court then turned to the sentencing factors and stated as follows:
[F]irst, the nature and circumstances of the offense and history and
characteristics of this defendant. Now, he – let me also back up to the
guidelines. I mean, [defense counsel] mentioned [Prieto-Chavez’s]
injury. It occurred in September of 2003, and we are now in 2007.
And I mean, there may be reasons that may be economic, may be lack
of ability to obtain health care, but . . . the point I’m making . . . is he
had an opportunity to have the problem addressed while he was in
Mexico, and that wasn’t done for whatever reason. . . .
Now, he may very well have come back to the United States
believing that he could get his medical issues addressed, but when he
was here . . . illegally he wasn’t caught at a border checkpoint. The
reason that this illegal reentry case was filed . . . is that he committed
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a battery in Ruidoso, in Lincoln County, and there was a battery count
and a concealing identity and new law violation. . . . I guess . . .
obviously, he’s got issues with his leg and has a medical condition,
but that didn’t stop him from committing a new law violation in
Lincoln County.
So I don’t see any grounds for departure under the guidelines
based on his medical condition, because I think [government counsel]
is correct that, if he’s going to require surgery and further medical
attention – and I’m going to recommend that he be medically
evaluated by the Bureau of Prisons as soon as possible – that is more
likely to be addressed and he’s more likely to be provided the
necessary medical care while in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons
as evidenced by the fact that . . . for the time he was in Mexico from
September of 2003 until he illegally reentered the United States, . . .
this surgical care that he claims he needs was not . . . done before
that.
Id. at 11-13. The court thus concluded that for the purpose of the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(D) sentencing factor of providing the defendant “with needed . . .
medical care . . . in the most effective manner,” Prieto-Chavez was best served
being sent to the Bureau of Prisons. Id. at 13.
Returning to Prieto-Chavez’s criminal history and the nature and
characteristics of the defendant, as § 3553(a) requires, the court explained that the
sixteen-level increase in his base offense level was “because he has a conviction
for residential burglary,” id., and “everyone who’s convicted of a residential
burglary under the guidelines on an illegal reentry gets that 16-level increase
because the guidelines treat it as a crime of violence.” Id. at 14. The court then
reviewed his criminal history, including his several prior illegal reentries into the
United States, and noted that “although I lowered his criminal history score based
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on overrepresentation, certainly an argument could be made that that should not
have been done because he had prior convictions for which he received no
criminal history points.” Id. at 15. The court concluded by observing that “his
criminal history, in my view, shows that he does not have respect for United
States law because we’re seeing multiple illegal reentries after deportation on an
offense constituting an aggravated felony.” Id.
At this point, the court stated that it agreed with the government that
“basically there is a presumption of reasonableness that attaches to a correctly
calculated guideline sentence,” that the advisory Guidelines sentencing range was
reasonable and that “the presumption of reasonableness has not been overcome by
the defendant for the reasons that I have stated.” Id. at 16. The court therefore
imposed a sentence of fifty-seven months, at the low end of the advisory
Guidelines range.
Prieto-Chavez appeals, arguing: (1) “the court erred in applying the
advisory guidelines as if they were still mandatory, contrary to Booker and
§ 3553(a)”; (2) the court erred “when it sought to craft a sentence that was
‘reasonable,’ instead of one that was ‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary,’
to comply with the purposes of sentencing”; and (3) the sentence imposed was
substantively unreasonable. Appellant’s Br. at 10-11.
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DISCUSSION
“When reviewing a sentencing challenge, we evaluate sentences imposed
by the district court for reasonableness.” United States v. Conlan, 500 F.3d 1167,
1169 (10th Cir. 2007). “Reasonableness has both procedural and substantive
components.” United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 591 (10th Cir. 2006).
“Procedural reasonableness involves using the proper method to calculate the
sentence.” Conlan, 500 F.3d at 1169. “Substantive reasonableness involves
whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the
case in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. (citing United
States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1053 (10th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)). A properly
calculated Guidelines sentence is entitled to a presumption of reasonableness at
the appellate level.
I. Did the district court treat the Guidelines as mandatory?
Prieto-Chavez first argues the district court treated the Guidelines as
mandatory, in violation of the Supreme Court’s directive in Booker. He argues
the court demonstrated this by initially finding that his case was not outside of the
“heartland,” and that finding “dictated the remainder of the court’s analysis, in
which it failed to look beyond the guidelines to determine what sentence was
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, for Mr. Chavez-Prieto based on the
statutory sentencing considerations in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Appellant’s Br. at
13-14.
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We faced an identical argument in the recent case of United States v.
Galarza-Payan, 441 F.3d 885 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 434 (2006). As
we explained,
The term “heartland” has its origins in the Guidelines’ policy
statements. The Guidelines instructed courts not to depart from a
sentencing range absent unusual circumstances. The reason for this
was that departures outside the applicable range were intended for
extraordinary cases that, because of a combination of such
characteristics or circumstances, differ significantly from the
heartland cases covered by the Guidelines. Courts used this
terminology as a shorthand way of analyzing whether particular
defendants qualified for a downward or upward departure under the
Guidelines.
Id. at 888 (internal quotations and alterations omitted). As in Galarza-Payan, in
this case “the district court, while using pre-Booker terminology, did not sentence
[the defendant] in a mandatory fashion.” Id. Rather, the record makes clear, as
the excerpts above demonstrate, that the district court understood its discretion
and followed the § 3553(a) factors in sentencing Prieto-Chavez. “Even in the
post-Booker legal landscape, we can expect judges to employ the familiar
terminology of the Guidelines.” Id. 4
4
As indicated above, however, to the extent that Prieto-Chavez attempts to
appeal from the district court’s discretionary decision not to depart downward
when calculating the Guidelines sentence, we lack jurisdiction to review that
claim. But we may still review the sentence, and any reasons proffered for
departure, when we conduct our reasonableness review.
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II. Did the district court err in applying a presumption of
reasonableness to the Guidelines sentence or otherwise fail
to properly apply the § 3553(a) factors?
Prieto-Chavez next argues that the district court’s sentencing decision was
procedurally defective in that it required him to “rebut a presumption of
reasonableness of a guideline sentence before it would consider a below-guideline
variance.” Appellant’s Br. at 21. He also argues the district court failed to seek a
sentence that was “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to effectuate the
purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
The district court, as well as the government, referred at several points to a
presumption of reasonableness of a within-Guidelines sentence, and the court
noted that Prieto-Chavez had failed to rebut that presumption. This was an error.
Prior to the district court’s sentencing proceeding in this case, our court had
suggested that a district court errs when it applies the appellate presumption of
reasonableness to the advisory Guidelines when sentencing. United States v.
Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 977 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 32 (U.S.
Sept. 25, 2007) (No. 06-11543); see also Conlan, 500 F.3d at 1169 (noting that in
Begay, “we held it was error for the district court to apply the appellate
presumption of reasonableness to the advisory guidelines when sentencing,” and
that “[t]his decision was recently validated, although not specifically mentioned,
in Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).”). As we acknowledged in
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Conlan, “Rita thus makes clear that the presumption of reasonableness applies
only at the appellate level.” Conlan, 500 F.3d at 1169.
Prieto-Chavez did not, however, object to the district court’s application of
a presumption of reasonableness. Ordinarily, we review such an unobjected-to
error for plain error. See Begay, 470 F.3d at 976; see also Conlan, 500 F.3d at
1169-70 (considering whether to apply plain error review to similar claim, but
concluding that the defendant in that case had adequately preserved the issue at
sentencing). In two unpublished cases we have applied plain error. United States
v. Esparza-Estrada, No. 07-2037, 2007 WL 3194849, at *3-4 (10th Cir. Oct. 25,
2007) (unpublished); United States v. Chaheine, No. 07-2052, 2007 WL 2561822,
at *2 (10th Cir. Sept. 5, 2007). However, in Begay itself, although
acknowledging that plain error would be the normal standard of review, we
concluded that there was no reason for the defendant in that case to anticipate that
the district court would adopt such a “novel interpretation of Booker.” Begay,
470 F.3d at 976. We therefore excused the defendant’s failure to object and
reviewed for harmless error.
In another unpublished case, we also excused the defendant’s failure to
object to the district court’s use of a presumption of reasonableness for a
Guidelines sentence, on the ground that our decision in Begay, making it clear
that it was error for the district court to apply a presumption of reasonableness at
sentencing, was not issued until a month after the defendant’s sentencing. United
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States v. Beltran-Lopez, No. 06-1530, 2007 WL 3226460, at * 4 (10th Cir.
Oct. 31, 2007) (unpublished) (“There was no reason, before this court’s Begay
decision, for [the defendant] to have objected to the district court’s reference to
the advisory guideline range as the ‘presumptive imprisonment range.’”).
In this case, by contrast, Begay had been decided some five months prior to
Prieto-Chavez’s sentencing proceeding. On the other hand, neither the
government nor the district court were aware that it was erroneous for the district
court to apply a presumption of reasonableness to a Guidelines sentence. We
therefore analyze the effect of the district court’s error under the plain error
standard, on the assumption that Prieto-Chavez failed to raise the error, and under
a harmless error standard, on the assumption that we forgive that failure. 5
Under a review for plain error, Prieto-Chavez must demonstrate that “there
is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4)
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Begay, 470 F.3d at 976 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta,
5
We feel comfortable reviewing the district court’s error under both
standards in part because a review of our caselaw both prior to and after Rita
indicates that there was some confusion about the propriety of a district court’s
application of a presumption of reasonableness to a Guidelines sentence. See,
e.g., United States v. Angel-Guzman, 506 F.3d 1007, 1016 (10th Cir. 2007)
(noting that prior to Rita, “some district judges in the Circuit interpreted our
caselaw as embracing a presumption of reasonableness at the sentencing court
level, as well [as on appeal]”).
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403 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc)). Prieto-Chavez fails to meet the
third prong.
As the record and the excerpts above demonstrate, while the district court
certainly stated that a presumption applied and Prieto-Chavez had failed to rebut
it, it is clear that the court considered all the § 3553(a) factors and evaluated
whether to impose a sentence outside of (lower than) the advisory Guidelines
range. Ultimately, those § 3553(a) factors, particularly Prieto-Chavez’s criminal
history, the fact that he would receive better medical care were he to be in the
custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a sufficient time to treat his medical
condition, the fact that his cultural assimilation argument was not unique in any
way, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been convicted of similar crimes (in this case
illegal reentry after prior deportation following an aggravated felony conviction),
convinced the district court that a reasonable sentence was one at the bottom of
the advisory Guidelines range. The district court conducted exactly the kind of
review of the § 3553(a) factors, as applied to Prieto-Chavez’s particular situation,
as is required under the advisory Guidelines system. There is no indication that,
even without a presumption of reasonableness, the district court would have
selected a lower sentence as reasonable for Prieto-Chavez. We accordingly
conclude Prieto-Chavez has failed to demonstrate that the district court’s error
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about a presumption affected his substantial rights, or that the district court erred
in any other way in its analysis of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.
Under a harmless error standard of review, “the United States has the
burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the district court’s error
did not affect the court’s selection of the sentence imposed.” Conlan, 500 F.3d at
1170. We conclude that the government has met that burden. As our discussion
above indicates, the record makes it clear that, even though the court sentenced
Prieto-Chavez at the low end of the advisory Guidelines range, the error did not
affect the court’s selection of the sentence imposed. 6
III. Was the sentence imposed substantively reasonable?
Having determined that Prieto-Chavez’s within-Guidelines sentence was
properly calculated, we finally consider whether the fifty-seven month sentence
imposed in this case was substantively reasonable. That sentence is, on appeal,
accorded a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. As the Supreme Court has
recently confirmed, this amounts to a review “under an abuse-of-discretion
standard.” Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). In this case, the
district court thoroughly and carefully supported its sentencing decision,
6
In so concluding, we, of course, by no means suggest that the plain error
and the harmless error standards are the same. Indeed, as explained above, for
example, the burden of proof is placed on different parties in each test, and each
test has a different focus. In this case, the record makes it clear that Prieto-
Chavez did not meet his burden of establishing that the district court’s error
affected his substantial rights, and, alternatively, the government met its burden
of showing that the error was harmless.
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explaining how the decision was consistent with the § 3553(a) factors. The court
specifically addressed all the arguments made by both sides regarding an
appropriate sentence. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion and
that the fifty-seven month sentence imposed was reasonable.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the sentence in this case is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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