Hess v. Trammell

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 23, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
DARYL A. HESS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
Nos. 13-5091, 13-5092 & 13-5093
v.
(D.C. Nos. 4:10-CV-00435-GKF- TLW,
4:10-CV-00462-CVE-FHM &
ANITA TRAMMELL, Warden,
4:10-CV-00517-CVE-FHM)
(N.D. Okla.)
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before HARTZ, O’BRIEN, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Daryl Hess seeks release from the Oklahoma prison where he is serving
sentences for three armed robbery convictions. He argues his convictions are
attributable to ineffective assistance from his trial and appellate attorneys and
various other constitutional violations besides. The district court thoroughly
addressed those arguments in three separate opinions and concluded that they
didn’t meet the requirements for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The
district court also denied Mr. Hess’s three separate requests for a certificate of
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
appealability (COA). He now requests them from us so that he may pursue his
challenges to the district court’s rulings. Separately, he asks us to find fault with
the district court’s decisions refusing to appoint counsel for him in these habeas
proceedings and to reconsider our own refusal to appoint counsel on appeal.
Mr. Hess is entitled to a COA only if he makes a “substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). And he can do that
only by showing that reasonable jurists could debate (or agree on) a different
resolution of the habeas petition or the merit of further proceedings. Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Having fully considered all of his many
arguments, we agree with the district court that he hasn’t met this standard.
The first constitutional right Mr. Hess says he was denied is his due process
right not to plead guilty while incompetent. To enter a guilty plea competently, a
criminal defendant must have a rational understanding of the proceedings against
him and the ability to consult with his attorney. Allen v. Mullin, 368 F.3d 1220,
1238-39 (10th Cir. 2004). The record here contains no evidence suggesting this
standard wasn’t met. Mr. Hess says he suffers from a mental illness and this
precluded him from entering a rational guilty plea. Even assuming he does suffer
from some mental infirmity, however, this court has held a defendant’s mental
illness — standing alone, without more — doesn’t necessarily prove he pleaded
guilty without adequate understanding. Gonzales v. Tafoya, 515 F.3d 1097, 1118
(10th Cir. 2008). Neither can we agree with Mr. Hess that he has presented
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anything more in this case. The plea colloquy was thorough, inquired into mental
health questions and Mr. Hess’s ability to consult with counsel about potential
lines of defense and alternatives to his guilty plea. In a prior trial, he was found
competent to stand trial. Simply put, there’s nothing in this record to raise doubts
that Mr. Hess was legally competent at the time of his plea. Because the record
raises no such doubts, the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing on the
issue was not an error either. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1399
(2011) (“[W]hen the state-court record ‘precludes habeas relief’ under the
limitations of § 2254(d), a district court is ‘not required to hold an evidentiary
hearing.’” (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007))).
Mr. Hess also argues that his attorneys provided ineffective assistance. To
prevail on this claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney’s
performance was deficient and that the deficiency was prejudicial. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). After our own independent review of the
record, we agree with the district court that reasonable jurists couldn’t debate
whether these requirements are met in this case.
Many of Mr. Hess’s arguments fail to identify any constitutional deficiency
in his attorneys’ conduct. For example, he claims his trial counsel and one of his
alleged victims were friends, but there is no indication that’s true other than Mr.
Hess’s post-conviction insistence that his attorney once told him so. To the
contrary, the trial transcript reveals that Mr. Hess’s attorney and the alleged
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victim recognized each other simply because the latter had previously worked in
the courthouse as a bailiff. Other of Mr. Hess’s ineffective assistance arguments
fail under the second Strickland requirement: they don’t demonstrate a
reasonable probability of a different outcome for Mr. Hess even assuming they
identify genuine errors. Consider trial counsel’s purported error in not objecting
to the prosecutor’s commentaries on Mr. Hess’s neck tattoo and what it might
suggest about his personality. In view of the considerable evidence of guilt
before the jury, it isn’t plausible that the outcome of the trial turned on the silence
of his attorney during the prosecutor’s remarks.
The district court found that a number of Mr. Hess’s arguments were
procedurally barred because he hadn’t made them on direct appeal from his
convictions. He responds by faulting an ineffective appellate counsel for
choosing not to do so. Because we, like the district court, find neither of his
attorneys constitutionally ineffective, we cannot agree (as we would have to) that
the district court’s procedural ruling was debatably incorrect. See Slack, 529 U.S.
at 484. Neither can we issue a COA because the district court erroneously barred
his ineffective assistance of counsel claims — because the district court didn’t bar
those claims.
In sum, neither these nor Mr. Hess’s other arguments convince us that the
district court’s denial of his habeas petitions was debatably incorrect or that the
issues he raises merit further proceedings. We also find no error in the district
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court’s decision not to appoint counsel, which was within its sound discretion
here. See Engberg v. Wyoming, 265 F.3d 1109, 1122 (10th Cir. 2001). And we
likewise deny his motions to reconsider our own decisions not to appoint counsel
on appeal. Mr. Hess’s COA applications are denied and these appeals are
dismissed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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