Jaiyeola v. Garmin International

Appellate Case: 21-3114 Document: 010110675839 Date Filed: 04/26/2022 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 26, 2022
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
GANIYU AYINLA JAIYEOLA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. Nos. 21-3114 & 21-3169
(D.C. No. 2:20-CV-02068-HLT-JPO)
GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC., (D. Kan.)
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before BACHARACH, BRISCOE, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
In these combined appeals, Ganiyu Ayinla Jaiyeola appeals (1) the district
court’s final judgment dismissing his action with prejudice as a sanction for his
abusive litigation conduct and (2) the district court’s order denying for lack of
jurisdiction motions filed after the notice of appeal of the final judgment. Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm in each appeal.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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I. Background1
A. The show cause order
Mr. Jaiyeola brought an action against Garmin International, Inc., asserting
Garmin’s failure to hire him was discriminatory.2 After a year of the parties
attempting to proceed through the early litigation stages, the assigned magistrate
judge determined that efforts to effectively and fairly manage the case had been
unsuccessful due to Mr. Jaiyeola’s litigation conduct. That conduct included making
unsubstantiated claims of fraud and bad faith by defense counsel and requesting
sanctions for that alleged conduct;3 seeking, without good cause or success,
reconsideration and/or district court review of nearly every discretionary decision the
magistrate judge had made; and filing two unsuccessful motions to disqualify the
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the record or an appendix are to
those in appeal No. 21-3114.
2
Mr. Jaiyeola has represented himself throughout this litigation. We therefore
construe his pro se filings liberally, but we may not act as his advocate. See Yang v.
Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
3
Mr. Jaiyeola believed counsel committed fraud on the court in two ways.
First, in Garmin’s answer, counsel described the job he applied for as “Advanced
Materials Engineer – Plastics and Metals,” R., Vol. I at 268 (emphasis added)
(boldface omitted), rather than, as Mr. Jaiyeola described it, “Advanced Materials
Engineer – Metals,” id. at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Jaiyeola
claimed this was fraud on the court because it was an attempt to show he was not
qualified for the position. See, e.g., id. at 316-17. Second, Mr. Jaiyeola alleged that
counsel lied in another filing when she included an email she wrote to him
summarizing a telephone call during which Mr. Jaiyeola allegedly made derogatory
comments to her, stated he would be filing an ethics complaint against her,
and indicated she would be disbarred. See R., Vol. II at 26.
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magistrate judge. Concluding that Mr. Jaiyeola was “abusing the judicial process,”
the magistrate judge ordered him to show cause why the case should not “be
dismissed as a sanction for his abusive litigation tactics” and why he should not be
required to reimburse Garmin for “attorney fees and expenses incurred in response to
his frivolous filings.” R., Vol. II at 252. The magistrate judge also vacated the
scheduling order.
B. Filings leading up to the June 9 status conference
Mr. Jaiyeola did not directly respond to the show cause order. Instead, he filed
a motion for certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and a stay (ECF No. 1084) so he
could appeal the show cause order to this court. On April 14, 2021, seeking to
“manage expectations” and “set the tone for this case going forward,” R., Vol. II
at 927 (internal quotation marks omitted), the district court set an in-person status
conference on the show cause order and the § 1292(b) motion in Kansas City (ECF
No. 112). Mr. Jaiyeola moved for reconsideration (ECF No. 113), primarily arguing
he could not attend the hearing because of the COVID-19 epidemic and the fact that
he resides in Michigan. He also requested recusal of the magistrate judge. The
district judge set a telephonic hearing on the motion for reconsideration and recusal,
and she ordered expedited briefing (ECF No. 115). Mr. Jaiyeola then filed a motion
4
We identify the many different motions discussed in the remainder of our
decision by reference to the Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) number on the district
court’s docket. Although we omit reference to the separate memoranda Mr. Jaiyeola
filed in support of his motions, we have reviewed those memoranda.
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to appoint a special master to decide the show cause order and his motion for
reconsideration (ECF No. 117).5
Just minutes before the telephonic hearing, however, Mr. Jaiyeola filed his
third motion to disqualify the magistrate judge (ECF No. 120). The district judge
held the telephonic hearing and denied the motion for reconsideration of the order
setting the status conference and the incorporated request for recusal of the
magistrate judge (ECF Nos. 122 (minute entry), 134 (transcript)). The court stated it
would consider filing restrictions if either party continued to file multiple motions on
repetitive issues. See R., Vol. III at 20-21.
Mr. Jaiyeola immediately filed a notice of appeal from that ruling (ECF
No. 123). The same day, the district court referred ECF No. 120 to the magistrate
judge (ECF No. 125). Soon thereafter, and because of the appeal, the district court
cancelled the status conference (ECF No. 127). While the appeal was pending,
Mr. Jaiyeola filed a motion for a scheduling order (ECF No. 130) and a motion for
(1) reconsideration of the referral of ECF No. 120 and (2) recusal of the district judge
based on the referral (ECF No. 128).
A panel of this court dismissed the appeal because the order denying the
motion for reconsideration was not final or immediately appealable, see R., Vol. II
at 490-91. After that dismissal, the district court reset the status conference for
5
Mr. Jaiyeola “believe[d]” the district judge had a “conflict regarding the
issues” because, by summarizing some of the district judge’s rulings, the magistrate
judge had made her “a witness” regarding the issues raised in the show cause order.
R., Vol. II at 387.
4
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June 9, 2021 (ECF No. 137). The next day, Mr. Jaiyeola sought reconsideration of
that setting, vacatur of the referral of his third disqualification motion, and a ruling
on his pending requests to disqualify or recuse the district and magistrate judges
(ECF No. 138). The district court vacated the referral, denied the third motion to
disqualify, denied the request that the district judge recuse, declined to reschedule the
status conference, and ordered the parties to attend that hearing (ECF No. 140).
Thereafter, Mr. Jaiyeola filed (1) a motion to vacate the show cause order
(ECF No. 141); (2) a motion, soon amended, to continue the June 9 hearing until
after briefing on his motion for a scheduling order could be completed so that motion
could be considered at the hearing (ECF Nos. 146, 149); and (3) a motion for
reconsideration of ECF No. 140 (ECF No. 147). The district court did not rule on the
motion to vacate the show cause order, but it denied the other two motions (ECF
No. 150). The court warned that future filings related to the June 9 hearing would
likely result in a $200 sanction. Shortly before that order was entered, Mr. Jaiyeola
had filed another motion to continue the hearing (ECF No. 151), which the district
court separately denied (ECF No. 153).
Next, the day before the June 9 hearing, Mr. Jaiyeola filed a petition for a writ
of mandamus with this court, seeking disqualification of the district and magistrate
judges, vacatur of the show cause order, and appointment of a special master. A
panel of this court denied the petition on June 28, 2021.
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C. The June 9 status conference
Meanwhile, the district court held the status conference on June 9. The
magistrate judge attended. At the outset, Mr. Jaiyeola objected that his pending
mandamus action divested the district court of jurisdiction. The district court
overruled that objection, explaining that “[a]bsent a stay by the Tenth Circuit, the
filing of a petition for mandamus does not divest the district court of jurisdiction.”
Aplee. Suppl. App. at 58 (citing Moore v. Busby, 92 F. App’x 699, 702 (10th Cir.
2004)). At the conclusion of the conference, the court took matters under
advisement. By minute order (ECF No. 157), the court denied Mr. Jaiyeola’s
motions for § 1292(b) certification and for appointment of a special master.
D. Filings after the in-person hearing
While the court considered the pending matters, Mr. Jaiyeola filed an objection
to the magistrate judge’s presence at the hearing (ECF No. 158). He alleged that the
magistrate judge, who sat in the jury box, created a hostile environment by “glaring
at” Mr. Jaiyeola and moving closer to him during the hearing. R., Vol. II at 911.
Mr. Jaiyeola also filed a response (ECF No. 160) to Garmin’s motion for an
extension of time to file its response to the motion for a scheduling order until after
the district court ruled on the show cause order. He asked the court to sanction
Garmin and its counsel for filing the request, which he characterized as frivolous and
in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, by granting summary judgment in his favor and
imposing sanctions against defense counsel. The magistrate judge granted the
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extension of time and declined to sanction Garmin (ECF No. 161). Mr. Jaiyeola filed
a notice of appeal from the magistrate judge’s order (ECF No. 162).
E. The district court’s “final chance” ruling
On June 18, while the appeal was pending, the district court issued a 36-page
ruling (ECF No. 165). The court first determined that the magistrate judge’s order
granting Garmin’s motion for an extension of time and declining Mr. Jaiyeola’s
request for sanctions was an unappealable interlocutory order, and therefore
Mr. Jaiyeola’s notice of appeal was frivolous and deficient; accordingly, the notice
did not divest the district court of jurisdiction. This court in fact dismissed the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction on July 6, 2021, because the magistrate judge’s order
was not final or otherwise appealable. See Aplee. Suppl. App. at 51-53 (ECF
No. 180).
The district court also determined that Mr. Jaiyeola had (1) never shown cause
in writing why his case should not be dismissed; (2) made repetitive, frivolous, and
abusive filings, including motions for recusal and motions for reconsideration;
(3) made repeated, unsubstantiated misconduct allegations against the court and
defense counsel; (4) resisted or obstructed nearly every effort by the court to manage
the case and showed disrespect leading up to and during the June 9 hearing; and
(5) had engaged in similar conduct in other cases. Regarding Mr. Jaiyeola’s
objection to the magistrate judge’s presence at the hearing, the court specifically
found that “at no time did [the magistrate judge] glare at [Mr. Jaiyeola], in a hostile
manner or otherwise,” and that the magistrate judge “always remained on the
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opposite side of the courtroom from [Mr. Jaiyeola].” R., Vol. II at 940. The court
concluded that Mr. Jaiyeola’s “objection simply reflects [his] continued and
unfounded attempt to baselessly attack a member of the judiciary.” Id. at 941.
Consequently, the district court found that the show cause order was
warranted, denied the motion to vacate that order, and denied a motion to sanction
defense counsel Mr. Jaiyeola had filed (ECF No. 103) just prior to the show cause
order. The court also overruled Mr. Jaiyeola’s objections to an order of the
magistrate judge (ECF No. 97) denying his motion to compel discovery of documents
Garmin claimed were subject to attorney client privilege (ECF No. 62). But rather
than dismiss the case as a sanction, the district court gave Mr. Jaiyeola “a final
chance” by allowing the case to continue with several restrictions and conditions. Id.
at 949. Chief among those were: (1) either party could “notice up to two additional
depositions” but could show that additional depositions were warranted by filing “an
appropriate and targeted motion”; (2) Mr. Jaiyeola’s filing of any further motions the
district court “denied and deemed frivolous” would “result in at least a $200
monetary sanction but may include additional sanctions, including dismissal with
prejudice”; (3) “[r]equests to disqualify either the [district judge] or [the magistrate
judge would] be deemed frivolous if based on similar allegations as his previous
motions or if sought simply because [Mr. Jaiyeola] disagrees with court orders”;
(4) “[u]nwarranted or rote motions for reconsideration or review that fail to set forth
valid grounds for reconsideration or review, and which are subsequently denied,
[would] be deemed frivolous”; and (5) “any other repetitive, abusive, or vexatious
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motion . . . may result in additional sanctions, including . . . dismissal with
prejudice.” Id. at 950-51. The court “strongly cautioned” Mr. Jaiyeola “that failure
to abide by these sanctions and follow these orders [would] likely result in the
imposition of additional sanctions, including dismissal of this case with prejudice
and without further notice.” Id. at 951.
F. Dismissal of the case
Despite these warnings, and on the next business day after the June 18 order,
Mr. Jaiyeola filed a motion to disqualify both judges, repeating his allegations that
the magistrate judge harassed and threatened him during the June 9 conference and
that the district judge had enabled and encouraged the magistrate judge’s presence
and actions (ECF No. 167). Mr. Jaiyeola also reiterated his previously rejected
misconduct claims against the magistrate judge. Two days later, he filed a motion to
depose twelve additional witnesses (ECF No. 169).
The district court denied the motion to disqualify and deemed it frivolous
given the court’s related findings in its June 18 order. And it considered the motion
for twelve additional depositions a reflection of Mr. Jaiyeola’s “clear intent . . . to not
abide by the Court’s limitations going forward and to continue his aggressive and
vexatious litigation behavior,” id. at 1028, because the motion was not “targeted,” as
the June 18 order required, see id. at 950, but was based solely on the fact that
Mr. Jaiyeola had designated the individuals as witnesses in his initial disclosures.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the case with prejudice as a sanction under Rule 11
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because the motions violated “the letter and spirit of the June 18 order,” id. at 1028.
The court denied the motion to depose an additional twelve witnesses as moot.
Mr. Jaiyeola appealed the judgment of dismissal, giving rise to appeal
No. 21-3114. Soon thereafter he made a series of filings in the district court6 seeking
reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s order (ECF No. 161) granting Garmin’s
motion for an extension of time to file a response to Mr. Jaiyeola’s motion for a
scheduling order. The district court denied the motions without prejudice for lack of
jurisdiction because they concerned more than collateral matters, and the appeal from
the final judgment divested it of jurisdiction over non-collateral matters
(ECF No. 193). Mr. Jaiyeola appealed that ruling, giving rise to appeal No. 21-3169.
II. Discussion
A. Appeal No. 21-3114
1. Argument concerning the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction
Because subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue, see Lang v. Lang
(In re Lang), 414 F.3d 1191, 1195 (10th Cir. 2005), we begin our discussion with the
final argument in Mr. Jaiyeola’s opening brief—that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to hold a hearing and rule on the show cause order and the motion
to appoint a special master. Mr. Jaiyeola argues this is so because, a day before the
June 9 hearing, he filed a petition for a writ of mandamus concerning those two
matters, and “a mandamus petition is a notice of appeal.” Aplt. Opening Br.
6
ECF Nos. 182 (motion for reconsideration), 184 (motion to withdraw ECF
No. 182), 185 (motion for reconsideration).
10
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at 61-62. In support, he cites In re Dummar, No. 07-4185 (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 2007)
(unpublished) (order denying mandamus petition). This argument is frivolous. What
we said in Dummar was that “[w]e have on occasion construed a mandamus petition
as a notice of appeal.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added). In support, we cited United States
v. Gundersen, 978 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1992). In Gunderson, we explained that
although a mandamus petition generally may not be a substitute for an appeal,
id. at 582, such a petition could be construed as a notice of appeal when necessary to
preserve the right to appeal an appealable order, see id. at 583-84. But nothing in
Mr. Jaiyeola’s mandamus petition suggested he was seeking to appeal; instead, he
clearly sought mandamus relief—disqualification of the magistrate and district
judges, vacatur of the show cause order, and appointment of a special master. Nor
was the show cause order or the denial of the motion to appoint a special master final
or immediately appealable rulings. Thus, even if the mandamus petition could be
construed as a notice of appeal, it did not divest the district court of jurisdiction. See
Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 340-41 (10th Cir. 1976) (“If the
notice of appeal is deficient by reason of . . . reference to a non-appealable order, . . .
the district court may ignore it and proceed with the case.”).
2. Arguments concerning dismissal
We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s dismissal of an
action with prejudice as a sanction for abusive litigation conduct. See King v.
Fleming, 899 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2018) (setting out standard of review). The
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district court applied the five factors that guide courts in determining whether
dismissal with prejudice is a proper sanction:
(1) the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant caused by the
misconduct; (2) the amount of interference with the judicial process; (3) the
culpability of the litigant; (4) whether the court warned the litigant in
advance that dismissal of the action would be a likely sanction for
noncompliance; and (5) the efficacy of lesser sanctions.
Id. at 1150 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). And having reviewed
the district court record, we conclude that Mr. Jaiyeola has not shown the district
court abused its discretion in determining that test was met.
Mr. Jaiyeola does not appear to address the district court’s finding on the first,
fourth, or fifth factors. But regardless of any briefing failure, we see no abuse of
discretion as to those factors. His arguments instead appear to primarily target the
second and third factors.7
For the second factor, the district court found Mr. Jaiyeola interfered with the
judicial process based on his repetitive, frivolous, and abusive filings, particularly
after the court first set the in-person hearing,8 and even more particularly after the
7
In many of his arguments, Mr. Jaiyeola takes issue with the substance of
rulings on motions he filed, complaining that in several instances the district court
abused its discretion by failing to explain its reasoning for denying a motion. We
reject his argument that the district court failed to adequately explain its reasoning
for rulings in ECF Nos. 100, 103, 108, and 117. The district court’s reasoning for its
rulings against Mr. Jaiyeola on those motions can be found at R., Vol. II at 954-55;
id. at 938-39; Aplee. Suppl. App. at 70-72; and id. at 60-62, respectively.
8
In its dismissal order, the district court incorporated the discussion of
Mr. Jaiyeola’s litigation conduct and the five factors it had provided in its “final
chance” order. In that order, the court aptly noted that “[a]n order setting a hearing
in a case with contested issues is generally unremarkable. But in this case, it
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court issued the “final chance” ruling. For the third factor, the district court found
Mr. Jaiyeola culpable because his litigation conduct was the primary cause of
difficulties in the case, many of his filings occurred after he was sanctioned for
similar conduct in a case in another jurisdiction, and he lacked remorse for his
conduct, including by refusing to acknowledge at the June 9 hearing that he had filed
any repetitive or frivolous motions.
We see no abuse of discretion as to either factor. Mr. Jaiyeola’s assertion that
he never filed anything repetitious is belied by the record. And he misses the mark in
arguing that because neither the magistrate judge nor the district judge ever denied a
motion as frivolous, he never filed anything that was frivolous. In its “final chance”
ruling, the district court identified a number of filings it characterized as frivolous.
See R., Vol. II at 920 n.2 (referring to notice of appeal of order that granted Garmin’s
motion for extension of time and denied Mr. Jaiyeola’s request for sanctions as
frivolous); id. at 926 (discussing show cause order, where the magistrate judge found
Mr. Jaiyeola had “made numerous frivolous filings, including seeking
reconsideration or review (or both) of nearly every order, despite those rulings being
largely discretionary” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 935 (listing motions,
and requests embedded in other motions, to recuse magistrate judge as examples of
frivolous filings); id. at 945-46 (discussing the “mostly frivolous” filings
Mr. Jaiyeola made after the initial setting of the status conference). And in its
spawned a telephone conference, eleven motions, an interlocutory appeal, and a
petition for mandamus.” R., Vol. II at 939.
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dismissal order, the court found frivolous his final motion to disqualify the magistrate
and district judges.
Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in finding that Mr. Jaiyeola
“file[d] motions or appeals or [took] other actions to improperly and unilaterally
manipulate the schedule in this case,” id. at 936; that his misconduct allegations
against the court and defense counsel were unfounded; and that his conduct leading
up to and during the June 9 hearing “was disrespectful,” and he was “unrepentant for
this behavior,” id. at 939. We acknowledge Mr. Jaiyeola’s argument that he had to
file objections with the district court to preserve appellate review of the magistrate
judge’s non-dispositive rulings. See Sinclair Wyo. Refin. Co. v. A & B Builders, Ltd.,
989 F.3d 747, 781-83 & n.23 (10th Cir. 2021) (explaining that this court’s “firm
waiver rule,” under which “a party who fails to make a timely objection to [a]
magistrate judge’s ruling waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions”
unless an exception applies, is applicable “when a party fails to object to a magistrate
judge’s non-dispositive ruling” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)).
That, however, does not lead us to conclude that the district court exceeded its
discretion in finding Mr. Jaiyeola abused that process by “fail[ing] to apply the
appropriate deferential” standard of review; asserting “the underlying decision was
clearly erroneous or contrary to law, but never point[ing] to any evidence supporting
this conclusion”;9 often making “little to no effort to actually apply the standard he
9
When a litigant objects to a magistrate judge’s non-dispositive order, the
standard of review is whether the order is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”
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recites”; and making “demands for relief [that] are generally just conclusory.” R.,
Vol. II at 936.
Mr. Jaiyeola argues that the district court violated Federal Rule of Evidence
201(b)(2) by taking judicial notice of his conduct in other cases when considering
whether dismissal with prejudice was an appropriate sanction. That rule permits a
court to “judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it
. . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Mr. Jaiyeola argues the district
court violated the rule because the nature of his conduct in his other cases is subject
to reasonable dispute. However, the district court expressly did not “opine of the
propriety of any order or ruling in [the] underlying cases” and instead relied on
Mr. Jaiyeola’s conduct in those cases only because it “demonstrate[d] that [his]
conduct in this case is not an aberration.” R., Vol. II at 943. We see no
Rule 201(b)(2) violation. Even if there were, it would not materially alter our
conclusion that the district court did not abuse its discretion in evaluating the five
King factors and dismissing this case with prejudice as a sanction.
3. Arguments about recusal and sanctions
To the extent Mr. Jaiyeola persists in arguing that the magistrate and district
judges were biased against him and should have recused, we disagree. His argument
is based on adverse rulings the district court characterized—correctly, in our view—
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458,
1461-62 (10th Cir. 1988).
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as including “even fairly benign or procedural rulings,” id. at 1026, and on remarks
the magistrate judge made at a scheduling conference and in some rulings. But
“judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
motion,” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994), and we do not see how
they do here. Further, none of the magistrate judge’s remarks “reveal[ed] an opinion
that derive[d] from an extrajudicial source,” which can support a claim of bias, or
displayed the “high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment
impossible” that will support a bias claim. Id. Rather, the remarks at the scheduling
conference were merely an effort to educate a pro se litigant concerning the
management of the case, including the potential costs involved in pursuing certain
types of discovery, especially depositions. And the magistrate judge’s other remarks
were, at most, “expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even
anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after
having been confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display.” Id. at 555-56; see also
id. at 556 (“A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and
short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—remain
immune [from claims of improper bias].”).
Mr. Jaiyeola also asks us to sanction Garmin and its counsel, as a matter of
fraud on the court, for misstating in its answer to the complaint the title of the
position for which Mr. Jaiyeola applied. This request is frivolous, and we reject it.
Even assuming the misstatement was an intentional misrepresentation, it does not rise
to the level of fraud on the court. See Weese v. Schukman, 98 F.3d 542, 552-53
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(10th Cir. 1996) (explaining that “nondisclosure to the court of facts allegedly
pertinent to the matter before it[] will not ordinarily rise to the level of fraud on the
court” (internal quotation marks and italics omitted)).10
Finally, we add that we see no issues or arguments in this appeal meriting
discussion other than those we have addressed.
B. Appeal No. 21-3169
This appeal concerns post-judgment filings (ECF Nos. 182, 184, 185) in which
Mr. Jaiyeola asked the district court to consider objections to the magistrate judge’s
order (ECF No. 161) granting Garmin an extension of time (until seven days after the
district court’s ruling on the show cause order) to file a response to his motion for a
scheduling order and denying his request to sanction Garmin and its counsel for
seeking the extension. In requesting sanctions (summary judgment in his favor and
appropriate sanctions against defense counsel), Mr. Jaiyeola had characterized
Garmin’s motion as frivolous and violative of Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.11 The district court
10
We note an additional, discrete assertion in Mr. Jaiyeola’s reply brief—that
of the fourteen separately listed issues in his opening brief, Garmin responded to only
one (dismissal of the case with prejudice) and has therefore abandoned the remaining
thirteen. We disagree. Any lack of briefing by Garmin does not require us to rule in
Mr. Jaiyeola’s favor. See Fed. R. App. P. 31(c) (stating that an appellee’s failure to
file a response brief results only in forfeiture of oral argument, but an appellant’s
failure to file an opening brief can result in dismissal of the appeal). Mr. Jaiyeola’s
reliance on Hamilton v. Southland Christian School, Inc., 680 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir.
2012), is misplaced, because its discussion of appellee waiver involved a failure to
assert an alternative basis for affirming a judgment, see id. at 1318, which is not the
case here.
11
Mr. Jaiyeola apparently relied on Rule 1 for its statement that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure “should be construed, administered, and employed by the
17
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denied the post-judgment filings without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, explaining
that Mr. Jaiyeola’s notice of appeal from the final judgment deprived the court of
jurisdiction over the case except for collateral matters not involved in the appeal.
The court found that the post-judgment motions were not limited to sanctions but
involved issues similar to those that Mr. Jaiyeola had raised multiple times before
and that had led to dismissal.
We review de novo whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.
Mires v. United States, 466 F.3d 1208, 1209 (10th Cir. 2006). Mr. Jaiyeola argues
that the district court retained jurisdiction to review the magistrate judge’s denial of
his request for sanctions because sanctions are a collateral matter. We disagree.
“[T]he general rule is that, when a litigant files a notice of appeal, the district
court loses jurisdiction over the case, save for collateral matters not involved in the
appeal.” McKissick v. Yuen, 618 F.3d 1177, 1196 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted). A sanction is typically a collateral matter. See Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 (1990). Here, however, the district court’s
dismissal involved the propriety of all of Mr. Jaiyeola’s requests to sanction Garmin
or its counsel. See R. (No. 21-3169), Vol. III at 202-03 (finding, in “final chance”
ruling, that Mr. Jaiyeola had “levied inappropriate misconduct allegations at
[Garmin’s] counsel, including in briefs, a motion for sanctions, and during
communications between the parties”). Thus, Mr. Jaiyeola’s request for sanctions
court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding.”
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relating to Garmin’s motion for an extension of time is intertwined with aspects of
appeal No. 21-3114. See Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 574 (10th Cir. 1990)
(“The filing of a notice of appeal . . . confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and
divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the
appeal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Mr. Jaiyeola contends the sanctions
issue is not related to that appeal because there he did not argue the district court
abused its discretion in finding that his motions and other requests for sanctions
against Garmin and its counsel supported dismissing his case as a sanction for his
abusive litigation habits. We reject this argument. Regardless of whether he
advanced that argument, the sanctions issue remains an “aspect[] of the case involved
in the appeal,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s order denying the post-judgment motions. We deny all other relief
Mr. Jaiyeola requests in his opening brief (sanctions on defense counsel; referral of
defense counsel to Kansas disciplinary authorities; disqualification of the magistrate
and district judges; appointment of a special master).
III. Conclusion
In appeal No. 21-3114, we affirm the district court’s judgment, and in appeal
No. 21-3169, we affirm the order denying Mr. Jaiyeola’s post-judgment motions.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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