Mays v. Colvin

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 8, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
REBECCA L. MAYS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 13-5068
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHEN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA.
(D.C. No. 4:10-CV-00506-FHM)
Submitted on the briefs:*
Richmond J. Brownson, Timothy M. White, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
Danny C. Williams, Sr., United States Attorney, Cathryn D. McClanahan, Assistant
United States Attorney, Michael McGaughran, Regional Chief Counsel, Region VI,
Dianne Mullins Pryor, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Social Security
Administration, Office of General Counsel, Region VI, Dallas, Texas, for
Defendant-Appellee.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.
BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.
Ms. Rebecca L. Mays appeals from a district court order affirming the Social
Security Administration’s denial of her application for disability benefits. We affirm.
I. Background
Ms. Mays applied for benefits, alleging a disability beginning in May 2004.
The assessment began at step one, with the administrative law judge finding
that Ms. Mays had not engaged in substantial gainful activity from the alleged onset
date to the date that her insurance coverage ended.
At step two of the sequential evaluation process, the administrative law judge
found a severe impairment of low back pain.
At step three, the ALJ found that the impairments did not meet or medically
equal the regulatory “listings,” whether alone or in combination.
In assessing the residual functional capacity at step four, the ALJ found a
residual functional capacity that allowed Ms. Mays to perform a full range of
sedentary work. In making this finding, the ALJ found that the opinion of Ms. Mays’
treating physician, Dr. Chorley, was not consistent with the objective medical
evidence. The ALJ also found at step four that Ms. Mays could not perform her past
relevant work.
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But the judge determined at step five that jobs existed in the national economy
that Ms. Mays could perform. Thus, the ALJ found that Ms. Mays was not disabled.
The Appeals Council denied her request for review, and the district court
affirmed the Social Security Administration’s decision.
II. The Claims
Ms. Mays raises two issues on appeal. First, she claims that the Social
Security Administration failed to provide a complete administrative record. Second,
she contends that the ALJ failed to properly analyze the medical source evidence.
III. The Standard of Review
“We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal
standards were applied.” Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1080 (10th Cir.
2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
IV. Claims Regarding the Incomplete Administrative Record
Ms. Mays’ first claim relates to Dr. Chorley’s assessment of residual
functional capacity. Dr. Chorley changed this assessment, but the new version was
mistakenly omitted in the eventual administrative record. Ms. Mays contends that
the omission entailed a denial of due process and left the eventual findings without
substantial evidence. We reject these contentions.
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A. The Error in the Administrative Record
During the hearing, Ms. Mays asked if she could submit a new version of the
doctor’s written report. Ms. Mays represented that the two reports were identical
with one exception. In the amended report, Dr. Chorley downgraded Ms. Mays’
ability to sit, stand, and walk.
On page 1 of his original report, Dr. Chorley had opined that Ms. Mays could:
● sit for 3 hours, stand for 2 hours, and walk for 1 hour at a time,
● sit or stand for a total of 3 hours, and
● walk for a total of 2 hours during an 8-hour work day.
In the amended report, Dr. Chorley stated that Ms. Mays could stand and walk for
10 to 30 minutes at a time; sit and stand for a total of 2 hours in an 8-hour work day;
and walk for a total of 1 hour.
The ALJ stated that page 1 of Dr. Chorley’s original report was withdrawn and
the amended page 1 was substituted in its place. The amended report was handed to
the vocational expert, who was asked to assume the limitations stated there. The
vocational expert testified that according to the amended report, Ms. Mays could
stand and walk for 10 to 30 minutes at a time; sit and stand for a total of 2 hours in an
8-hour work day; and walk for a total of 1 hour. The expert added that there would
be no competitive work available to a person with the physical abilities stated in
Dr. Chorley’s amended report.
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The amended page 1 of the report was not ultimately incorporated into the
administrative record. Thus, the record contains only the original version of
Dr. Chorley’s report.
B. The Due-Process Claim
Ms. Mays contends that the error in the administrative record resulted in a
deprivation of due process because the ALJ and the Appeals Council could not
review an exhibit missing from the record. Without the new page, the ALJ and
Appeals Council could review only the version of Dr. Chorley’s report that had been
withdrawn. Because the error was not prejudicial, we reject Ms. Mays’ due-process
claim.
1. The District Court’s Reasoning
The district court rejected Ms. Mays’ due-process claim, reasoning that the
information from the amended page 1 of Dr. Chorley’s report was in the record
through the vocational expert’s testimony. As we have noted, the vocational expert
recited the limitations from that page when he answered the ALJ’s questions. Based
on this exchange, the district court concluded that the ALJ had considered the
amended report.
We agree with the district court that: (1) Dr. Chorley’s amended report was
presented at the hearing and its contents appeared in the administrative record
through the vocational expert’s testimony, and (2) the ALJ considered the amended
report during the hearing. But these conclusions do not fully address Ms. Mays’
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current claims. She argues that in the eventual written decision, the ALJ relied on the
wrong evidence (the original version of Dr. Chorley’s report).
2. The Social Security Administration’s Argument
The Social Security Administration does not dispute Ms. Mays’ assertion that
the ALJ based his decision on Dr. Chorley’s original report. From that conclusion,
the agency argues that the original report was properly included in the administrative
record and that the doctor’s amended report was properly excluded. The agency
therefore contends that: (1) Ms. Mays is seeking a remand to submit new evidence,
and (2) we need not remand because Dr. Chorley’s amended report is immaterial.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (providing that new evidence must be material to justify a
remand); Cagle v. Califano, 638 F.2d 219, 221 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that a
remand is proper when the reviewing court concludes that the “decision might
reasonably have been different” had the new evidence been considered).
This reasoning, like the district court’s, does not fully address Ms. Mays’
current argument. Ms. Mays acknowledges that the record matches the ALJ’s
decision. But Ms. Mays contends that both are wrong because Dr. Chorley amended
his report and the ALJ purported to accept the amendment.
3. The Prejudice Inquiry
Though we reject the reasoning of the district court and the Social Security
Administration, we must decide whether the error in the record deprived Ms. Mays of
due process. We conclude that no due-process violation took place because
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Ms. Mays has not shown a likelihood of a different result if the ALJ had addressed
Dr. Chorley’s amended report. Consequently, the due-process claim must fail.1
“Social security hearings are subject to procedural due process
considerations.” Yount v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 1233, 1235 (10th Cir. 2005). A due
process claim will not succeed, however, if the claimant fails to show prejudice.
See Energy W. Mining Co. v. Oliver, 555 F.3d 1211, 1219 (10th Cir. 2009). Thus,
when “a party complains about the course of administrative proceedings, that party
must demonstrate that the adjudication was infected by some prejudicial,
fundamentally unfair element.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see Glass v.
Shalala, 43 F.3d 1392, 1396-97 (10th Cir. 1994) (requiring a showing of prejudice
for a due-process claim involving social-security proceedings).
Ms. Mays contends that Dr. Chorley’s amended report would be crucial on
remand because it corrected an internal inconsistency between pages 1 and 3 of the
doctor’s original report. On page 1 of the original report, Dr. Chorley opined that
Ms. Mays could sit for 3 hours, stand for 2 hours, and walk for 1 hour. But
Dr. Chorley added on page 3 that Ms. Mays was unable to maintain a position of
comfort for more than 10 minutes. See Aplt. App., Vol. 3, at 280, 282. Ms. Mays
asserts that Dr. Chorley’s amended report eliminated this inconsistency by reducing
1
We note that it is not clear how the amended version of Dr. Chorley’s report
came to be omitted from the administrative record. It appears that Ms. Mays was the
party responsible for ensuring that it was included. According to the hearing
transcript, she agreed to submit the replacement page electronically after the hearing.
The record does not disclose whether she did so.
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her abilities to stand and walk on page 1 to only 10 to 30 minutes at a time.
Therefore, she claims, the difference in the two versions is significant.
We disagree because the ALJ did not reject Dr. Chorley’s original report based
on an internal inconsistency. Rather, the ALJ concluded that the doctor’s opinion
was not supported by the objective medical evidence. The ALJ cited Dr. Chorley’s
narrative, which involved his opinion that Ms. Mays was 100% disabled until
surgical intervention. Dr. Chorley did not alter that assessment in his amended report
when he upgraded Ms. Mays’ limitations on page 1. Therefore, Ms. Mays fails to
show a likelihood of a different result if the ALJ had considered the doctor’s greater
restrictions in his amended report. Without such a showing, we do not regard the
error in the record as prejudicial. And without prejudice, we must reject the
due-process claim.
C. The Claim Involving a Lack of Substantial Evidence
Ms. Mays also argues that the mistake in the record left the decision without
substantial evidence. We disagree.
“We have defined ‘substantial evidence’ as more than a scintilla. It is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Glass v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1392, 1395 (10th Cir. 1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Ms. Mays asserts that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence because the record is incomplete. We reject this argument for the reasons
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discussed above with the due-process claim. The ALJ had substantial evidence to
reasonably reject Dr. Chorley’s conclusions, and the existence of that evidence is not
undermined by the technical failure to replace one of the pages in the administrative
record.
V. Claims Regarding the ALJ’s Evaluation of the Medical Source Evidence
Ms. Mays contends that the ALJ also failed to properly analyze the
medical-source evidence. These contentions focus primarily on the ALJ’s rejection
of Dr. Chorley’s opinion. We reject each of the contentions.
A. The Required Process for Evaluating a Treating Physician’s
Opinion
The ALJ must follow a specific process when weighing a treating physician’s
opinion:
An ALJ must first consider whether the opinion is well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. . . .
If the ALJ finds that the opinion is well-supported, he must then
confirm that the opinion is consistent with other substantial evidence in
the record.
Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “[I]f the opinion is deficient in either of these respects, then it is not
entitled to controlling weight.” Id. And if the ALJ does not assign controlling
weight to a treating physician’s opinion, it is still entitled to deference and subject to
weighing under the relevant factors. See id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (listing
the factors).
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B. The ALJ Properly Explained His Rejection of Dr. Chorley’s
Opinion and Had Substantial Evidence for the Findings
Dr. Chorley opined that Ms. Mays was 100% disabled until surgical
intervention. The ALJ rejected this opinion, concluding that this opinion was not
consistent with the objective medical evidence. Ms. Mays argues that the ALJ erred
by:
 failing to specify the weight assigned to Dr. Chorley’s opinion,
 relying on a 2006 MRI and a 2008 CT,
 disregarding evidence of retrolisthesis,
 referring to Ms. Mays’ comment about pain control through medication,
 failing to consider the regulatory factors,
 selectively referring to the evidence,
 using boilerplate language,
 relying on a consultative examiner’s opinion, and
 misconstruing the consultative examiner’s statements.
The ALJ pointed to two medical tests: (1) a 2006 MRI that “revealed only
central disc protrusion at L5-S1” that “indented the thecal sac but did not clearly
result in neural encroachment,” and (2) a 2008 CT of the lumbar spine that “revealed
minimal disk bulge without spinal or neural foraminal impingement.” Aplt. App.,
Vol. 2, at 16. The ALJ also cited the report of a consultative examiner, Dr. Nodine,
who concluded that Ms. Mays “should be able to function in a work environment
which would limit physical hardship.” Id. The ALJ noted that Ms. Mays had told
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Dr. Nodine that “her pain [did] not become severe if she stay[ed] on her medication.”
Id. The ALJ ultimately held that the medical evidence and Dr. Nodine’s opinion
were consistent with Ms. Mays’ ability to perform a full range of sedentary work.
1. Specification of the Weight Assigned to the Opinion
Ms. Mays argues that the ALJ did not expressly state whether he had given
Dr. Chorley’s opinion “controlling weight.” But the ALJ implicitly declined to give
the opinion controlling weight. Because we can tell from the decision that the ALJ
declined to give controlling weight to Dr. Chorley’s opinion, we will not reverse on
this ground. See Causey v. Barnhart, 109 F. App’x 375, 378 (10th Cir. 2004).2
2. Reliance on the 2006 MRI and 2008 CT
In rejecting Dr. Chorley’s opinions, the ALJ could reasonably rely on the 2006
MRI and the 2008 CT. Ms. Mays questions this reliance, arguing that “foraminal
narrowing and central canal stenosis are factors for consideration only in cases of
meeting or equaling Listing § 1.04.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 24. But she does not
explain the ALJ’s inability to draw inferences about physical capability from the
MRI and CT.
3. Evidence of Retrolisthesis
Ms. Mays also argues that the ALJ ignored the detection of retrolisthesis in the
2008 CT and in a 2004 MRI. For Ms. Mays, this evidence is significant because
Dr. Chorley referred to retrolisthesis in his opinion. But the ALJ did discuss the
2
Though Causey is unpublished, it is persuasive.
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2004 MRI, noting that it revealed “mild” retrolisthesis. Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 12;
see also id., Vol. 3 at 161. And Ms. Mays does not point to anything in the 2008 CT
report that would indicate a worsening of this condition.
4. Reference to Pain Control Through Medication
Along with the 2006 MRI and 2008 CT, the ALJ cited Ms. Mays’ statement to
a doctor that medication kept her pain from becoming severe. Ms. Mays complains
about this reference, arguing that she also said that she was taking strong medications
four or more times per day. She does not explain why this omission is significant
and we will not construct an argument for her. See Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388,
1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that “perfunctory complaints” failing “to frame and
develop an issue” are not “sufficient to invoke appellate review”); see also
Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 2012) (declining to consider
issues not adequately briefed for review).
5. Consideration of the Regulatory Factors
Ms. Mays argues that the ALJ failed to weigh Dr. Chorley’s opinion based on
the relevant factors in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. But the ALJ listed those factors, and
the record shows that the ALJ adequately considered them. He recognized that
Dr. Chorley is Ms. Mays’ treating physician and discussed the doctor’s treatment
records going back several years. See Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1082
(10th Cir. 2004) (noting that the relevant factors included the nature and extent of the
treatment relationship, the length of treatment, and the frequency of examination).
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The ALJ also considered whether Dr. Chorley’s opinion was consistent with the
medical evidence. See id. (listing consistency with the record as another factor).
A doctor’s relevant area of specialization is also pertinent. See id. In her
opening appeal brief, Ms. Mays contends that specialization is only important
because a neurosurgeon had recommended surgery. She does not point to any
opinion evidence from a neurosurgeon or explain why another physician’s area of
specialization is relevant to the ALJ’s analysis of Dr. Chorley’s opinion.3
See Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that the ALJ
need not expressly apply each factor in weighing a medical opinion).
Finally, the ALJ considered other factors, including Ms. Mays’ report that her
pain does not become severe if she takes her medication. See Robinson v. Barnhart,
366 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2004) (listing “other factors brought to the ALJ’s
attention”).
Ms. Mays has not shown that the ALJ failed to consider the relevant regulatory
factors.
6. Selective Review of the Evidence
She also contends that the ALJ improperly picked from the record when
assessing Dr. Chorley’s opinion.
3
In her reply brief, Ms. Mays contends that the ALJ should have recognized
that Dr. Chorley was board certified in family medicine. But we do not address this
argument because it was raised for the first time in the reply brief. See Stump v.
Gates, 211 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 2000).
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We have stated:
The record must demonstrate that the ALJ considered all of the
evidence, but an ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence.
Rather, in addition to discussing the evidence supporting his decision,
the ALJ also must discuss the uncontroverted evidence he chooses not
to rely upon, as well as significantly probative evidence he rejects.
Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
Ms. Mays points to evidence that she claims the ALJ failed to discuss, but for
the most part she does not say why it was significantly probative regarding
Dr. Chorley’s opinion. Again, we will not develop an argument for Ms. Mays.
See Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994).4
She does argue that the ALJ had to discuss evidence showing muscular
weakness in heel walking, foot drop, weak or absent toe muscle strength, positive
straight-leg raising tests, and asymmetrical deep tendon reflexes because these test
results were “of listing level importance.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 32. For this
proposition, she cites § 1.00E1 of the listings, which states that “[i]nability to walk
on the heels or toes, . . . when appropriate, may be considered evidence of significant
motor loss.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1, § 1.00E1. That section further
advises that spinal examinations should include detailed descriptions of certain tests
4
In a perfunctory manner, Ms. Mays contends that the ALJ’s determination
regarding Dr. Chorley’s opinion is not supported by substantial evidence. She asserts
that the evidence supporting the opinion overwhelms the evidence that the ALJ
actually discussed. But her contentions consist mostly of record citations without
further development.
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and observations, including straight-leg raising from the sitting and supine positions
and deep tendon reflexes.5
Ms. Mays does not challenge the ALJ’s determination that she lacks an
impairment meeting or equaling the listings. Instead, Ms. Mays suggests that
evidence regarding a listing test is always significantly probative. She does not cite
authority for this suggestion, and none exists in our court.
It is true that the listing tests reflected evidence of back pain. But, the ALJ
acknowledged at step two that Ms. Mays had low back pain. The ALJ simply
rejected Dr. Chorley’s conclusion that the pain was sufficiently severe to render
Ms. Mays disabled.
In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ could draw from the same test results
relied upon by Ms. Mays. For example, Dr. Chorley’s examination showed that
Ms. Mays’ heel walking was normal, her sitting straight-leg raising was negative, and
her deep tendon reflexes were symmetrical.6 See Aplt. App., Vol. 3, at 283.
5
Ms. Mays also notes that § 1.04A of the listings identifies a positive
straight-leg raising test as a factor weighing in favor of a disability finding.
See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1, § 1.04A (addressing spinal disorders).
Nonetheless, we have concluded in an unpublished decision that in itself, a positive
straight-leg raising test does not render a claimant unable to perform sedentary work.
Rhodes v. Barnhart, 117 F. App’x 622, 630 (10th Cir. 2004). This conclusion is
persuasive.
6
Dr. Chorley did report a positive supine straight-leg raising on one side. But
Ms. Mays acknowledges that the ALJ discussed other evidence of a positive
straight-leg raising test. With this acknowledgment, Ms. Mays does not explain why
the omitted evidence would have been significantly probative.
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The ALJ did not selectively pick from the record.
7. Use of Boilerplate Language
Ms. Mays argues that the ALJ relied on improper boilerplate when he rejected
Dr. Chorley’s opinion. The ALJ mentioned the possibility “that a doctor [could]
express an opinion in an effort to assist a patient with whom he or she sympathize[d]
for one reason or another” and that “patients [could] be quite insistent and demanding
in seeking supportive notes or reports from their physicians.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2, at
15. Ms. Mays contends that an ALJ cannot reject a medical opinion based solely on
an assumption that the treating physician is biased. See Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508,
515 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that the ALJ’s statement that a family doctor “naturally
advocates his patient’s cause” was insufficient to support rejection of a doctor’s
opinion (internal quotation marks omitted)). But the ALJ’s comments did not
constitute the sole basis for rejecting Dr. Chorley’s opinion and did not detract from
the ALJ’s further explanation.
8. Reliance on Dr. Nodine’s Opinion
The Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Nodine’s opinion. The
ALJ stated:
Dr. Nodine’s physical assessment on December 28, 2005, found no
inciting injury or distinctive pathology on exam. The claimant told
Dr. Nodine her pain does not become severe if she stays on her
medication. Dr. Nodine opined that claimant should be able to function
in a work environment which would limit physical hardship.
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Aplt. App., Vol. 2, at 16. Ms. Mays contends that the ALJ improperly relied on
Dr. Nodine’s opinion that there was not an “inciting injury” and that Dr. Nodine’s
opinion was internally inconsistent. These contentions are rejected.
Ms. Mays contends in part that Dr. Nodine’s finding of “no inciting injury” is
not supported by the record. For this contention, Ms. Mays insists that she has
regularly reported that she awoke in May 2004 with back pain one day after she had
been “brush-hogging” on a tractor. But Dr. Nodine’s comment must be read in
context. Dr. Nodine said that Ms. Mays had “denie[d] any injury,” and this statement
immediately followed her account of the cause of her back pain. Id., Vol. 3, at 176.
Thus, Dr. Nodine appeared to distinguish “injury” from the pain that Ms. Mays
experienced after engaging in physical activity. In any event, the ALJ twice noted
Ms. Mays’ assertion that her back pain was traceable to her brush-hogging activity,
and there is no indication that the ALJ disbelieved this explanation. See id., Vol. 2,
at 13.
The Plaintiff also argues that Dr. Nodine’s opinion is internally inconsistent
because the doctor stated that he did not see “distinctive pathology,” yet he reported
that Ms. Mays demonstrated a positive seated straight-leg raising test on one side,
painful range of motion of her spine, muscle spasms, and tenderness upon palpation,
all of which she claims are distinctive pathologies. But again, Ms. Mays does not
explain why Dr. Nodine’s examination findings are inconsistent with an ability to
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function in a work environment. See Brown v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 361, 362-63
(10th Cir. 1986).
According to the Plaintiff, the ALJ ignored Dr. Nodine’s statement that
Ms. Mays “would benefit from a radiographic workup to rule out anatomical
pathology and should avoid manual labor until this time.” Aplt. App., Vol. 3, at 178.
Ms. Mays interprets this statement as Dr. Nodine’s opinion that she “could not work
at all without further evaluation.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 29. It is Ms. Mays, however,
who misreads Dr. Nodine’s conclusion: Dr. Nodine stated only that Ms. Mays should
avoid manual labor until she underwent further tests.
C. The ALJ’s Alleged Failure to Discuss and Weigh the State Agency
Medical Consultants’ Opinions Would Constitute Harmless Error
Ms. Mays also argues that the ALJ failed to discuss agency medical
consultants’ opinions about her physical limitations. This argument is rejected.
“It is the ALJ’s duty to give consideration to all the medical opinions in the
record. He must also discuss the weight he assigns to such opinions,” including the
opinions of state agency medical consultants. Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d
1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). But the need for express analysis is
weakened “[w]hen the ALJ does not need to reject or weigh evidence unfavorably in
order to determine a claimant’s RFC.” Id. at 1162. And an ALJ’s failure to weigh a
medical opinion involves harmless error if there is no inconsistency between the
opinion and the ALJ’s assessment of residual functional capacity. See id. at 1162-63.
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In that case, the claimant is not prejudiced “because giving greater weight to [the
opinion] would not have helped her.” Id. at 1163.
For the sake of argument, we may assume that the ALJ failed to weigh the
state agency medical consultants’ opinions. Still, Ms. Mays does not identify any
resulting prejudice. She cites one consultant’s conclusions that she could only
occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. But she fails to explain
why these limitations would conflict with sedentary jobs, for “[p]ostural limitations
or restrictions related to such activities as climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds,
balancing, kneeling, crouching, or crawling would not usually erode the occupational
base for a full range of unskilled sedentary work significantly because those activities
are not usually required in sedentary work.” SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *7.
Social Security Ruling 83-10 states that “[b]y its very nature, work performed
primarily in a seated position entails no significant stooping.” SSR 83-10, 1983 WL
31251, at *5; see SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *7 (“If a person can stoop
occasionally . . . in order to lift objects, the sedentary and light occupational base is
virtually intact.”).
Similarly, crouching is rarely needed for sedentary work. See SSR 83-14,
1983 WL 31254, at *2 (noting that to perform substantially all of the exertional
requirements of most sedentary jobs, a person would not need to crouch); see also
Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 841 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that the ability to
crouch is not needed for substantially all sedentary and light jobs).
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Like limitations on crouching, limitations on crawling, kneeling, or balancing
would generally prove inconsequential on the ability to perform sedentary jobs. See
SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *7 (stating that an inability to kneel or crawl is “of
little significance in the broad world of work”); SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *7
(postural limitations on balancing would not erode the occupational base for a full
range of sedentary work).
As a result, the agency consultants’ opinions proved inconsequential when the
ALJ limited Ms. Mays to sedentary work. In these circumstances, the alleged failure
to discuss the consultants’ opinions would constitute harmless error.
VI. Disposition
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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