Shulman v. Lamphere (In Re Lamphere)

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 4, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
In re: LANNY ALLEN LAMPHERE,
Debtor.
_________________________
No. 10-6213
JACK SHULMAN; AMERICAN (D.C. No. 5:10-CV-00021-HE)
COMPUTER COMPANY, (W.D. Okla.)
Appellants,
v.
LANNY ALLEN LAMPHERE,
Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TYMKOVICH and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Jack Shulman and American Computer Company (collectively, “Shulman”)
appeal the bankruptcy court’s judgment in favor of debtor Lanny Allen Lamphere
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
in an adversary proceeding contesting the dischargeability of a New Jersey
judgment. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), we affirm.
Background
Shulman sued Lamphere in New Jersey for libel and defamation. Lamphere
initially appeared and defended himself, but his answer was suppressed and his
counterclaim was stricken because he did not participate in discovery. After he
failed to appear for trial, the New Jersey court entered a default judgment, finding
that he acted with malice as defined under New Jersey law and that Shulman was
entitled to $431,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.
Lamphere later filed a bankruptcy petition in the Western District of
Oklahoma. Relying on 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), which excepts from discharge a
debt “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the
property of another entity,” Shulman initiated an adversary proceeding to have the
New Jersey judgment declared nondischargeable. He asked the bankruptcy court
to give preclusive effect to the New Jersey court’s finding that Lamphere acted
with malice. The bankruptcy court held that, under New Jersey law, a default
judgment was not subject to collateral estoppel (issue preclusion). At trial, the
bankruptcy court further found that Shulman had not established the requirements
of § 523(a)(6). Accordingly, it entered judgment for Lamphere. On appeal, the
district court agreed with both decisions. Shulman now appeals to this court.
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Analysis
Shulman raises only one issue before this court: whether the bankruptcy
court erred in declining to apply collateral estoppel to the New Jersey default
judgment. 1 “Our review of the bankruptcy court’s decision is governed by the
same standards of review that govern the district court’s review of the bankruptcy
court.” Sovereign Bank v. Hepner (In re Roser), 613 F.3d 1240, 1243 (10th Cir.
2010) (quotation omitted). “Because this case presents no disputed factual issues
but only matters of law, our review is de novo.” Id.“The preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a subsequent federal
lawsuit generally is determined by the full faith and credit statute, [28 U.S.C.
§ 1738].” Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380
(1985). “This statute directs a federal court to refer to the preclusion law of the
State in which judgment was rendered.” Id. Of New Jersey’s five requirements
for collateral estoppel, the only element relevant to this case is the second: that
“the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding.” First Union Nat’l Bank
v. Penn Salem Marina, Inc., 921 A.2d 417, 423-24 (N.J. 2007).
Under New Jersey law, the entry of a default judgment generally means that
the underlying issues were not actually litigated and determined, and thus the
1
Shulman’s opening brief does not appear to contest the bankruptcy court’s
conclusion, at trial, that the evidence did not satisfy § 523(a)(6). To the extent
Shulman intended to assert any such arguments, they are waived by inadequate
briefing. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir. 1998).
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“actually litigated” element is not satisfied. See Slowinski v. Valley Nat’l Bank,
624 A.2d 85, 91 (N.J. Super.Ct.App.Div.1993); Maglificio Allesandra v. Gross,
453 A.2d 904, 910 (N.J. Super.Ct.App.Div.1982); see also In re McMillan,
579 F.2d 289, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1978); Mattson v. Hawkins (In re Hawkins),
231 B.R. 222, 231-32 (D. N.J. 1999). Shulman points to a recent New Jersey
Supreme Court decision as authority that under some circumstances, New Jersey
will consider the issue litigated even when the first case resulted in a default
judgment. See First Union Nat’l Bank, 921 A.2d at 425. But First Union
National Bank’s determination regarding the actual litigation factor rested, in
large part, on the fact that it was the defendants who sought to apply preclusion in
the second action. “When defendants do not claim prejudice as a result of a
default judgment, there is no justification to give weight to that factor.” Id.
Here, it is not Lamphere who seeks the advantage of preclusion, but Shulman.
Shulman also argues that this case does not involve a default entered in the
complete absence of the defendant. Instead, Lamphere filed an answer and
counterclaims in the New Jersey proceeding and participated in the action until
the discovery phase. But the New Jersey appellate court has refused to apply
collateral estoppel to a default judgment obtained where a party initially
participated in the proceedings. See Maglificio Allesandra, 453 A.2d at 906-07,
910. And the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey recently rejected
collateral estoppel under circumstances analogous to this case. See Grumbine v.
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Azeglio (In re Azeglio), 422 B.R. 490 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2010). Stating that
“New Jersey courts . . . agree that collateral estoppel may not be applied in the
case of a default judgment,” that court continued, “[w]hat is not so clear is how
the New Jersey Supreme Court might rule on the applicability of collateral
estoppel” where a defendant actively participated in pretrial activity but failed to
appear at trial due to lack of notice. Id. at 494-95.
A review of New Jersey Supreme Court and Superior Court,
Appellate Division, issue preclusion cases suggests that the New
Jersey Supreme Court is unlikely to afford preclusive effect to a state
court judgment where the defendant participated in pretrial
proceedings but did not have notice of and did not appear for the
trial. These cases apply collateral estoppel only when the defendant
in the initial action had the opportunity to fully and actively
participate in the actual trial, and the manner in which the trial was
conducted merited a bar to relitigation of the issues determined.
Id. at 495.
We recognize that Lamphere had notice of the state trial and chose not to
appear. Given New Jersey’s general rule and the lack of New Jersey authority to
the contrary, however, we conclude that the New Jersey Supreme Court would be
unlikely to apply collateral estoppel simply because Lamphere initially
participated in the suit. This determination is reinforced by the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments, which New Jersey follows, see Maglificio Allesandra,
453 A.2d at 909. “In the case of a judgment entered by . . . default, none of the
issues is actually litigated. Therefore, the rule of this Section does not apply with
respect to any issue in a subsequent action.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments,
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§ 27 cmt. e (1982). The Restatement urges a uniform application of the
preclusion rules:
It is true that it is sometimes difficult to determine whether an
issue was actually litigated; even if it was not litigated, the party’s
reasons for not litigating in the prior action may be such that
preclusion would be appropriate. But the policy considerations . . .
weigh strongly in favor of nonpreclusion, and it is in the interest of
predictability and simplicity for such a result to obtain uniformly.
Id. Moreover, by all indications, Lamphere simply stopped participating in the
New Jersey action, which distinguishes this case from other circumstances which
may justify applying collateral estoppel to a default judgment. Cf. Melnor, Inc. v.
Corey (In re Corey), 583 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 2009) (applying collateral
estoppel to a federal default judgment where “[t]he default was not entered
because of [debtor’s] failure to contest the issue but rather because his efforts in
contesting it were abusive”), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1739 (2010).
Conclusion
Because the bankruptcy court did not err in declining to apply collateral
estoppel, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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