Lane v. Lane

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 10, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ROBERT M. LANE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 15-8092
(D.C. No. 2:15-CV-00061-ABJ)
DR. VIKKI L. LANE; MR. BRUCE (D. Wyo.)
GLESBY; MS. MARISA BEUOY;
GRIFFITH & THORNBURGH, LLP,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Proceeding pro se, Robert Lane appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
claims for lack of standing. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I
After Vikki and Robert Lane reached a divorce settlement, Robert1 filed for
bankruptcy. As part of the bankruptcy proceedings, the bankruptcy trustee (the
“Trustee”) initiated three adversary proceedings to recover assets that Robert had
conveyed to affiliated trusts, shell companies, and family members. Eventually,
Robert and the Trustee reached a global settlement resulting in the dismissal of the
three adversary proceedings. The settlement provided that Robert and his affiliates
would turn over all estate property, with certain exceptions, for disposition by the
Trustee. Robert also agreed that following execution of the agreement, he
shall not have any standing to object, join, or otherwise be heard on any
matter or proceeding in any pending or future matter in connection with
administering [his] Bankruptcy Case; this shall include, but not be
limited to, approval of settlements, sale of assets, allowance or payment
of administrative expenses, and allowance or payment of claims.
He also agreed that he “shall not have standing or any right to pursue pre-petition
claims or causes of action against any third-party or against any creditor in [his]
bankruptcy case.” However, Robert later interfered with the Trustee’s ability to
administer the estate by filing various documents in the bankruptcy court and
otherwise failed to satisfy his own obligations under the agreement. Accordingly, the
bankruptcy court sanctioned him twice for interfering with the Trustee’s ability to
administer the estate and for failing to satisfy his own obligations.
1
Because Vikki and Robert Lane share the same last name, we refer to them
by their first names in this order.
2
In 2012, Vikki filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding for
$1,163,894, and, in April 2015, the Trustee filed a settlement agreement in the
bankruptcy court to resolve her claim. In response, Robert filed this action in the
District of Wyoming against Vikki and her attorneys. Although his complaint seeks
damages for false statements and fraud, each claim he advances constitutes a
challenge to the resolution of Vikki’s proof of claim. Specifically, he alleges fraud
because the defendants: (1) filed a “false claim”; (2) asserted that their proof of
claim is for child support when in actuality it includes legal fees and other items; (3)
claimed a 10% interest rate, rather than the 7% rate he argues is permitted by the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court; (4) asked for penalties for past due child support even though
California waives penalties for unemployed individuals; (5) claimed a spousal
support buyout “when there was none”; (6) failed to properly account for certain
payments; (7) requested legal fees that the court had not awarded and that were
contrary to a prenuptial agreement; and (8) conspired to make false statements in an
attempt to obtain bankruptcy assets. He also alleges that attorney-defendants’ law
firm failed to properly supervise them by allowing them to participate in the alleged
fraud. In his complaint, Robert acknowledges that he only pursued this action in the
district court because “[a]lthough this matter would normally be a bankruptcy court
proceeding, Robert’s lack of standing in the bankruptcy court requires this matter to
be brought in U.S. District Court.”
The defendants moved to dismiss Robert’s complaint. While the motion was
pending, the bankruptcy court approved the proposed settlement between Vikki and
3
the Trustee allowing her to claim $895,015. The defendants filed a supplemental
memorandum, asserting that the settlement rendered the district court proceeding
moot, and advancing a res judicata defense. The district court granted the motion to
dismiss, concluding that Robert did not have standing because he waived standing in
the global settlement agreement, and even if he had not waived the issue, the claims
he asserted rightfully belong to the Trustee. The district court order did not discuss
mootness or res judicata. This appeal followed.
II
The district court determined it did not have subject matter jurisdiction
because Robert lacked standing.2 We review the district court’s determination
regarding subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Niemi v. Lasshofer, 770 F.3d 1331,
1344 (10th Cir. 2014). As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, Robert bears the
burden of establishing standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992). To meet his burden, he must show an “injury in fact.” Clapper v. Amnesty
Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013). And “each element must be supported in
2
The district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing. In the
bankruptcy context, we often apply a prudential standing requirement that “is more
stringent . . . than the case or controversy standing requirement of Article III.” In re
C.W. Mining Co., 636 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.5 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted).
Under Article III, a cognizable injury “need not be financial and need only be fairly
traceable to the alleged illegal action.” In re Alpex Comput. Corp., 71 F.3d 353, 357
n.6 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). In contrast, in the bankruptcy context an
appellant must be a “person aggrieved” to have prudential standing, as discussed
infra. Id. However, the distinction is immaterial in the matter before us: the only
injury Robert advances is a financial injury that would allegedly result from payment
of Vikki’s claim. Thus, if Robert’s alleged injury is insufficient to show standing
under the prudential “person aggrieved” standard, see infra, he also fails to show
standing under the jurisdictional Article III standard.
4
the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof,
i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the
litigation.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. At the pleading stage, “[t]hreadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
We agree with the district court that Robert lacks standing.3 Each of his
claims alleges that Vikki’s claim on the bankruptcy estate was fraudulent in some
way. Claims of fraud against a bankruptcy estate “are statutory causes of action
belonging to the trustee, not to the bankrupt, and the trustee asserts them for the
benefit of the bankrupt’s creditors, whose rights the trustee enforces.” Allegaert v.
Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 1977). The debtor is not injured by such alleged
fraud because, “[u]nless the estate is solvent and excess will eventually go to the
debtor, or unless the matter involves rights unique to the debtor, the debtor is not a
party aggrieved by orders affecting the administration of the bankruptcy estate.” In
re Weston, 18 F.3d 860, 863-64 (10th Cir. 1994). Robert’s argument to the contrary
3
Even if Robert demonstrated standing, his complaint amounts to an attempt
to circumvent the bankruptcy court proceedings. “It is for the court of first instance
to determine the question of the validity of the law, and until its decision is reversed
for error by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court, its orders based on
its decision are to be respected.” Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 313
(1995) (quotation omitted). Thus, if Robert believes the decisions of the bankruptcy
court are improper, the proper venues to challenge those decisions are the bankruptcy
court and a federal district court or a bankruptcy appellate panel through a direct
appeal. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 158. Robert instead agreed not to object in the
bankruptcy proceedings. His attempt to collaterally attack those proceedings “cannot
be permitted . . . without seriously undercutting the orderly process of law.” Celotex,
514 U.S. at 313.
5
rests on his bare conclusory assertions that if Vikki’s claim was not paid, the money
would “otherwise be his.”4 These conclusory statements are not sufficient to
demonstrate an injury to support standing to challenge the administration of the
bankruptcy estate.5
III
The district court’s dismissal for lack of standing is AFFIRMED. Robert’s
motion to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
4
In contrast to these bare assertions is Robert’s own concession that he lacks
standing in the bankruptcy proceedings. In particular, he agreed that he “shall not
have any standing to object, join, or otherwise be heard on any matter or proceeding
in any pending or future matter in connection with administering [his] Bankruptcy
Case; this shall include . . . approval of settlements . . . and allowance or payment of
claims.” We reject Robert’s contention that his complaint does not concern the
bankruptcy court’s approval of settlements and allowance or payment of claims. To
the contrary, the claims brought in this action fall squarely within the scope of his
concession in the settlement agreement. Our holding finds support in—but does not
depend on—this concession.
5
Robert also argues that the district court abused its discretion by entertaining
the defendant’s supplemental memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss
without allowing Robert to file a reply. Robert does not convincingly argue that
accepting a supplemental memorandum, without more, amounts to an abuse of discretion.
See United States v. Nicholson, 983 F.2d 983, 988 (10th Cir. 1993) (“District courts
generally are afforded great discretion regarding trial procedure applications
(including control of the docket and parties), and their decisions are reviewed only
for abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted)).
6