Spraggs v. Sun Oil Company

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 16 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
RALPH SPRAGGS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-5194
(D.C. No. 96-CV-275)
SUN OIL COMPANY, a corporation (N.D. Okla.)
in the State of Delaware,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , BRISCOE , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Ralph Spraggs appeals from a district court order granting
summary judgment in favor of defendant Sun Oil Company (Sun Oil) in this
employment discrimination action under the Americans With Disabilities Act
(ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq ., and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. On de novo review, see Siemon v. AT&T
Corp. , 117 F.3d 1173, 1175 (10th Cir. 1997), we affirm, though in one respect for
a different reason than that stated by the district court, see Stat-Tech Int’l Corp. v.
Delutes (In re Stat-Tech Int’l Corp.) , 47 F.3d 1054, 1057 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e
are free to affirm a grant of summary judgment on grounds different than those
used by the district court if the record is sufficient to support such ground.”).
Plaintiff was a longtime employee of Sun Oil, performing various tasks
over the years. In 1988, he became the locksmith at Sun Oil’s Tulsa Oklahoma
refinery. In this capacity, he repaired and built “Best Locks” and other file and
cabinet locks, worked on radios, security cards, lockout/tagout systems, security
and safety orientation, and video production, and served on the fire brigade.
In 1992, Sun Oil began a reorganization. By the end of 1993, over a
hundred employees had been dismissed and a third of the refinery shut down.
Because of these measures, Sun Oil’s manager of health, safety and security
believed there would be fewer locks and radios to maintain. In addition, Sun Oil
decided to partially adopt use of a different type of lock for the lockout/tagout
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system, expected to result in less locksmith work as well. Sun Oil decided to
redistribute plaintiff’s duties among other employees and, in November 1993,
reassigned him to a job at its Lube Service Center Warehouse on the “pick line,” a
night shift position for less pay. The new job required him to lift and move
pallets to provide products for Sun Oil’s customers. In late December 1993, he
was injured while moving a pallet. As a result, he went on short term disability
leave from January 24 until mid-August 1994. In the interim, he had surgery on
his neck to repair the injury.
On August 1, 1994, plaintiff was released by his surgeon, Dr. Letcher, to
full-time, unrestricted activity. A week later, however, Sun Oil’s physician, Dr.
Campbell, signed a return to work slip imposing restrictions of no climbing, no
lifting over fifteen to twenty pounds, limited neck extension, and the ability to
alternate sitting and standing. On August 15, 1994, plaintiff returned to work at
the Lube Service Center as a spout packer, but ceased working due to pain within
three days. At that time, Dr. Campbell indicated he would not be released to
work until further notice.
On December 8, 1994, Dr. Campbell released plaintiff to work with a
twenty-five pound limit on lifting, pushing and pulling, no ladder climbing, and
use of stairs with handrails and walkways only. These restrictions were expected
to remain in effect for three months. Plaintiff returned to the Lube Service Center
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as a barrel filler. In mid-March 1995, Dr. Campbell continued the prior work
restrictions and, two weeks later, plaintiff went back on disability leave.
Finally, on October 23, 1995, Dr. Campbell again released plaintiff to
work, this time limiting him to work “he can do that he has complete control
[over] and does not require any bending or lifting and he can take breaks when
needed.” Absent such a job, Dr. Campbell granted medium term disability.
Plaintiff never returned to work. He was terminated in July of 1996, pursuant to
company leave policy, because he did not qualify for long term disability.
ADA Claim
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, plaintiff
had to show (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) he is qualified,
i.e., able to perform, with or without reasonable accommodation (which he must
describe), the essential functions of the job, and (3) his employer terminated him
due to the disability. See Pack v. Kmart Corp , 166 F.3d 1300, 1303 (10th Cir.
1999). The district court granted summary judgment for Sun Oil, because, it held,
plaintiff had not demonstrated a triable issue as to the existence of any disability
and, therefore, had failed to establish the first prong of a prima facie case.
For present purposes, the term “disability” denotes a physical impairment
substantially limiting one or more major life activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)
(defining “disability”). “Major life activities” include basic functions such as
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seeing, hearing, sitting, standing, walking, lifting, and reaching, as well as the
broader activity of working. See Pack , 166 F.3d at 1304. Indeed, the former are
clearly differentiated from the latter in sequence and substance of analysis. See
Davoll v. Webb , 194 F.3d 1116, 1135 & n.12 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting functional
activities are analyzed first, and if no substantial limitation is found as to these,
inquiry proceeds to work limitations, which implicate an additional set of factors
to be considered).
Plaintiff does not claim he is disabled with respect to work, but in his basic
abilities to lift, stoop, bend, and stand in one place for an extended period. To
demonstrate a substantial limitation regarding such activities, he must show he is
either unable to perform them or is “significantly restricted as to the condition,
manner, or duration under which [he] can perform [them] as compared to the
condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general
population can perform [them].” Pack , 166 F.3d at 1305 (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(j)(1)). Three factors inform this assessment: “(1) the nature and severity
of the impairment; (2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
(3) the permanent long term impact, or the expected long term impact of or
resulting from the impairment” Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)). These must
be considered on an individualized, case-by-case basis. See id. at 1304.
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The district court did not assess plaintiff’s alleged disability in accordance
with the above authorities. Instead, it focused on plaintiff’s ability to work,
concluding that he was not disabled “because his impairment does not prevent
him from performing a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.”
District Court Order at 15-18 (applying regulations and case law addressing work
limitations). In keeping with the sequential analysis explained in Davoll , 194
F.3d 1135 & n.12, if plaintiff demonstrated a substantial limitation on a major life
activity of the functional sort he asserted, it would have been error for the district
court to reject his ADA claim on the basis of factors relevant only to work
impairments. See Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc. , 87 F.3d 1170, 1173-74
(10th Cir. 1996) (reversing summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff had
shown genuine issue of material fact regarding substantial limitation on major life
activity of lifting, and noting it was “unnecessary to consider the additional
factors [for work limitations] relied upon by the district court [to deny existence
of disability]”).
We need not decide whether plaintiff’s functional impairments constitute a
disability, however, as there is another dispositive deficiency in his ADA claim,
regarding accommodation, which has been addressed by the parties and is
conclusively established on our record. Plaintiff contends Sun Oil should have
accommodated his impairments by (1) reassigning him back to his position as
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locksmith, (2) modifying his job at the Lube Service Center to enable him to work
there, or (3) reassigning him to another, vacant position. Because, as explained
below, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a triable issue as to whether any of
these options were possible or required, the entry of summary judgment for Sun
Oil was proper. See White v. York Int’l Corp. , 45 F.3d 357, 361-63 (10th Cir.
1995).
Plaintiff’s first suggested accommodation, involving a return to a position
which no longer exists and to duties which other employees now perform, clearly
fails as a matter of law. Reassignment may be a required accommodation under
the ADA. Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. , 180 F.3d 1154, 1167 (10th Cir. 1999).
However, “[i]t is not reasonable to require an employer to create a new job for the
purpose of reassigning an employee” and, thus, “[r]eassignment is limited to
existing jobs within the company.” Id. at 1174 (emphasis added); see Terrell v.
USAir , 132 F.3d 621, 626 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding employer cannot be required
to re-create position that no longer exists). Further, “it is not reasonable to
require an employer to bump another employee in order to reassign a disabled
employee” and, thus, the obligation to reassign can apply only to duties of “a
vacant position.” Smith , 180 F.3d at 1174-75 (emphasis added).
The second suggested accommodation, which plaintiff mentions only in
passing, relates to modification of his duties at the Lube Service Center. This
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argument, if indeed it is one, 1
fails for lack of substantiation. Plaintiff insists he
cannot perform such duties for a host of reasons, including his lifting and bending
limitations, inability to stand for extended periods, and need to control work pace.
See Opening Br. of Plaintiff-Appellant at 12-15, 23-24. Yet he states he might
have stayed at the Lube Service Center had Sun Oil “allow[ed] him to have more
assistance at work.” Id. at 27. This conclusory assertion--with no description of
the assistance involved, see Pack , 166 F.3d at 1304--cannot satisfy plaintiff’s
burden to show an effective accommodation was possible. See White , 45 F.3d at
362-63 (holding “bald conclusion” that plaintiff could perform job “with
reasonable accommodation” insufficient to defeat summary judgment); Jackan v.
New York State Dep’t of Labor , 205 F.3d 562, 566 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The burden of
persuasion on the existence of an effective accommodation is not satisfied with
mere speculation.” (quotations omitted)).
Finally, as for reassignment generally, “[t]o survive summary judgment,
Plaintiff must establish that he was qualified to preform an appropriate vacant job
which he must specifically identify and show was available within the company at
or about the time he requested reassignment.” Taylor v. Pepsi-Cola Co. , 196 F.3d
1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Smith , 180 F.3d at 1179). In this regard,
1
“Scattered statements” or “perfunctory complaints” may well “fail to frame
and develop an issue sufficient to invoke appellate review.” Murrell v. Shalala ,
43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994).
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plaintiff relies on the affidavit of former co-worker Buster Genson, who stated
there had been openings in the following positions: unit mechanic, maintenance
equipment operator, lab technician, and crude oil truck driver. However, the
affidavit of Sun Oil human resource manager Robert Schaefer stated these jobs all
entailed physical requirements precluded by plaintiff’s asserted limitations. With
respect to crude oil truck drivers--the only position for which plaintiff makes any
effort to argue his qualifications--Schaefer stated such drivers lift, carry and push
hoses and other items weighing in excess of twenty-five pounds, stoop, bend and
climb onto the top of tanks and trucks, and cannot set their own pace to perform
their duties. In opposition, plaintiff refers the court to his own affidavit, which
states it would be easy to set his own pace as a truck driver, but does not dispute
any of the other disqualifications noted by Mr. Schaefer. Hence, it remains
uncontroverted on our record that “[e]ach position required physical duties that
Plaintiff admits he was unable to perform,” and, therefore, summary judgment on
the ground that “reassignment to a vacant position was not a reasonable
accommodation” is proper. Id. at 1110-11.
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ADEA Claim
The district court fashioned a prima facie case model appropriate to this
somewhat unusual ADEA discriminatory reassignment/reduction-in-force context,
requiring plaintiff to “(1) prove that he was within the protected age group;
(2) prove that he was doing satisfactory work; (3) prove that adverse employment
action was taken against him; and (4) produce evidence from which a fact finder
might reasonably conclude Sun intended to discriminate in reaching the decision
to reassign Plaintiff’s former duties.” District Court Order at 20. See generally
Jones v. Denver Post Corp. , 203 F.3d 748, 753 (Feb. 10, 2000) (prima facie case
of discriminatory demotion where job from which plaintiff was demoted was not
eliminated); Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc. , 2000 WL 368522 at *4 (10th Cir. April
11, 2000) (prima facie case for discriminatory discharge in context of reduction in
force). The district court held plaintiff made this prima facie showing, which Sun
Oil does not dispute on appeal. The court went on to conclude, however, that Sun
Oil had demonstrated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for redistributing the
duties constituting the locksmith position, justifying plaintiff’s assignment to the
Lube Service Center, and that plaintiff had failed to raise a genuine issue of fact
as to whether this justification was pretextual. Accordingly, the court entered
summary judgment for Sun Oil on plaintiff’s ADEA claim. See Jones , 203 F.3d
at 753-54.
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The reasons articulated by Sun Oil for eliminating the locksmith job as
a separate position were its ongoing effort to downsize the workforce at the
refinery, its belief that the various duties performed by the locksmith could be
incorporated into the duties of other employees, and its intent to switch, at least
partially, the lock system used at the refinery. Indeed, these reasons were not just
articulated, but factually substantiated, by Sun Oil in its summary judgment
submission.
Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that these proffered reasons are
pretextual. See id. at 753. We agree with the district court that the arguments he
advances in this regard lack merit. We specifically note and reject his contention
that he was “replaced” by the younger individuals among whom his duties were
distributed, so as to give rise to an inference of age discrimination. The
locksmith position was eliminated based on the judgment that it was no longer
necessary; plaintiff was not replaced in that position: “[Plaintiff] disputes the
fact that his position was eliminated because his . . . responsibilities were still
performed after his [reassignment]. However, the test for position elimination is
not whether the responsibilities were still performed, but rather whether the
responsibilities still constituted a single, distinct position.” Furr v. Seagate
Technology, Inc. , 82 F.3d 980, 988 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Tinker v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co. , 127 F.3d 519, 522 (6th Cir. 1997) (“a person is not replaced
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when another current employee assumes [his] duties . . ., or where [his] work is
redistributed among employees already performing related tasks”).
In sum, the record reflects an employer’s legitimate business decision
regarding the elimination of a position. Plaintiff’s criticisms of that decision do
not render it unworthy of belief; at most they challenge the employer’s wisdom,
which is beyond our purview here. See Furr , 82 F.3d at 986 (“The ADEA is not a
vehicle for reviewing the propriety of business decisions.”). Accordingly, we
affirm the grant of summary judgment on plaintiff’s ADEA claim for substantially
the reasons stated by the district court. See Jones , 203 F.3d at 754.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Appellee’s motion to
strike portions of appellants’ appendix is denied.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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