Naiym Shahaab Talib v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

Case: 15-13462 Date Filed: 04/05/2017 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-13462
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-23019-UU
NAIYM SHAHAAB TALIB,
a.k.a. Lonnie James Walker,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(April 5, 2017)
Before HULL, WILSON and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 15-13462 Date Filed: 04/05/2017 Page: 2 of 7
Naiym Shahaab Talib was committed to the Florida Department of
Corrections (“FDOC”) in 1981 under the name Lonnie James Walker. While
incarcerated, he converted to Islam and in 1982 successfully petitioned a state
court to legally change his name to his current name. In 1993, Talib filed a suit
against the Secretary of the FDOC seeking to compel prison officials to recognize
his Islamic name. The district court entered an order in 2000 (“2000 Order”)
granting Talib a declaratory judgment holding that certain FDOC rules “as applied
to [Talib] violate [his] rights under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution to the extent that such policies and regulations prevent [Talib] from
the use of his Islamic name on his prison uniform and on all incoming and
outgoing mail.” 2000 Order at 3.1
In 2014, Talib, proceeding pro se, filed a new civil action in federal district
court. He primarily alleged that prison officials had prevented him from displaying
his Islamic name on his prison uniform or identification and continued to harass
him for using that name. In the complaint, he asked the district court to reopen his
earlier case and direct FDOC to comply with the 2000 Order. He also requested
that the district court compel the Secretary to allow him to display his Islamic
name first on his identification and award him declaratory relief and damages.
Additionally, Talib sought to hold his former attorney in contempt of court for
1
A copy of the 2000 Order can be found at pages 9-11 of the district court docket’s first
numbered entry.
2
Case: 15-13462 Date Filed: 04/05/2017 Page: 3 of 7
failing to ensure the Secretary’s compliance with the 2000 Order and for giving
him only $1,100 after promising him $6,000 to settle the earlier case.
The district court construed Talib’s complaint as a request for civil contempt
seeking to enforce the final judgment in the earlier case. It referred the matter to a
magistrate judge, who ordered the Secretary to show cause why the court should
not hold her in contempt for the violations that Talib alleged. The Secretary
responded that even assuming the truth of Talib’s allegations, she should not be
held in contempt because the 2000 Order granted only declaratory relief and
imposed no requirement to act.
The magistrate judge entered a supplemental show cause order noting that
the 2000 Order had granted Talib only declaratory relief, not injunctive relief,
because the entering court had presumed the defendants would comply with its
declaratory judgment and thus perceived no need for injunctive relief. The
magistrate judge directed the Secretary to explain in detail the steps she has taken
to comply with the 2000 Order. In response, the Secretary explained that the
policies declared unconstitutional were repealed and replaced in 2006 with new
policies that complied with the 2000 Order. She moved to terminate any
prospective relief the 2000 Order had granted Talib as no longer necessary to
correct the constitutional violation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a), (b) (establishing
3
Case: 15-13462 Date Filed: 04/05/2017 Page: 4 of 7
criteria for granting and terminating prospective relief in civil actions with respect
to prison conditions).
The magistrate judge concluded that the FDOC’s 2006 policies comply with
the 2000 Order and recommended that Talib’s claims for relief be denied and the
Secretary’s motion to terminate prospective relief be granted. The district court
adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, denied Talib’s request for civil
contempt and other relief, granted the Secretary’s motion to terminate prospective
relief, and ordered administrative closure of the case.
“This court reviews the grant or denial of a motion for civil contempt under
the abuse of discretion standard.” McGregor v. Chierico, 206 F.3d 1378, 1383
(11th Cir. 2000). “This standard requires the petitioner to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the respondent violated the court’s prior order.” Afro-
Am. Patrolmen’s League v. City of Atlanta, 817 F.2d 719, 723 (11th Cir. 1987).
“This clear and convincing proof must also demonstrate that 1) the allegedly
violated order was valid and lawful; 2) the order was clear, definite and
unambiguous; and 3) the alleged violator had the ability to comply with the order.”
McGregor, 206 F.3d at 1383.
When reviewing a district court’s order on a motion to terminate prospective
relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3626, we review a district court’s conclusions of law de
4
Case: 15-13462 Date Filed: 04/05/2017 Page: 5 of 7
novo and its findings of fact for clear error. Rowe v. Jones, 483 F.3d 791, 794 n.4
(11th Cir. 2007).
“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted
by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United
States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). These include pro se appellate
briefs. Harris v. United Auto. Ins. Group, Inc., 579 F.3d 1227, 1231 n.2 (11th Cir.
2009). However, “liberal construction is not the same thing as wholesale
redrafting.” Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266, 281 (11th Cir. 2013).
Talib’s complaint, even construed liberally, raised no meritorious claims for
relief. He sought to compel the Secretary to comply with the 2000 Order, but that
order declared unconstitutional as to Talib only policies that the Secretary has
since repealed. It did not speak to prison regulations currently in effect, which
allow inmates to display their legal religious names on their identification and
mail. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-603.101(b), (c). Because the policies the 2000
Order declared unconstitutional as to Talib are no longer in effect, they work no
violation of Talib’s constitutional rights. The district court thus did not err in
declining to enjoin the Secretary to comply with the 2000 Order or impose
contempt sanctions on her.2
2
The district court construed Talib’s complaint as seeking to hold the Secretary in
contempt, which relief it denied. We affirm on the alternative ground that Talib did not in fact
seek civil contempt sanctions against the Secretary. See Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506
5
Case: 15-13462 Date Filed: 04/05/2017 Page: 6 of 7
For essentially the same reasons, the district court correctly granted the
Secretary’s motion to terminate prospective relief. “Prospective relief in any civil
action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to
correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs,” and,
upon a party’s motion, “shall be terminable . . . [two] years after the date the court
granted or approved” it. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), (b)(1)(A)(i). Upon such
motion, “the court must determine whether such relief should be continued under
§ 3626(b)(3),” Cason v. Seckinger, 231 F.3d 777, 783 (11th Cir. 2000), which
provides that it
shall not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the
record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current
and ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and . . . is
narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3). Because Talib suffers no ongoing violation of his
constitutional rights, the district court properly granted the Secretary’s motion to
terminate prospective relief. 3
F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (“We may affirm the district court’s judgment on any ground
that appears in the record, whether or not that ground was relied upon or even considered by the
court below.”).
3
To the extent Talib sought to compel the Secretary to allow him to display his Islamic
name before his committed name on his inmate identification card, which the 2000 Order did not
require, he has shown no basis for relief. “A prison regulation, even though it infringes the
inmate’s constitutional rights, is an actionable constitutional violation only if the regulation is
unreasonable.” Hakim v. Hicks, 223 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2000). “[A] dual-name policy
always is sufficient to satisfy an inmate’s free exercise claim involving use of a religious name.”
6
Case: 15-13462 Date Filed: 04/05/2017 Page: 7 of 7
Finally, Talib’s request to hold his former attorney in contempt also fails.
He brought this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “only provides for claims to
redress State action.” Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347
(11th Cir. 2001). Because Talib has not alleged that his former attorney is a state
actor, § 1983 does not cognize his claim.
Because Talib stated no meritorious claim for relief and suffers no ongoing
violation of a constitutional right, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of his
complaint and termination of prospective relief.
AFFIRMED.
Id. at 1248. Because the policies currently in effect allow inmates to display both their religious
and committed names, Talib’s constitutional challenge fails. Although the district court did not
expressly consider this argument, our precedent forecloses it. See Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364.
7