United States v. Stephanie Lorraine Prendergast

Case: 15-13876 Date Filed: 08/31/2017 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-13876
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:15-cr-60052-BB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
STEPHANIE LORRAINE PRENDERGAST,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(August 31, 2017)
Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Stephanie Prendergast appeals her convictions for making a false claim of
United States citizenship with the intent to obtain a state benefit, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1015(e), and using or attempting to use a false, forged, counterfeited, or altered
passport, 18 U.S.C. § 1543. On appeal, Prendergast asserts that the district court
erred by denying her post-verdict motion for a new trial, arguing that the district
court improperly applied the materiality standard under Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), rather than the materiality standard under Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150 (1972). She contends that she was entitled to a new trial under
Giglio because the government withheld or suppressed the existence of a fake or
fraudulent passport with similar biographical information on it as the one involved
in her case, which, if it had been disclosed, would have shown that the testimony
of two witnesses was false.
We review the district court’s denial of a new trial motion asserting a Brady
or Giglio claim for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Vallejo, 297 F.3d
1154, 1163 (11th Cir. 2002). We review a district court’s factual findings for clear
error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Moya, 74 F.3d 1117, 1119
(11th Cir. 1996). And we may affirm for any reason supported by the record, even
if not relied upon by the district court. United States v. Al-Arian, 514 F.3d 1184,
1189 (11th Cir. 2008).
To prove a Brady violation, the defendant must establish that:
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(1) the government possessed favorable evidence to the defendant; (2)
the defendant does not possess the evidence and could not obtain the
evidence with any reasonable diligence; (3) the prosecution
suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) had the evidence been
disclosed to the defendant, there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome would have been different.
United States v. Stein, 846 F.3d 1135, 1146 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Vallejo, 297
F.3d at 1164). Giglio errors, which are a “species” of Brady errors, require the
defendant to establish that:
(1) the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony or failed to
correct what he subsequently learned was false testimony; and (2)
such use was material i.e., that there is any reasonable likelihood that
the false testimony could have affected the judgment.
Stein, 846 F.3d at 1147 (quoting Ford v. Hall, 546 F.3d 1326, 1331-32 (11th Cir.
2008)). Like Brady errors, new trials are not required whenever “a combing of the
prosecutors’ files after the trial has disclosed evidence possibly useful to the
defense but not likely to have changed the verdict[.]” Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154
(quoting United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1968)). Furthermore,
“the suggestion that a statement may have been false is simply insufficient; the
defendant must conclusively show that the statement was actually false.” Maharaj
v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 432 F.3d 1292, 1313 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Stein,
846 F.3d at 1150. But the Giglio materiality standard “is more defense-friendly
than Brady’s,” because Giglio requires a new trial unless the district court finds
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that the false testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Stein, 846 F.3d
at 1147.
No error occurred as to the district court’s choice of materiality standard
because Prendergast failed to establish the materiality prong under any relevant
standard. Prendergast also failed to establish that the government suppressed the
existence of the Suresh Benny case or any information related to the case because
it disclosed both Suresh Benny’s name and his offense’s potential relation to
Prendergast’s charged offense before trial. Lastly, Prendergast failed to establish
that Williams or Vila presented false testimony. Neither Williams nor Vila
suggested that they possessed any knowledge about what happened to
Prendergast’s passport after Williams gave it to her supervisor.
AFFIRMED.
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